Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

97. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1978, 9:45 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Carter-Gromyko Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
• The President
• Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
• Secretary Harold Brown
• Dr. Zbigniew
• Ambassador Warnke
• Ambassador Toon
• Mr. David Aaron
• Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
• Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter
• U.S.S.R.
• Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
• First Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
• Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
• Mr. V.G. Makarov
• Mr. V.G. Komplektov
• Mr. A.A. Bessmertnykh
• Mr. N.N. Detinov
• Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President first wanted to tell the Minister that he was glad to have him come back to Washington for this meeting. He was happy to note that relations between our two countries appeared to be rapidly improving. He believed that a matter of first priority for our two states was successful completion of the work on the SALT Agreement.² As far as we were concerned, this could be accomplished this morning. The President also wanted Gromyko to know that a comprehensive detente remained a major aim and keystone of our policy. We wanted our relations with the Soviet Union to be based on mutual respect and mutual advantage. There had been mention of competition as well as cooperation between us. The President wanted to put major emphasis on cooperation.³

The President noted that there were a number of differences between us which had resulted from competition. He proposed to mention them briefly.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, the ongoing MBFR negotiations in Vienna, U.S.-PRC negotiations, trade and science topics, the comprehensive test ban, and Africa.]

Overall Soviet-US Relations⁴

Gromyko had to tell the President quite frankly that over the recent period our relations had worsened. It was true, of course, that he did discern a somewhat more positive note in recent statements by the President’s representatives, in the President’s comments today and in some press articles, indicating that in⁵ the most recent period, during the past month perhaps, there had been somewhat of a turning point for the better. That might be so, but he had to say that he had not discerned anything truly substantive to indicate an improvement in our relations. The fact that our relations had become worse as compared to the past was known to the whole world, and this could not fail to concern and perplex the Soviet Union. He wanted to convey this to the President in all frankness. He had taken note of the President’s pronouncement, contained in his message to Brezhnev, where the President had used words to the effect that we should not try to place the blame for the worsening of relations between us, but should look ahead.⁶ This was quite understandable, but he would point out that the Soviet Union was not prepared to assume any blame for the worsening of relations and he wanted the President to know that.

Gromyko noted that in those matters where our respective views did not fully coincide, or did not coincide at all, affairs could be conducted in a number of different ways. These differences could be discussed without crossing a certain line, throwing back the relations between us.⁷ These relations had been laboriously built up between the Soviet Union and the United States and the process had not been easy. Quite the contrary, it had been an arduous and difficult road. On the one hand, relations between us could be conducted with the use of fine instruments, seeking ways to bridge gaps and to come to mutual understanding. On the other hand, one could also use an axe, raising and dropping it repeatedly to sever the threads that existed between us. Again, speaking quite frankly, he would point out that in his view the latter method was the one used by the United States quite frequently in the recent past. Of course, such a situation could not but have a negative impact on the delicate process called international detente. He would hope that in all assessments of each other’s policy neither side would fail to observe a certain sense of proportion and not go beyond a certain limit. As seen by many people, one or two statements by the leaders of one of our countries were quite enough to derail detente. Of course, it would not be much of a detente if that were really true. He regarded it as a process that goes much deeper, one that was based on the hearts and minds of literally hundreds of millions of people.⁸ He did believe that if one plotted detente as a curve on a graph, on the whole that curve was pointing upward. There were ups and downs, to be sure, but on the whole if one felt the pulse of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people all over the world, detente was on an upward track. It was a process that needed to be developed and was developing, but the greater the effort applied in that direction the better and stronger it would be. For its part, the Soviet Union was fully prepared to do all in its power to promote everything that furthered detente, and to preserve in our mutual relations everything that had been achieved in the past, and boldly go further.

Gromyko wanted to assure the President that in all its actions the Soviet Union was not trying to undercut relations between the United States and third countries so long as these relations were not directed against the Soviet Union. He and the Soviet leadership felt that conditions were now ripe for going ahead, improving and strengthening our relations.

Gromyko noted that in his statement today the President had not referred to one thought which he had repeatedly expressed in the past. Perhaps that was only an oversight, but it was an axiom of foreign policy that the nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States to an enormous extent determined the general world situation, the state of detente, the state of East-West relations and the international atmosphere as a whole. That was indisputable, and it was an idea the President had put forward in the past and, with which the Soviet Union agreed wholeheartedly.⁹

The President wanted to repeat that, as he had said earlier, good relations with the Soviet Union were a keystone of our foreign policy.

Gromyko said that was one aspect of the matter, the other being that these relations determined the general situation throughout the world. That was not necessarily to everyone’s liking and he was aware of the many epithets being directed at each of us, but particularly at the Soviet Union, referring to superpowers, to attempts at exercising hegemony, etc.¹⁰ He felt that neither of our countries were to blame in that respect, for neither we nor they had elected ourselves as superpowers.¹¹ That had resulted from an objective process of historical development.¹²

Gromyko wanted to speak briefly on some specific aspects the President had touched upon.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, MFBR negotiations, China, trade issues, Africa, comprehensive test ban, and SALT.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/20–25/78. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Drafted by Krimer. For the discussion of SALT at this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 218.
2. In his weekly report, September 29, Brzezinski suggested that it would be helpful for Carter to stress to Gromyko several points made previously: “that we desire to improve the relationship, that it is our determination to seek SALT, but that the overall status of the US-Soviet relationship is not immune to events in key parts of the world. In this connection, we are concerned about Cuban/Soviet behavior in Africa and Soviet attacks on the Camp David Accords.” The President underlined “improve the relationship,” “seek SALT,” “not immune,” “Africa,” and “Camp David Accords.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7–9/78)
3. In the September 29 weekly report (see footnote 2 above), Brzezinski made the following point: “In brief, I think it is important to use the meeting with Gromyko also to communicate a broader message: that as you said at Annapolis, détente should be genuinely comprehensive and reciprocal. Otherwise, I am quite convinced that the US-Soviet relationship will again deteriorate, and this will certainly complicate attainment of such otherwise desirable objectives as SALT. If he does not get this message clearly from you, he certainly will not get it clearly from anyone else.” In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President drew a mark pointing toward the first sentence.
4. Krimer added the title of this section by hand.
5. Krimer added this preposition by hand.
6. Presumable reference is to the President’s September 2 letter to Brezhnev. In it, the President commented: “I am distressed, as I know you are, that relations between our two countries have not developed well. We would each have our own explanation of why this has been the case, but I do not believe it would be useful to repeat familiar arguments about who or what is to blame.” The President’s letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 142.
7. The sentence originally began with “These.” Krimer deleted it and capitalized “differences.”
8. Krimer substituted “détente” for “it.”
9. Krimer deleted the comma following the second “and” in this sentence and substituted “one.”
10. Krimer deleted the comma following “and,” inserted “the” before “many,” substituted “us” for “them,” and added a comma following “us.”
11. Krimer changed “were” to “was” and substituted “of us” for “we nor they.”
12. Krimer substituted “the” for “an.”