118. Address by Secretary of State Vance1
Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World
From the first days of our nation; Americans have held a staunch optimism about the future. We have been a self-confident people, certain about our ability to shape our destiny. And we are a people who have not only adapted well to change, we have thrived on it.
We are now living in a period of history marked by deep and rapid change. Tonight, I want to talk about change and how America can use its extraordinary strength to meet the challenges of a changing world.
America’s optimism has been jarred in recent years—by a bitter war, by domestic divisions that tested our democratic institutions and left many of our people skeptical about government, by the sudden awareness that our economic life at home can be shaped by actions abroad, and by the realization that there are events which affect us but which we can only partly influence.
There is much that we can and have learned from these experiences. But fear of the future is not one of them.
Let me share with you frankly my concern that the distorted proposition being advanced by some that America is in a period of decline in the world is not only wrong as a matter of fact but dangerous as a basis for policy.
For we would imperil our future if we lost confidence in ourselves and in our strength and retreated from energetic leadership in the world. And we would imperil our future, as well, if we reacted in frustration and used our power to resist change in the world or employed our military power when it would do more harm than good.
[Page 600]The realization that we are not omnipotent should not make us fear we have lost our power or the will to use it. If we appreciate the extraordinary strengths we have, if we understand the nature of the changes taking place in the world, and if we act effectively to use our different kinds of power to shape different kinds of change, we have every reason to be confident about our future.
America’s Strengths
We must begin with a clear understanding of our own strengths as a nation.
America’s military strength today is formidable. I know of no responsible military official who would exchange our strategic position for that of any other nation.
• We have friendly neighbors on our borders.
• We have strong and reliable security relationships. Together, these allies more than double our overall military strength.
• We have easy access to the sea, which enables us to have diversified strategic forces and the ready capacity to project our power.
Our economy, and those of our allies, are more than three times as productive as those of the Soviets and their allies.
The industrial democracies continue to lead the way in technological innovation and in harnessing that technology to serve mankind.
And the way of life of our people and what we stand for as a nation continue to have magnetic appeal around the world.
Because we and our allies are the engines of creative change in almost every field, because of the vitality of our political institutions and the strength of our military forces, we have a capacity for leadership—and an ability to thrive in a world of change—that is unsurpassed.
The issue is not whether we are strong. We are. The challenge is to use these unquestioned strengths appropriately and effectively to advance our interests in a world undergoing different kinds of change.
What are these changes, and how can we use our strength effectively?
Stable Strategic Equivalence
The first element of change is the evolution from an earlier period of American strategic supremacy to an era of stable strategic equivalence.
We should harbor no illusion that we could return to the earlier era. Neither side will permit the other to hold an exploitable strategic advantage. Each side has the financial and technical resources to keep pace with the other. With the stakes so high, we know that both of us will do whatever is necessary to keep from falling behind. That is why essential equivalence has become the only realistic strategy in today’s nuclear world.
[Page 601]This rough balance can also serve the cause of stability—even if some find it unsettling compared with our earlier supremacy. It is this essential equivalence in strategic arms which allows us to move ahead on arms limitation. For if one side were far ahead, it would feel no special urgency about arms control, and the side that was behind would refuse to negotiate from a position of weakness. Only when both sides perceive a balance, as is now the case, can we hope for real arms control progress.
Our response to this broad change in the security environment has several elements.
We will assure that essential equivalence in nuclear arms is maintained. We will not be overtaken by the momentum of Soviet military programs.
We have undertaken a far-reaching modernization of our strategic forces. We are improving each leg of our strategic triad—with cruise missiles for our B–52 bombers, with a new Trident I missile for existing submarines and the development of a new Trident submarine and Trident II missile, and with development funding for the M–X missile. And we are examining, in a timely fashion, the options for offsetting the probable future threat to the land-based portion of our missile force.
At the same time, we are equally determined to enhance our security by applying mutual limits to nuclear arms. We are at the threshold of a SALT II treaty. It is a critical step in the process of bringing strategic weapons under sensible control. As its terms become known and debated, I am confident that the Senate will agree that it will enhance our national security and that of our allies. Its rejection would lead to an intensification of the nuclear arms race. The risk of nuclear war would increase. The costs to our taxpayers would rise sharply. It would heighten tensions with the Soviets, trouble our allies, and deal a crippling blow to future arms control prospects.
The American people, and our allies, understand the importance of decreasing tensions with the Soviet Union and seeking common ground where our interests may converge.
While we address strategic issues, we must also be especially sensitive to the importance of maintaining a balance of conventional forces. At the NATO summit last summer, we and our allies committed ourselves to real increases of 3% in defense expenditures and to modernize and upgrade NATO forces.2 Last year’s repeal of the arms em [Page 602] bargo against Turkey was an important step to help bolster NATO’s southern flank.3
In Europe and elsewhere, we are committed to maintain strong conventional forces. And no one should doubt that we will use those forces if our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened.
In these ways, we will maintain, and strengthen, our security in an age of essential equivalence by meeting the new problems it presents and by seizing the new arms control opportunities it affords.
Growing Risks of Regional Conflicts
A second change is the reality that the risks posed by regional conflicts have grown. Many of these conflicts are long standing. They have roots deep in history, in geography, in religious and ethnic differences.
But as more nations acquire more sophisticated arms, regional conflicts become more dangerous. They pose a constant threat of wider confrontation. As a result, the United States must be more active in working to help settle these disputes peacefully.
The fact is that no nation is more intensively engaged in the continuing effort to dampen the flames of conflict around the world than the United States.
No other nation could have played the role that the United States has played in helping Israel and Egypt achieve an historic peace treaty.4 And we will continue to remain actively involved in the effort to achieve a comprehensive peace—a peace in which Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinian people can live with security and with dignity.
In southern Africa, in the eastern Mediterranean, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the world, we are using the influence we have for peace. Progress does not come easily or quickly. There will be setbacks, for the path to peace is often more difficult than the road to war. But with persistence and steadiness, we can help provide the parties to conflict with an alternative to violence—if they choose to take it.
In some cases, these efforts will involve working with other interested nations as a catalyst for bringing the parties together. In other situations, we will support international and regional institutions that provide a framework for easing tensions. When we believe it will con [Page 603] tribute to regional stability, we will assist nations threatened by external force to strengthen their ability to defend themselves.
In all cases, we will oppose attempts by others to transform local disputes into international tests of will. Every nation has a responsibility to recognize that there is greater safety in healing, rather than fueling, local conflicts.
Changes Within Nations
A third kind of change we must address is change within nations.
As a result of mass communications, better education, urbanization, and growing expectations for a better life, there is a new tide in many Third World nations, as more and more people demand a fuller share in their government and their economy. These demands can place extraordinary pressures on economic, social, and political institutions.
This ferment can at times cause the kind of turmoil that adversely affects our interests, at least in the short run. But rather than reacting in opposition to such change, or assuming that it necessarily works against us, let us look at two central questions: Is this kind of change generally in the interest of our nation? And what are the best instruments through which we can help others meet popular aspirations in an orderly and peaceful fashion?
The answer to the first question, in my judgment, is that the growing demand of individuals around the world for the fulfillment of their political, social, and economic rights is generally in our interest. These aspirations are producing new or strengthened democratic institutions in many nations throughout the world. And America can flourish best in a world where freedom flourishes.
Should we not gain confidence from this expansion of democracy, which is taking place not because we force it but because of its inherent appeal?
And what is that inherent appeal? Surely it lies in the enhanced opportunity that democracy provides for the realization of fundamental human rights—the rights to political and religious expression, to political participation, and to economic justice.
These values are remarkably attuned to the demands of change. The change which confronts many nations—particularly the less developed nations—challenges cultures, ways of living and communicating, notions of individual and national autonomy. The great strength of democratic processes is their flexibility and resilience. They allow accommodation and compromise. By giving all groups a voice in the decisions which affect their lives, democratic societies are far better able to shape a peaceful and stable balance between tradition and progress.
[Page 604]Internal change in other countries will sometimes be turbulent and difficult. At times, it may run in repressive directions. But we must not let our concerns about the crosscurrents blind us to the tide running in favor of freedom.
In seeking to help others meet the legitimate demands of their peoples, what are the best instruments at hand?
Let me state first that the use of military force is not, and should not be, a desirable American policy response to the internal politics of other nations. We believe we have the right to shape our destiny; we must respect that right in others. We must clearly understand the distinction between our readiness to act forcefully when the vital interests of our nation, our allies, and our friends are threatened and our recognition that our military forces cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the purely internal problems of other nations.
In helping other nations cope with such internal change, our challenge is to help them develop their own institutions, strengthen their own economies, and foster the ties between government and people.
To do so, we must continue to provide them with increasing levels of development assistance. We must maintain human rights policies which work in practical ways to advance freedom. And we must accept the fact that other societies will manage change and build new institutions in patterns that may be different from our own.
Third World nations will fiercely defend their independence. They will reject efforts by outsiders to impose their institutions. We should welcome this spirit. For our national interest is not in their becoming like us; it is that they be free of domination by others.
This strategy of affirmative involvement and support for the independence and the diversity of developing nations serves us well. It capitalizes on the West’s inherent strengths. And it improves our ties to developing countries in a context which does not force them to make an explicit choice between East and West.
The test of our will in dealing with domestic change abroad will come not in how we use our military might but in whether we are willing to put our resources behind our words—and to make them work effectively.
An Increasingly Pluralistic World
A fourth kind of change that we are seeing is in the international system itself. Building on our experience as a pluralistic nation, we must learn to deal effectively with an increasingly pluralistic world.
Since the early 1960’s, we have seen the emergence of dozens of new nations, each with its distinctive identity, each fiercely intent on fulfilling its national aspirations.
[Page 605]We have seen the development of new powers in the world, nations which play an increasingly important role in international economic and political life.
And we have come to recognize that many of the challenges we face are genuinely global in scope. Halting the spread of nuclear weapons, managing the world’s resources sensibly and fairly, preserving an environment that can sustain us—these problems do not derive from any single nation nor can any single nation, working alone, resolve them.
A world where many must participate in designing the future rather than a few, where progress often requires cooperative effort, demands more—not less—American leadership. It requires us to exercise that leadership creatively, to inspire others to work with us toward goals we share but cannot achieve separately. It calls for a new kind of diplomacy.
We must practice, wherever possible, an inclusive form of diplomacy, working together with others to achieve common goals. Such multilateral efforts are time consuming and complex. But they can often be more productive than working alone.
The core around which these broader efforts must be built is a strong and solid relationship with our traditional allies. We have worked hard in this Administration to strengthen that partnership, and we have done so.
Working together with our allies we are able, on an increasing number of issues, to engage others in collective efforts to resolve some of the more intractable problems we face. Let me cite just one example—our effort to find a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle.
At our initiative, 44 nations have come together to search for ways—both technical and institutional—to enable nations to pursue peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. There is no “American” answer to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation; there is only an international answer, and we are working with others to find it.
We are strengthening our ties with those developing nations which exert increasing economic and political influence. We have worked to bring these and other developing nations more fully and fairly into the decisionmaking of international institutions which affect their life and ours. For enduring solutions to problems we face in common can be found only if all who have a stake also have a role and recognize their responsibilities as well as their rights in the world community.
To work effectively in a changing international system we must be prepared to work with nations whose ideologies are different from our [Page 606] own. By establishing full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, for example, we are now in a better position to deal directly and forthrightly with a government that represents one-fourth of the world’s people.
We have embarked on a deliberate effort to enhance the role of the United Nations and regional institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the Organization of African Unity. These institutions often can provide the most effective setting for resolving international disputes and for broadening the realm of international cooperation.
To secure the cooperation of other nations, we must deal with them on a basis of mutual respect and independence. Our achievement of a new Panama Canal treaty, which secures our use of the canal for coming generations, has demonstrated that fair dealing with other nations, whatever their size, can serve our interests as well as theirs. Our relations throughout this hemisphere have benefited as a result.
A Changing World Economy
Let me turn finally to the change we are seeing in the international economy—the growing stake every nation has in economic decisions made beyond its borders.
America’s strength rests on the vitality of America’s economy. Our economy continues to provide expanding opportunity for our people and continues to fuel growth around the world. We must also recognize the other side of this coin—the health of other economies around the world increasingly affects the health of our economy.
Our exports provide Americans with jobs—in fact, one out of every eight jobs in the manufacturing sector—and income for our firms and farmers. Every third acre of our farmland produces for export. Imports from abroad provide us with essential raw materials, they afford our consumers greater choice, and they dampen our inflation.
This growing economic interdependence requires that our government work with others to help create international conditions in which all nations can thrive. We cannot seek to build our own economic future at the expense of others, nor will we allow others to compete unfairly. For a new era of economic nationalism could have tragic consequences, just as it did during the protectionist warfare of the 1930’s.
We are deeply involved in working with other nations to meet the challenges of a changing world economic order.
We have been successful in strengthening economic cooperation among the industrial nations. We have instituted regular economic summits to coordinate our economic policies so that they reinforce rather than undermine one another. And there has been far closer col [Page 607] laboration among our monetary authorities in restoring order to foreign exchange markets.
We have initialed an important new multilateral trade agreement that will establish fair trading rules for the next decade.5 It will have a direct and positive impact on our economy.
We have agreed with the other industrialized members of the International Energy Agency to cut back our collective demand for oil by 2 million barrels a day. To fulfill this commitment—and to reduce our own costly and dangerous dependence on oil imports—the President has initiated a sensible program for achieving greater domestic conservation and production. For we must begin to deal urgently with a markedly changed global energy environment.
We recognize that a well-managed foreign assistance program contributes to the economic performance of the developing countries. Their growth has become an increasingly important factor in the health of our own economy. Aiding that development is not only an investment in the future of others, it is an investment in our own future as well.
The Path We Will Follow
In the foreign policy choices we are now making, we are determining the path we will follow in a new era. In unsettled times, each of us has a responsibility to be clear about how we would deal with the world as we find it.
Most Americans now recognize that we alone cannot dictate events. This recognition is not a sign of America’s decline; it is a sign of growing American maturity in a complex world.
We are stronger today because we recognize the realities of our times. This recognition, together with an equally clear understanding that we remain the most powerful of nations, should make every American as staunchly optimistic about our nation’s future as we have always been.
There can be no going back to a time when we thought there could be American solutions to every problem. We must go forward into a new era of mature American leadership—based on strength, not belligerence; on steadiness, not impulse; on confidence, not fear.
We have every reason to be confident. For 200 years, we have prospered by welcoming change and working with it, not by resisting it. We [Page 608] have understood, at home and abroad, that stability is not the status quo. It comes through human progress. We will continue in this American tradition.
- Source: Department of State Bulletin, June 1979, pp. 16–19. Vance delivered his address before a meeting of the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges.↩
- See Document 83.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 93. On September 26, 1978, the President lifted the arms embargo against Turkey by signing into law the International Security Assistance Act (S. 3075; P.L. 95–384). For the text of the President’s statement on signing the bill, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, p. 1636.↩
- Reference is to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, signed at Washington on March 26, 1979. For the text of the treaty, see Department of State Bulletin, May 1979, pp. 3–15.↩
- The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva concluded in mid-April. On June 19, the President transmitted to Congress the text of the trade agreements negotiated and entered into in Geneva and the text of the proposed Trade Agreements Act (P.L. 96–39). For the President’s transmittal message, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 1092–1094.↩