Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

91. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 7, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #66

1. Opinion: Choices

In four key policy areas—China, the Middle East, Africa, and the Soviet Union—we are at the point where some basic choices need to be made. If we do not make them explicitly and consciously, we are likely to find it more difficult to attain our key objectives.

Let me state them very concisely:

A. China

We have embarked on a course that could have very great international consequences. U.S.-Chinese normalization could open the doors to a political-economic relationship with one-fourth of mankind. It could alter the international balance. Success here would be a very major and historic accomplishment for you.

However, in seeking it, we should avoid actions that convey to the Chinese insensitivity to their concerns. The issue of Vietnam is very germane here. The Chinese see Vietnam as veering towards the Soviets, and they are genuinely alarmed and outraged. A Soviet presence in Vietnam would provide the Soviets with a strategic springboard, as threatening to China’s security as are the Soviet forces now in Mongolia.

The Vietnamese, probably encouraged by the Soviets, are now making noises about U.S.-Vietnamese normalization. The State Department said yesterday, “Our policy is clear. We are prepared to normalize relations.”²

This willingness comes at the wrong time and in the wrong context. It will reinforce Chinese concerns, and thus needlessly complicate the more important task—normalizing with Peking. You need to choose: Vietnam or China, and China is incomparably more important to us.

If you agree, you might wish to have me send a note to the State Department, asking that efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam be postponed until the other issue is resolved.

B. The Middle East

We are nearing a very crucial point: once the U.S. “suggestions” are submitted, we will have no choice but to push with all our resources to obtain a settlement. Without such a settlement it is likely that the situation in the Middle East will deteriorate greatly.

The alternative, which the Vice President recommends, is to adopt a less assertive strategy, playing for time and limiting damage to our relations with Israel and with the Jewish community. This course would produce less controversy, and it will be less politically risky. It will also, however, perpetuate the Middle Eastern problem, and thus pose some dangers to Sadat himself.

If you choose to go ahead, you will face an unavoidable confrontation. Are we ready for it? Do you have the resources to prevail? What specifically can we do to make certain that rejection of our “suggestions” is too costly for the parties concerned? Cy and I are developing some thoughts for you, but only you can decide whether we are prepared for a major confrontation—without which no settlement seems possible—later this summer and probably throughout much of the fall.

However, if you do decide to cut the Gordian Knot, a sustained time-commitment by Cy will be needed. The Middle East issue cannot be handled on a part-time basis. Either he will have to give it a major portion of his time over the next several months, or you should appoint a top-flight negotiator (but one loyal to you and one whose success will be your success).³ This challenge will not be overcome on a part-time basis, and endless exercises in drawing up draft declarations are no substitute for direct political negotiations, with someone holding noses to the grindstone.

C. The Soviet Union

Here we confront three basic choices: (a) the scope of what we negotiate and seek to ratify; (b) the human rights issue; (c) rules of detente and the Soviet involvement in Africa.

We should not tie the three issues together, but we should be consistent and firm on each.

On negotiations, the key issue which you ought to review is whether the chances for SALT would be increased or decreased if SALT is coupled with CTB. On the basis of the last two weeks’ discussions, I believe that you will have a unified administration behind you on SALT, and a disunited or disingenuous one on CTB. Moreover, I fear that opposition to SALT would be reinforced, and not diluted, by opposition to CTB. Thus the more effective sequence might be SALT signing, then China, then SALT ratification, and then CTB.

However, this entails a political judgment on which you might prefer to consult with the Vice President and Ham.⁴ In the meantime, we are proceeding energetically on both SALT and CTB.

On human rights, the Soviet rejection of our Shcharanskiy overture (and we should now let the word out to the Jewish community that we tried),⁵ the other trials, and the insulting Pravda postcard campaign directed at you (see below Facts)⁶ indicate that the Soviets have concluded that they can safely ignore our earlier protestations. I think the time is ripe for a strong statement of condemnation of the Soviets—and let the Soviets link this to SALT if they choose. (I do not understand the argument that we must not link anything to SALT, but that we must also not do some things—on human rights, China, Africa, etc.—because the Soviets might link that to SALT.)⁷ Your credibility on human rights is now at stake, and Cy should tell Gromyko in no uncertain terms that your Administration intends to speak up.⁸ Moreover, it would be good if State was instructed to do so—because if you alone do so the newspapers will be full of stories, attributed to State Department officials, critical of your position on human rights.

On detente and Africa, I remain of the view that the position you stated at Annapolis⁹ should be the basic guideline—and not the twist put on it by subsequent testimony before Congress and by the McHenry trip.¹⁰ Unless both we and the Soviets come to exercise restraint in the injection of force into Third World disputes, the situation will become more tense, with negative consequences for all. I believe your Annapolis formulations on detente should be reiterated publicly—and perhaps the Congressional meeting Monday¹¹ night might be a good place for such initial restatement (with Cy then echoing you).

In addition, we should give serious consideration to the possibility of limiting either some exchanges with the Soviets or the flow of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. Words alone cannot successfully convey to the Soviet Union that we are seriously concerned about some of the above-mentioned matters. Some moderate but deliberate action is also necessary, and exchanges and the technology flow provide the most obvious avenues.

Ultimately, detente is not an end in itself but a means of achieving a more cooperative world. If we let detente be defined primarily by Soviet actions, we will pay a high price internationally and also domestically (and the latter is becoming evident already).

D. Africa

We plunged heavily into African problems—which, alas, the British created. But should we be so heavily engaged? And should we really lean towards Nkomo, Neto, etc.—and not Muzorewa, Savimbi, Senghor, etc? Sadat was very eloquent on these points with the Vice President, and perhaps Fritz has reported this to you already.¹²

I know that our commitment is to majority rule, and not to any particular individuals or orientation. Yet the perceived effect of our policy is to favor the left and the guerrillas. Moreover, in Angola, we are beginning to inch up to Neto, who does not even command the support of his own people.

Perhaps the British will succeed in seducing Nkomo—but if they do not, then maybe we should choose to quietly disengage and lower our own direct involvement.¹³ This will not be a satisfactory outcome, but it may be better than being drawn into a massive conflict between the forces of apartheid and Soviet/Cuban dominated guerrillas.

A final thought: our foreign policy till now has been heavily “contractual.” Yet political problems cannot be resolved by patient negotiation of peace contracts or agreements alone. At some point, it is necessary to bring a situation to a head—to have a brief crisis or confrontation even—and then to resolve it, with one’s own forces marshalled in the background to provide the needed sanction or leverage.

This is essentially true of the Middle East and of U.S.-Soviet relations. A period of tension with Israel is probably an unavoidable prelude to a settlement; U.S.-Soviet frictions in the past contributed to the development of mutually understood rules of the game governing European affairs and the strategic equation. The same may now be needed regarding human rights and intervention in Third World problems. A period of friction or crisis is not the same thing as a confrontation—and it should not be viewed as mindless advocacy of conflict. But unless some situations are brought to a head, they are likely to fester, with destructive consequences for either regional or international peace. Making the right choice at the critical moment is ultimately the basic test of statesmanship.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7–9/78. Secret; Sensitive. On the first page of the memorandum, the President noted: “Zbig—1. I should think that a U.S.-VNam relationship would be better for PRC. Worse for USSR. I agree with State, but don’t wish to push any effort now. J.”
2. Reference to press guidance issued by the Department of State on July 6 for that day’s noon press briefing. Telegram 170745 to CINCPAC Tokyo, July 6, indicated that Hodding Carter III had stated that U.S. policy with regard to normalization “is clear. As we have stated at each of the three rounds of talks with the Vietnamese in Paris last year, we are prepared to normalize relations at the diplomatic level and to exchange embassies and ambassadors. Once embassies are in place, we would lift the trade embargo.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780278–0662)
3. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President added a question mark and drew an arrow from it to the sentence.
4. Hamilton Jordan.
5. In the right-hand margin, the President wrote “ok” and drew an arrow from it to this portion of the sentence. On July 7, the Department released a statement reading, in part: “The U.S. Government has repeatedly made its concern for Mr. Shcharanskiy known, both privately to the Soviet Government and publicly. Our interest in him is natural in view of his activities on behalf of human rights, particularly for the right to emigrate which we and the American people have a firm commitment to promote.” (Department of State Bulletin, August 1978, p. 28)
6. In the “Facts” section of the weekly report, Brzezinski noted: “Komsomolskaya Pravda has organized an insulting campaign, directed at you personally. I know of no precedent for it. I understand that we have now received from 7,000 to 9,000 postcards, as per the attached Xerox (Tab A). I believe that our displeasure at this personal campaign should be explicitly registered with the Soviets.”
7. In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “I agree”
8. Reference is to Vance’s meetings with Gromyko in Geneva July 12–13; see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 132–137.
9. See Document 87.
10. Reference is to the administration’s late June decision to send McHenry to Angola to meet with Neto and other Angolan officials. (Walter Pincus and Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S. Envoy Dispatched to Angola: Talks With Neto To Focus on Calming Tensions With Zaire,” The Washington Post, June 22, 1978, pp. A–1, A–22)
11. July 10. The briefing took place in the State Dining Room at the White House from 6:56 to 10:05 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the briefing has been found.
12. The President wrote “no” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Reference is to Mondale’s trip to the Middle East; he met with Sadat in Cairo on July 3 and 4. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 259, footnote 2. For Mondale’s recollections about the trip, see The Good Fight, pp. 205–209.
13. The President underlined “to quietly engage” and wrote “a good possibility” in the right-hand margin next to the sentence.