119. Editorial Note
On May 9, 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced at the White House that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiations had concluded. The U.S. and Soviet Governments instructed their delegates at Geneva to incorporate agreements reached by Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin during their negotiations into the draft treaty and resolve any outstanding issues. Vance commented on the significance of the treaty and then discussed the way forward:
“This treaty will not only mark the end of one negotiation, it will open the way for another. When it is ratified by the Senate, it will become the cornerstone for still further limits in reductions in SALT III.
“The national debate which we now commence is not only about this treaty. We are still considering as well the inescapable realities of a nuclear world—the necessity to our security of a strong defense and the grave danger to our security of an unlimited race in nuclear arms, for our security today lies in maintaining a stable strategic balance between two nations with awesome power.
“The SALT II treaty will make a substantial contribution to that stability. We have demonstrated through the SALT process that even as we compete in some areas, the United States and Soviet Union can and must cooperate to lessen the dangers of war. In this way, the treaty can serve to open the path to a more constructive and peaceful relationship between us.
“This treaty is a message of hope for us and for all the people of the world.”
Brown explained that the SALT II treaty would aid the United States in maintaining a strategic nuclear balance. He highlighted the main elements of the agreement and concluded:
“In sum, SALT will help us maintain flexible and credible deterrence, stability, and essential equivalence. Without the treaty, we could also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain. None of the challenges we face would be less without the treaty, and some would be considerably greater. All the increases we plan in our defense [Page 609] efforts with SALT would still be needed without it. But many more would be needed as well.
“I see the treaty as a valuable method of helping, along with our own moderately increased programs, to meet our nation’s strategic needs, and, if the Soviet Union will emphasize cooperation rather than competition, SALT will also allow a healthier state of U.S.-Soviet relations.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 1979, pages 23–24)
On May 11, President Jimmy Carter took part in an interview and question-and-answer session with editors and news directors. The interview began at 1:15 p.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The President discussed the beginning of the ratification process in his opening remarks:
“Perhaps more important than anything that I will address while I’m President and perhaps the most important vote that the incumbent Members of the Senate will ever cast is concerning the ratification of SALT II.
“It’s a fair treaty, enforceable treaty, verifiable treaty, and rejection of this treaty would have a devastating, adverse effect on our Nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union, on our ability to deal effectively with our allies, with uncommitted nations, and with the control of nuclear weaponry or explosives in the future throughout the world. That’s one issue.”
The President noted that the Middle East peace treaties, signed by Egyptian and Israeli officials, constituted the second crucial international issue facing the United States. He continued:
“We hope that the other nations in that region will soon realize the importance of these treaties. We’ll do all we can to implement them fully and to demonstrate to all those who are interested that we believe in and are committed to a comprehensive peace settlement.”
During the question-and-answer portion of the interview, a reporter asked the President for his assessment of the SALT treaty and whether or not he could guide the treaty through the Senate in the same form in which he intended to sign it. The President responded:
“Well, you know, we’ve negotiated this SALT treaty now for going on 7 years, under three Presidents, and it’s been negotiated in the most extreme specificity, much greater specific, detailed negotiation than ever existed with the limited test ban or SALT I or the ABM treaty.
“There’s been a hard negotiation, a tough negotiation on both sides, and the Soviets, I think, as have we, have been not only tough but fair. We have gotten the best deal we can. It’s not perfect. I could have written a unilateral treaty if I didn’t have to consult with the Soviets, that it would have been more attractive to us and less attractive to them. But for the Senate to expect the Soviets substantially to change [Page 610] their posture just because we unilaterally want them to do so is fruitless and, I think, would cause a rejection of SALT treaty completely.
“I think the treaty is to our great advantage and also to the Soviets’ great advantage. And I need not go into all the details of SALT II, but I think that it’s, at the very least, very fair, well-balanced, stable, verifiable, adequate, and a move in the right direction. It leads to SALT III, which will be even better.
“Rejection of the treaty, however, will have the most devastating consequences to our country and, I think, to world peace. It will sever, to a substantial degree, the workable relationship between ourselves and the Soviets. It will shake the confidence of our own NATO Allies in our ability to get along reasonably well with the Soviets and leave them in an increasingly vulnerable position. It would make it almost impossible for us to pursue successfully the control of nuclear weapon development in countries like India, Pakistan, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and other nations who have the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons, but have refrained from doing so because they saw an overall, worldwide restraint.
“If we show that we are not willing to restrain our own nuclear arsenal, when it’s to our advantage and the Soviets’ both to do it—we would already have several thousand nuclear weapons—there’s no way that I could go to someone like Prime Minister Desai in India, with whom I have had long discussions on this, and say, ‘We have set a good example for you, now you restrain yourself and don’t ever develop another explosion in India.’ It would be almost impossible for me to do it. So, it would wipe out any real good opportunity for us to constrain nuclear weaponry.
“And as you know, there are three ways that we can compete with the Soviet Union. One is militarily through a prospective or actual war, which we both want to avoid. The other is what we are doing. We are meeting them competitively in the political realm and also in the philosophical and moral and ethnic [ethical?] realm. And that’s where the competition goes on.
“If the Soviets should sign SALT II and, in effect, ratify it—which is, I think, inevitable—and if we should sign it and then reject it, we would lose our competitive ability to reach effectively the hearts and minds of other people around the world who will be making a choice between us, on the one hand, and the Soviets, on the other, in the future for military, political, trade alliances; because the Soviets can put themselves through a massive propaganda effort, which would be inevitable, too, in their role of a powerful but fair and peace-loving nation.
“We would be put in the role of a powerful nation that was, in effect, in their opinion, a warmonger who refused even to participate in an equitable restraint on the most destructive weapons on Earth. And [Page 611] how we could deal effectively as a nation in competition with the Soviets after we rejected the SALT treaty is something that I cannot understand and which I would hate to have to face as a President.
“So, I am asking the Senators—the ones that were sitting around this table day before yesterday [May 9]—’Before you vote on SALT, take yourselves out of the role of a Senator or out of the role of the chairman or a member of the Armed Services Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee, and put yourself in the position of the President, who would have to implement a national policy and an international policy after our Nation was crippled, in effect, by the consequences of a SALT II rejection.’
“This is undoubtedly the most important single issue that I will ever have to face as President, unless we are faced with actual war. And I hope that every American will join in with me, not in a quiescent way, just observing what’s going on, but in an active way. And I particularly hope the news media will assess the details of the SALT agreement, the consequences of either passage or rejection, and let your voices be heard in the strongest possible way.
“It transcends partisanship; it transcends the necessary objectivity of the news media toward politicians. And I hope that legitimately, within the bounds of the role of the news media, that you will actively support and promote the ratification of the SALT treaty.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pages 845–852)