Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

123. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

• Next Eighteen Months

In thinking about this exercise,² we began by looking back at your December memorandum to the President.³ The most impressive fact that emerges from such a review is the extraordinary progress made since then on the “big issues”: SALT, China legislation, MTN, and the Middle East. You wrote to the President that success on three of the four would be historic. Specific goals on all four were met.⁴

As we thought about how you will allocate your time in the next eighteen months, we tried to identify ongoing issues which will continue to require your attention, to subjects that you might want to leave primarily to others in the Department, and new areas of concentration.

We start with the premise that, after your UNGA period in New York, and especially after SALT is ratified (an increasingly likely prospect for the fall), you will have the opportunity to decide how to use a dividend of unallocated time. Unless you give some clear signals on how you expect to use this time, the bureaucracy naturally will try to fill the vacuum with issues that are not necessarily worth your own attention.

Since you have announced your intention not to serve in the second Carter Administration, you need more than ever to show a command of the important continuing issues as well as an energetic approach to new areas, so as not to be perceived, in the final months, as a lame duck.⁵

We do not suggest that the coming months will provide fertile ground for dramatic new successes. There isn’t much money available—indeed, we will be fighting to avoid real cuts in our foreign policy resources. And the domestic political climate as we head into the election is obviously difficult.

We do believe, however, that you can be extremely effective in a number of areas in which you can leave a lasting imprint, by defining new substantive longer-term goals, influencing public opinion, or strengthening the institutions of your office and this building.⁶

I. Priority Old Issues.

In this category are issues that have, from the beginning, represented cornerstones of the Administration’s foreign policies. Your active involvement is needed in each case either to build on a partial success or to keep the pressure up on finding solutions. In certain cases, your presence is necessary so that other agencies or other advisors do not counsel the President in ways that could lead to dramatic policy reversals or sharp increases in international tensions.

A. Middle East: No issue continues to present more difficulties and dangers.⁷ Clearly your involvement is crucial even with Strauss’s appointment.⁸ We are concerned that the U.S. is moving in the direction of dealing with the Palestinians without adequate study of the effect of such moves on: Israeli flexibility on the West Bank/Gaza; Israeli doubts about the U.S. at a time that a change in government may be near in Jerusalem; and the 1980 Presidential candidates who may polarize this emotional issue within the U.S.

Quite frankly, we doubt that we can both move closer to the Palestinians and exercise significant pressure on Israel to make progress in the autonomy negotiations or on Lebanon.⁹ If we have to choose—and we believe it necessary to do so, we favor the second objective over the first.

If we fail, a year or so hence, to have gained progress on the¹⁰ West Bank/Gaza, then we might want to move on the U.S.-Palestinian front for the sake of our Saudi and other ties. We do not think that now is the time.

B. US/USSR/China Relations: Given the differing conceptual views of the triangle, your own heavy involvement on such issues as MFN for the USSR and the PRC will remain important.¹¹ If SALT II fails, of course, your primary task will be to salvage what we can with the Soviets, not to mention the Allies. With the likelihood of a succession before 1981, it is especially important for you to be closely involved in the handling of the post-Brezhnev period.

C. Arms Control, Post-SALT: In terms of actual new agreements, we should be thinking about a push for CTB, since we will soon be entering the late 1979–1980 period of new non-proliferation activity you noted for the President.¹² If a full agreement is not possible, a fallback to agreement on principles might be useful.

An ASAT agreement might be reachable and, less likely, a RW agreement.¹³ Progress on CW is unlikely.

More important than these specific agreements will be base laying: for SALT III; with the Allies for TNF negotiations (immensely complicated; actual negotiations unlikely to move quickly; but very important in Allied context); and for MBFR progress, perhaps in 1981. Reg should also proceed on laying a new base for CAT.¹⁴

D. Relations with Allies: Despite the absence of specific disagreements, our relations with major Allies (especially the Summit partners) are not strong. It is unfortunate but true that our key friends are slowly losing confidence in the Administration’s ability to lead both domestically and internationally. You and Harold Brown are the only senior officials of the Administration whose standing remains high. The Governments in the U.K., Canada, France, Japan and probably the FRG are likely to be in place well beyond the 1980 U.S. elections; this fact gives them a certain over-confidence, not to say arrogance, in dealing with an Administration perceived to be in political trouble. Your time and attention on key issues between the U.S. and our Allies—TNF deployments, energy—is probably indispensable.¹⁵

E. Southern Africa: Your personal stature with the British, South Africans and key African players—as well as in the Congress and the American black community—is such that you will probably want to remain fully involved in both Namibia and Rhodesia.¹⁶ Additionally, our African policy could run into heavy weather in coming months. For you to distance yourself from the difficulties could be perceived by the Africans and much of the Third World as an abandonment of the one policy that most distinguished this Administration from its predecessors.

F. Central America and Western Asia: These areas are very different from each other except in one crucial¹⁷ respect: they will be the scene of crucial Administration decisions on how to manage change and a positive evolution, in terms of U.S. interests, of regimes that are repressive, weak, unrepresentative and pro-American.¹⁸ As you know, the Administration is deeply divided on this issue, and our policies have zigzagged in every case. These developments are also a subject of domestic political interest.

II. Old Issues to be Delegated.

It is always difficult to step away from an important issue, especially when it has not been successfully resolved. If we recommend less of your involvement in these areas, it is because we believe that they could be competently handled by others—at least on a day to day basis—and that your time could be better spent elsewhere.

A. Indochina and Refugees: Dick Clark will handle refugees well although he will require some guidance and attention from you and Chris.¹⁹ Dick Holbrooke should continue to pursue ideas on how to get at the Kampuchea problem and further our excellent ties to ASEAN nations.²⁰ But prospects on Kampuchea are unpromising in the medium-term.

B. Non-Proliferation: We are approaching crucial decisions in this area with respect to South Africa and India/Pakistan. In addition, the NPT review/renegotiation conference will soon be on us.²¹ Given the cross-cutting political-scientific-strategic nature of the issues involved, we suggest that Chris be given oversight of the issue, including management of the various individual components—both geographic and functional.²²

C. Northern Africa (Western Sahara): This area needs more effort by the Department. Dave Newsom and NEA should give greater priority to thinking through how we can do more for Hassan while encouraging him towards flexibility on the Saharan dispute.²³ Without the latter, the former is a prescription for growing longer-term difficulties in our relations with interested Arab and African nations (c.f., OAU resolution).²⁴ David should also oversee a review of our relations with Algeria.²⁵

D. Mexico: Matt and Pete should continue to stay closely involved as Krueger takes over.²⁶ However, you or Chris may have to step in if, as is possible, domestic political considerations continue to be a key element in determining our policies toward Mexico.²⁷

E. Korea: We need to think through alternatives for improving the hostile political climate on the Peninsula if the tripartite talk idea²⁸ flounders. Holbrooke to manage.²⁹

F. Japan: Ohira is a strong and well-disposed leader, and we should find ways to keep up our consultations with the Japanese on a wide variety of issues. We must also convince the suspicious Japanese that our policies and attention are not Sinocentric. Holbrooke to manage.³⁰

G. Africa North of the Zambezi: You might ask Dick Moose and S/P to oversee analyses of our policy towards the Horn and Zaire. We are treading water in both areas, but we can foresee a dangerous drift, especially in Zaire, unless we and others increase the pressure for reform.³¹ We also need to keep an eye on relations with Nigeria, where we should plan to concentrate progress and resources in order to develop closer relations with the new civilian government.³²

H. Human Rights: Chris continues to manage this issue well although we still advocate a system which would give his committee oversight responsibility for both military and economic assistance programs.³³ This Administration should not let this term end without ratification of the genocide and other human rights conventions.³⁴

Chris might also want to initiate a review of the two years of experience that we have had in applying our human rights objectives to individual cases in order to derive a body of operating principles.³⁵

I. Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey ticks away as an issue which could explode. Considerable Congressional and public lobbying will be needed to keep our assistance levels high enough to pursue this important relationship. Chris and Matt to handle.³⁶

J. India/Pakistan: Apart from our nuclear proliferation concerns, the strategic and political stakes in the subcontinent are becoming more critical. Chris and Constable to handle.³⁷

K. Poland: Here the serious economic/financial situation, coupled with a call for Western assistance, give us a unique opportunity for influence with a key Eastern European government. We may have opportunities, through the international financial institutions, to help shape this socialist economy, including the level of Polish military spending. However, attempts to politicize our assistance, or put an anti-Soviet twist on it, will have to be resisted. Matt could manage.³⁸

L. Foreign Assistance: You might want to have Chris, Tony, Doug and Brian put together a strategy for our next foreign assistance submissions in what promises to be an extremely difficult political and resource climate.³⁹

III. Issues Deserving More Attention

A. Public Statements and Appearances: We are concerned that one result of the SALT debate and the political campaigns may be to narrow the focus of public discussions of foreign policy towards a preoccupation with Soviet actions and balances of power.⁴⁰ This is apparently one of the objects of Henry Kissinger’s testimony.⁴¹ If this happens, the contributions of your recent speeches, especially the ones on North/South issues and political change, could be forgotton.⁴² During the next 18 months, we would urge you to be much more actively involved in speeches and TV appearances and press conferences to articulate the themes you have been developing recently.⁴³ Although you will not be making political speeches as such, you will be speaking authoritatively about the Administration’s view of the world and the success or failures of U.S. policies. Because of the campaign atmosphere in this country, you will have an opportunity not only to define the Administration’s policies but to lay the groundwork for what the President’s second term could achieve in foreign affairs.

As one S/P staff member put it in a recent memo:

“Some sort of basic national post-Vietnam consensus on foreign policy must inevitably emerge, and I think the Secretary ought to make a major effort to shape it.⁴⁴ Secretary Vance has stored up a great deal of respect and credibility, both among sophisticates—the press, the bureaucracy, the Congress, and related academia—and, to the extent they have followed foreign policy, among the public. Those assets should be invested. There is probably no one who could have a greater public impact in addressing these issues in a sustained way at the conceptual level.”

B. Energy: We are convinced that both the Department and you personally should play a more aggressive role on economic issues.⁴⁵ This is one area in which we would seriously fault the Department’s performance. Energy is probably the most serious issue the nation faces. It is an international issue, yet the Administration’s handling of the matter is primarily carried out in a domestic context. There is a vacuum here that the State Department ought to fill.

We suggest that you meet soon with Dick Cooper, EB and others to discuss how we can become more involved and what we should be pressing for in this area.⁴⁶ Attached is a list of proposals which might be explored for possible new initiatives.⁴⁷

C. North/South Issues: You have expressed an interest in spending more time on these issues. Your support, and speeches, have been very valuable for what progress we have made in the last two years; but you will have to spend more time in the bureaucratic arena, and in getting fully acquainted with the substance of these complex matters, to have the desired impact.

We have been more effective at setting broad directions than in obtaining practical movement. The recent fiasco on the liberalization of the Compensatory Finance Facility makes the point.

Budgets and politics make dramatic new North/South initiatives unthinkable. But as listed in previous memos, there are a number of specific issues on which progress may be possible (e.g., a bond guarantee scheme to increase LDC access to private credit and debt questions).⁴⁸ We are working on a contingency fund proposal as part of the FY’81 ESF budget. And we may want to suggest to you that Tom Ehrlich set up a working group, perhaps including SFRC and HFAC staffers, to work on a streamlined foreign aid bill, looking toward our FY’82 submission.⁴⁹ Church and Zablocki should be consulted first. This would lay the groundwork for Congressional action in 1981.

D. Institutional Issues: We would encourage you to make a conscious effort to upgrade the role and performance of the Department in the next eighteen months.⁵⁰ Thanks to your stature and standing with the President, the Department usually is involved in key policy decisions. However, participation by your top officials is often not institutionalized—it is only a result of your involvement on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis.⁵¹ When you leave, your successor may find that the Department’s presence in the key decision-making processes is again open to question, even challenge.⁵² Specific problems: (1) Outside the Department, you still are not adequately a part of the decision-making process in the intelligence field (sensitive collection and covert actions) or in the strategic policy (witness Phil Odeen’s study). Anything more that you can do to inform key Department personnel, on a thorough and systematic basis, of meetings that you hold outside of the Department (examples: on the Hill, with Stan Turner) would enable the bureaucracy to serve you better.⁵³ Similarly, more should probably be done to find ways to have senior Department officers accompany you to key meetings.⁵⁴ If they are with you when decisions are debated, their roles at working levels in the inter-agency process are enhanced. (2) Inside the Department, you may want to consider weekly meetings on new subjects of interest to you, such as energy and North/South relations.⁵⁵ If you had agendas and brief papers prepared for these meetings, you would thereby force the Department’s attention to these areas in a decisive way.

E. The Foreign Service: The new Foreign Service Act is likely to pass, and this measure will result in a more productive and more professional corps.⁵⁶ There are, however, additional ways for you to strengthen the performance of the career service in the months to come. Appointing the most promising FSO’s, with years of service before them, to key policy positions in the Department is one way to promote excellence and continuity.⁵⁷ Authorizing “stretch assignments” for outstanding middle-grade officers is another way.⁵⁸ At the same time, the senior officers who are being encouraged to leave the Service should be treated with greater consideration, and your willingness to hold a reception for them next month is a step in that direction.⁵⁹ Finally, schedule permitting, we recommend finding some opportunities in coming months for you to appear occasionally before groups of FSO’s (e.g., the Open Forum). Such appearances would not only give the career professionals a better sense of the man whom they work for, it would also be an expression of interest on your part in a dialogue with a broader spectrum of career officers.⁶⁰

F. Multilateral Diplomacy: A recent Chicago CFR poll shows a significant decline among elite groups for the UN. More broadly, a growing mood of nationalism undermines popular support for multilateral diplomacy and multilateral assistance. On the other hand, we are doing more of our diplomatic and economic business through multilateral groups and organizations. More thought needs to be devoted to revitalizing multilateral organizations.⁶¹ Sometimes, multilateral diplomacy works best outside the framework of established international organizations. For you to review the international structures available to us, and recommend how the U.S. can use them best, could be a valuable service to this and succeeding Administrations.

1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980: Lot 84D241, Goals and Objectives 1979. Secret; Eyes Only. Tarnoff initialed for Lake.
2. Tarnoff solicited input for the memorandum from all regional and functional assistant secretaries. According to several of the submissions, Tarnoff requested this support in an August 2 memorandum. Although this memorandum has not been found, copies of the bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to/from Tarnoff/Wisner/Perry. Tarnoff sent copies of these submissions, which included Vance’s marginal comments and notations, to Christopher, Newsom, Read, and Lake under an August 29 memorandum. (Ibid.) The Bureau of Public Affairs did not submit a memorandum at this time, but Dyess did send Christopher a memorandum, August 14, entitled “Priority Policy Issues for Public Affairs,” which Christopher noted. Lake sent another copy of the August 14 memorandum to Christopher under an October 12 memorandum in advance of a meeting with the PA Bureau leadership. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director: Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 18, Next Eighteen Months—Mtgs. w A/S) Additional documentation on follow-up efforts concerning the exercise are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to/from Tarnoff/Wisner/Perry.
3. See Document 107.
4. Vance placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
5. Vance underlined “you need more than ever to show a command of the important continuing issues as well as an energetic approach to new areas,” and wrote “I agree” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. En route from the Middle East to Rome on May 27, Vance informed reporters that he would serve only one term as Secretary of State. According to The New York Times, Vance asserted: “After four years in office, you get too tired, you lose freshness and imagination. After four years, you ought to get out and turn it over to someone else.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Vance Makes It Clear He Won’t Stay On After 1980,” May 29, 1979, p. A–2)
6. Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “by.”
7. Vance placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this heading and sentence.
8. See footnote 3, Document 121.
9. Vance drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “I want to talk about this.” The opening of the autonomy talks, the next phase in the Middle East peace negotiations following the signing of the peace treaty in March, took place in Beersheva, Israel, May 25. (Bernard Gwertzman, “Egypt and Israel Open Negotiations At Beersheba on Palestinian Areas,” The New York Times, May 26, 1979, p. 3)
10. An unknown hand placed brackets around this word.
11. Vance underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “your” and added “I agree” in the left-hand margin next to it.
12. Vance underlined “we should be thinking about a push for CTB,” and wrote “ok” in left-hand margin next to this sentence.
13. Vance underlined most of this sentence and wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to it.
14. Vance underlined most of this paragraph. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote “all of these are important & potentially [unclear].” The TNF negotiations were scheduled to take place in December. “Reg” is a reference to Bartholomew.
15. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “yes.”
16. Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “is,” placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to it, and wrote “yes.”
17. An unknown hand placed brackets around this word and wrote “important” in the right-hand margin. Vance placed a checkmark above “important.”
18. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “Correct. I will have to keep a close eye on these while delegating as much as possible.”
19. Vance placed two parallel, vertical lines in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent sentence and wrote “OK.” Reference is to Christopher. In a statement on July 31 before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee, Vance provided background on the Indochinese refugee crisis and noted that the Carter administration had agreed to increase the admission of Indochinese refugees into the United States from 7,000 to 14,000 per month. The conflict between China and Vietnam, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, and human rights abuses all contributed to the refugee crisis. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, pp. 4–6)
20. Vance underlined this sentence, placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to it, and wrote “yes.”
21. Scheduled for the spring of 1980.
22. Vance underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “suggest” and ending with “issue.” In the right-hand margin next to it, he wrote “yes.”
23. Vance underlined this sentence. Reference is to the disputed territory of the Western Sahara. In the mid-1970s, Spain ceded control of the Western Sahara to both Morocco and Mauritania. The Frente Polisario opposed the claims of both states to the territory.
24. At the July 17–20 Organization of African Unity summit in Monroeville, Liberia, delegates approved a resolution calling for a referendum in the Western Sahara. (Leon Dash, “African Leaders Adopt Compromise On Mideast Pact,” The Washington Post, July 22, 1979, p. A–13)
25. Vance underlined this sentence. He also placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “ok” in the margin.
26. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “yes” in the margin. References are to Nimetz and Vaky. On June 22, the President announced that he would nominate former Representative Robert Krueger (D–Texas) as Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Mexican Affairs. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 1134–1135)
27. Vance underlined most of this sentence, placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it, and wrote “yes.”
28. Presumable reference to the tripartite talks on the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula discussed by the President and Park during Carter’s June 29–July 1 State visit to South Korea. (William Chapman and Edward Walsh, “U.S., Park to Propose Talks With North,” The Washington Post, July 1, 1979, pp. A–1, A–29) Documentation on the State visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XIV, Korea; Japan.
29. Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote “6 party talks.”
30. Vance underlined this sentence and placed a checkmark next to it. In the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence, he wrote “we have built a good base & we must continue development.”
31. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence. Next to it, he wrote “ok” and “Zaire is dangerous & difficult.”
32. In mid-August, Shehu Shagari was elected Nigeria’s first civilian President, marking the end of military rule.
33. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “yes.” The committee reference is to the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, colloquially known as the “Christopher Group” or “Christopher Committee.” Documentation on the establishment of the committee is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
34. Vance underlined “genocide” and “other human rights conventions.” In the right-hand margin, he wrote “I agree.”
35. Vance placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “yes.”
36. Vance underlined this sentence and wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to it.
37. Vance underlined this sentence and, in the right-hand margin next to it, wrote: “Dave [Newsom] should be included.” Reference is to Peter Constable.
38. Vance underlined this sentence and, in the right-hand margin next to it, inserted a comma and added “with George [Vest].”
39. Vance underlined “have Chris, Tony, Doug and Brian put together a strategy” and wrote “yes, priority” in the left-hand margin. References are to Christopher, Lake, Bennet, and Atwood.
40. Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
41. Kissinger testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 31. He conditioned his support for the SALT treaty on the President’s willingness to authorize an increase in military spending. The New York Times reported that Kissinger had “urged that the Senate attach to its resolution of ratification a statement of principles warning the Soviet Union that failure by it or by such allies as Cuba to exercise restraint around the world would ‘seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process.’” (Charles Mohr, “Kissinger Suggests Senate Link Treaty to More Arms Funds: Proposes Other Conditions,” August 1, 1979, pp. A–1, A–6)
42. Presumable reference to Vance’s addresses before the Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging International Order (see Document 115) and the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges (see Document 118).
43. Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “we” and, in the left-hand margin, wrote “ok.”
44. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “I would like to do this.”
45. Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote “yes.”
46. Vance underlined this sentence, placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it, and wrote: “ok after Labor Day.”
47. Not printed is an undated, 1-page set of proposals entitled “Energy Initiatives.”
48. Vance underlined this sentence.
49. Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote “interesting.”
50. Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote “yes.”
51. Vance underlined the portion of this sentence from the beginning and concluding with “institutionalized.”
52. Vance underlined most of this sentence.
53. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence and wrote “you are right.”
54. Vance placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “you are probably right.”
55. Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “yes.”
56. On June 21, Vance testified before a joint hearing of subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and Post Office and Civil Service Committees on the administration’s proposed Foreign Service reform legislation. (Kathy Sawyer, “Vance Unveils Proposals To Alter Foreign Service” The Washington Post, June 22, 1979, p. A–3) On June 28, Fascell introduced the Foreign Service Act of 1979 (H.R. 4674), which was referred to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. On July 9, Church introduced the Senate version of the bill (S. 1450), which was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Neither bill made it out of the respective committees. In March 1980, Fascell re-introduced the legislation in the House (H.R. 6790). The legislation, with amendments, passed the House and Senate in September; the House and Senate both adopted the conference report in late September–early October. The President signed the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–465) into law on October 17. The act eliminated the Foreign Service Reserve category, established a Foreign Service “bill of rights,” created a new Senior Foreign Service, and outlined new pay guidelines. (Congress and the Nation, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 93)
57. Vance underlined this sentence. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote “yes.”
58. Vance underlined this sentence. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote “yes.” A stretch assignment allows a Foreign Service officer at a lower grade to be paneled into a higher grade position without requiring a promotion to the higher grade.
59. Vance underlined most of this sentence. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote “yes.”
60. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Vance wrote “There aren’t that many hours in the day unfortunately.”
61. Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote “S/P to look at this—perhaps with outside consultants.”