Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 19, 1978

SUBJECT

• Congressional Foreign Policy Discussion

I. Your Conduct of the Meeting

1. Since this is clearly a meeting with the President, you should set the tone for it through an opening statement, and then ask for only brief (5–10 minutes) supplementary comments by Cy, Harold, and myself. I would urge you to impose strict time constraints on your supporting cast. Otherwise the Congressmen will feel “talked at” instead of being “talked with.”

2. Cy will be prepared to comment on the state of our key negotiations (SALT, Middle East, Southern Africa); Harold on our defense posture (NATO, and, if needed, SALT); I on the China trip or more generally on broad global changes.

II. Your Overview

1. Basic Message: Your basic commitment is to the shaping of a more just and equitable international system for a world that has now become more politically awakened (and you might mention the emotional outpouring of the Panamanians as an example)² and that thus cannot be confined to a system dominated exclusively by the developed countries. The world now includes more than 150 nation-states, and their aspirations as well as participation require a wider framework. Unlike the years 1945–1950, when America played a creative role in shaping the post-World War II international system, this calls not for a predominantly American response but for more subtle inspiration and cooperative leadership on a broader front.

In effect, we are seeking to shape a cooperative global community, while attempting to dampen the more traditional East-West conflicts and to resolve the novel global and North-South issues.

2. Your Ten Key Goals—and Our Performance

Early in 1977 you set yourself ten key goals as a way of achieving a more equitable international system.³

Your Key Goals	Response
1. To engage Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced democracies in closer political cooperation, thereby also providing wider macroeconomic coordination among them.	The first Summit was quite useful; the second is about to be held;4 more frequent and more direct personal top-level contacts and consultations than ever before (including phone calls).
2. To weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political, and economic cooperation with the new emerging regional powers, thereby extending our earlier reliance on Atlanticism to include such newly influential countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Indonesia in a wider pattern of international cooperation.	Your two trips were designed to advance that goal;5 the Vice President has recently been to Indonesia; U.S. has better relations with all of those mentioned than at any previous point.
3. To exploit the foregoing in the development of more accommodating North-South relations, both political and economic, thereby reducing the hostility toward the United States that in recent years has developed within the Third World.	We have made excellent progress politically; here especially noteworthy is the breakthrough in Panama and the formulation of a new policy towards Latin America, a policy no longer based on a single slogan but one which recognizes both the importance of bilateral relations with individual Latin American countries and the global character of many of their concerns. However, so far we have not done enough to formulate an economic policy dealing with North-South problems.
4. To push U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks into strategic arms reduction talks, to widen the scope of American-Soviet collaboration by engaging the Soviet Union in a wider pattern of negotiating relationships, thereby making detente both more comprehensive and reciprocal.	We have made progress on a wide range of bilateral issues and are pressing to get SALT. At the same time, we have finally made the Soviets aware that we are concerned over their lack of restraint in the use of military proxies in Africa. We do not expect the cold war to revive and we are prepared both to compete and to cooperate simultaneously. At the same time, we have developed more extensive relations with East European states—both those externally independent and those internally more liberal.
5. To normalize U.S.-Chinese relations in order to preserve the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a major stabilizing factor in the global power balance.	We remain committed to such normalization; in the meantime we are broadening the scope of our bilateral relations and have recently held mutually useful global consultations.
6. To seek a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement, without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the reentry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East would be difficult to avoid.	The last year has been one of remarkable progress. We are disappointed with the most recent Israeli answer, but will continue to press for negotiations.6 In the meantime, we are continuing our efforts to draw the moderate Arabs into closer ties with the West.
7. To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa and to forge closer cooperation with the moderate black African countries.	We have made progress on Namibia and Rhodesia. Moreover, we have established more positive relations with a larger number of African countries. At the same time, we are concerned that the Soviet/Cuban intrusion into Africa will interfere with our efforts to obtain peaceful accommodation; moreover, African governments remain quite vulnerable to such significant external military presence.
8. To restrict the level of global armaments and to inhibit nuclear proliferation through international agreements as well as unilateral U.S. acts.	We have now developed a policy of U.S. restraint on the sale of arms,7 while the INFCE program8 is a very tangible response to what is now increasingly recognized to be a genuine global problem.
9. To enhance global sensitivity to human rights through pertinent U.S. actions, comments, and example, thereby also seizing the ideological initiative.	While progress has been uneven, there is not a continent which is unaware of U.S. concerns; moreover, tangible progress has been made in a number of Latin American and Asian countries.
10. To renovate the U.S. and NATO defense posture in	The recent NATO Summit reflects tangible progress;9 the
keeping with the requirements posed by the Soviet arms buildup.	Long-Term Defense Program10 is a tangible expression, as is the reinforcement of the U.S. commitment.

III. Four Likely Problem Areas

The legislators are likely to be most concerned with the state of U.S.-Soviet relations; our African policy; the Middle East; and perhaps China.

I would suggest the following comments:

1. U.S.-Soviet relations: Our long-term objective remains constant: to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, and to increasingly assimilate the Soviet Union in wider international cooperation. The recent public exchanges were necessary to convince the Soviets that we are serious about our concerns, namely that the Soviet Union is overly inclined to use its growing military power to exert political pressure and particularly to exploit Third World turbulence, thereby preventing moderate solutions to international problems. We have repeatedly tried through private correspondence to convince Brezhnev that we are serious. Your speech reaffirmed our commitment to a detente based increasingly on mutual restraint and on reciprocity.¹¹ We want to draw the Soviet Union into a wider fabric of international cooperation.

Africa: Our central objective is the creation of majority rule governments and elimination of racial oppression. At the same time, we want to avoid a situation in which East-West and North-South conflicts intersect. This is precisely why we object so strongly to the Soviet/Cuban intrusion. It makes moderate solutions more difficult to achieve and it runs the risk of transforming difficult regional problems into graver international conflicts. We would like the Africans, particularly acting through the OAU, to resolve African problems themselves.

Middle East: You might express cautiously your disappointment at the recent Israeli response. Any peaceful solution must be based on the complete application of UN Resolution 242. I would suggest you simply ask the legislators for their advice, without being too specific on what we might do next.

China: You might make the point that we remain committed to normalization, and that in the meantime it is in our mutual benefit to widen the scope of our global cooperation. You might mention that I specifically told Chairman Hua on your behalf that we seek closer relations with China for long-term strategic reasons and not because of any tactical expediency. How fast we move on normalization depends on our ability to negotiate successfully some of the outstanding issues; it also depends on Congressional attitudes, and here asking for their advice may also be the best way to deal with the issue.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 26, Foreign Policy: 12/77–12/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under a June 19 note, indicating that 70 members of Congress would attend the meeting and inquiring as to whether or not Young should attend. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the East Room of the White House on June 20 from 7:07 to 10:12 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Although no record of the meeting has been found, an article in the Chicago Tribune contains assessments of the meeting from three participants: Udall, Fascell, and Solarz. (“Carter displays united foreign policy front,” June 21, 1978, p. 6) Attached but not printed is a list of participants.
2. Presumable reference to the reception the President received in Panama. Carter traveled to Panama June 16–17 in order to sign the protocol confirming the exchange of documents ratifying the Panama Canal treaties.
3. See Document 36.
4. See Document 92.
5. See Document 60 and footnote 4, Document 74.
6. Presumable reference to the Israeli Cabinet’s decision on the occupied territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. See Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Criticizes Israel but Plans to Press for Renewed Talks,” and William E. Farrell, “Sadat Says He Is Still ‘Optimistic’ On Peace Despite Israeli Response,” both The New York Times, June 21, 1978, pp. A–1, A–4.
7. Presumable reference to PD/NSC–13; see footnote 5, Document 40.
8. See footnote 3, Document 56.
9. See Document 83.
10. NATO members attending the North Atlantic Alliance Washington summit (see footnote 9 above) agreed to a 15-year plan designed to modernize and improve military forces. (Kenneth H. Bacon, “NATO Members Agree on Defense Plan, Differ on Approach to African Situation,” The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1978, p. 5)
11. See Document 87.