Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

124. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Next 18 Months

We are in a new period.

There will be no more foreign policy extravaganzas requiring long planning and negotiation, sustained Presidential involvement, and extensive Congressional debate (such as the Panama Canal Treaties, China normalization, and SALT). Thus, before discussing the ten goals, I want to describe some of the constraints of the new context in which we will be operating in the remainder of the Term.

(a) The time is short, more like a year than 18 months. In the immediate future, the focus will be on SALT. If SALT is approved by Thanksgiving, that leaves less than a year until the 1980 Presidential elections.

(b) Priority for domestic issues will preclude the President’s personal involvement in foreign policy initiatives requiring a major commitment of his time. Existing commitments (e.g., Middle East negotiations), the day-to-day flow of foreign “crises”, and unavoidable state visits will continue to occupy an important place on the President’s calendar, but he will not be able to make substantial time for new initiatives. And probably he shouldn’t. It is also realistic to note that the President does not have a large store of political capital that he can draw on to manage foreign policy initiatives.

(c) After SALT, the Congress will be unable to give foreign policy issues the major chunks of time which it has given such issues in the first three years. Of course, Congress will spend a substantial amount of time in 1980 dealing with unavoidable foreign policy items (such as trade agreements and appropriations), but in the main the Congress will want to spend its time focusing on energy and the economy. And probably it should.

(d) Our goals will be constricted by election year politics. This does not mean that we should step back from projects which are in the national interest, but we must recognize that our ability to initiate and accomplish must reckon with political factors. The President’s political advisers will naturally want to avoid foreign policy actions which would be unpopular with segments of the electorate. In addition, with the long stream of primaries, we can expect even ephemeral issues to be stridently debated in public.

We may be able to overcome the foregoing constraints in specific instances, but they will provide the overall context. In that context, the following are ten points for emphasis in the last 18 months.

1. Latin America. An unusual opening for progress in Latin American relations is provided by the Panama Canal Treaties, our role in the removal of Somoza,² and our human rights policy. Systematic attention by you and others on the 7th Floor to Latin America can pay big dividends, and can be done without cutting across the constraints outlined above.

(a) Andean Countries. The opening is especially important with respect to the Andean countries. Their democratic leanings make us natural allies on many problems. We should consult more with them, learn from them, and seek to make common cause with them in approaching the hemisphere’s problems.

(b) Brazil. The new Figueredo regime affords an opportunity to put our relations on a sound and friendly footing.³ We started off on the wrong foot with Brazil but they have recently shown signs that they are ready for a closer relationship. We should begin to consult with them not primarily on bilateral matters, but on regional and global issues, treating them as the equals that they may some day be. Sometime during this period, I would like to consider making a trip to Brazil, which, if it went well, might be seen in contrast to the trip I made at the very beginning of the Administration, carrying the rather heavy non-proliferation message.⁴

(c) Mexico. We have had a roller-coaster relationship with Mexico, with more downs than ups. The US-Mexican Coordinator gives us a mechanism to try to smooth out the relationship.⁵ It is however a rather awkward mechanism which will work only if it has support at the highest levels. You have devoted considerable time to Mexican relations, but some of that investment was lost when Roel was replaced.⁶ We should work especially hard to prevent the border from continuing as a source of friction. The domestic political overtones of anything we do vis-a-vis Mexico will have to be assessed with special care.

(d) Caribbean. Substantial effort should be devoted to following up on Phil Habib’s analysis and discussions regarding the Caribbean.⁷ To do so, we will have to challenge the prevailing wisdom that aid to the Caribbean must be taken “out” of the aid funds for Latin America as a whole. I am not reluctant to argue that it is in our national interest for us to put a disproportionate amount of our aid resources into development of countries in the western hemisphere.

2. The Genocide Treaty. Human rights will be one of the hallmarks of this Administration. However, some are beginning to suggest (wrongly, I think) that the human rights initiative has run out of steam and that the Administration is trimming its sails. A decisive counter to this insinuation would be a strong Administration effort to ratify the Genocide Convention, which was first submitted to the Senate thirty years ago. While requiring some Presidential and Senatorial time, this goal could be within reach after the SALT debate. I recommend that we make it one of the highest foreign policy objectives for 1980. If we succeed, we could then turn to the other human rights conventions.⁸

3. Indochina. Our interests have been served well by our policies in the PRC/Vietnamese conflict and Cambodian debacle. Recent developments, however, may require a more aggressive role during the next 18 months. We may have to take the lead in mounting initiatives regarding the famine in Cambodia, the Vietnamese security threat to ASEAN nations and the possibility of renewed PRC/Vietnamese military conflict.

4. South Asia. The instability and uncertainties in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan provide great opportunities for creative diplomacy. In India, we should move briskly with the new administration to avoid slipping back to the pre-Desai attitudes.⁹ Pakistan presents a striking challenge to our capacity to blend our non-proliferation policy with our other foreign policy objectives. In Afghanistan, we need to avoid over-eagerness which might rescue the Soviets from a major failure.

5. North-South Dialogue. Our generalized intention to give more attention to the North-South dialogue will require some specific initiatives. I understand that Tony Lake is developing and scrubbing a list of possible approaches. We should meet on this subject sometime during the first three weeks of September, before you leave for the UN. Among the issues we should consider is how to develop a better forum for the North-South dialogue. The UN Committee of the Whole is plainly not an optimum mechanism.

6. Foreign Service Reform. The enactment of the Foreign Service legislation should be one of our highest priorities.¹⁰ It will not require much time on the floor of the Senate or the House, and does not impinge on the other restraints set forth at the beginning of this memorandum.

7. Trade Agreements with the PRC and Soviet Union. The approval of these trade agreements should be one of our principal legislative goals for 1980. To gain this approval, especially in the Soviet case, will require a mobilization of business support as well as sensitive dealings with the interests groups. Once approved, we should give a strong impetus to the implementation of the agreements.

8. A Non-Isolationist Energy Policy. Our evolving energy policy has some “Fortress America” overtones. One of our responsibilities in the next 18 months is to ensure that we do not isolate ourselves on this issue. One way to do this—and a way that could have great substantive benefits as well—would be to explore fully the possibilities of joint development of the tar sands in Canada and Venezuela. There is wide agreement that these tar sands deposits are an enormous source of potential energy which could be developed if sufficient capital is made available from governmental sources. We should make sure that our new energy legislation is flexible enough to permit such joint development.

9. Normalizing Diplomatic Relations. The United States had less-than-normal relations with 13 countries when we came into office. We now have reduced that to 10 countries: Albania, Angola, Cuba (Interests Section), Equatorial Guinea, Kampuchea, Iraq (Interests Section), North Korea, South Yemen, Vietnam, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. We should improve this record during the last 18 months, asking ourselves in each instance whether a continuation of the current anomaly serves any national interest. Normalization in some instances may prove to be politically impossible, either from a domestic or international standpoint. However, there are other instances where we can make progress without impinging on any of the constraints set forth at the beginning of this memorandum. Vietnam will be one of the most difficult, but also one of the most important. Progress in our relations with all three African countries on the list would seem a reachable goal. An end to the isolation of Rhodesia would be especially welcome.

10. A Comprehensive Middle East Settlement. No list of goals would be complete without this reference, but there is no need to elaborate.

Finally, a postscript about your own activities. I firmly believe that you should increase your contacts with the American public in the forthcoming period. This would mean more speeches in the U.S., and fewer Congressional appearances (where your statements do not get the attention they deserve). It would mean more U.S. television appearances, which should be undertaken even if it means cutting something else out.

In such speeches and appearances, I urge that you relax your discipline and discuss your philosophy and concept of American security and foreign policy. It would be good for the American people to hear it. And it would be helpful to the President.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memoranda to the Secretary—1979. Secret. There is no indication that Vance saw the memorandum. An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. In July, the State Department demanded that Somoza, who had fled to Miami from Nicaragua after his resignation, persuade the acting Nicaraguan President to step down or Somoza could not stay in the United States. Somoza left Miami, eventually taking refuge in Paraguay. (Wayne King, “Somoza Is Planning A Foreign Trip Soon From Exile in Miami,” The New York Times, July 20, 1979, p. A–4)
3. Figueredo succeeded Geisel as President of Brazil in March 1979.
4. In early March 1977, Christopher participated in high-level talks with Brazilian officials regarding nuclear energy issues. The talks concluded after 1 day. (Bruce Handler, “Nuclear Talks in Brazil End Abruptly,” The Washington Post, March 3, 1977, pp. A–1, A–16)
5. See footnote 26, Document 123.
6. On May 16, Lopez-Portillo replaced Foreign Secretary Santiago Roel Garcia with Jorge Castaneda. Lopez-Portillo also replaced the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Budget and Planning. (Alan Riding, “President of Mexico Shuffles His Cabinet On Eve of Castro Visit,” The New York Times, May 17, 1979, p. A–13)
7. Habib had served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until 1978. Vance later asked Habib to serve as an Ambassador at Large and “troubleshooter” on various regional issues, including the Caribbean. (John M. Goskho, “Caribbean Ministates New Source of Concern,” The Washington Post, July 6, 1979, pp. A–1, A–10)
8. The Senate did not ratify the Genocide Convention until 1988.
9. Desai resigned as Prime Minister in July, and Chaudhary Charan Singh became Prime Minister.
10. See footnote 56, Document 123.