167. Telegram 7084 From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State1
Subj: Paratroop Mutiny: The Situation as of Evening Nov 26. Summary: Government forces are in control of country with a few possible pockets of resistance remaining. Communists are laying low. Moderates have just about won a striking victory militarily. Pro-government forces, while stretched thin, are on top and have the momentum bred by success. Politically, we expect Popular Democrats, Socialists, and Prime Minister to take tougher stance on Communist role in government, and Costa Gomes to resist expulsion of Communists from position of influence. Moderates will exploit victory but lurch to right will not take Portugal back to pre-March 11, 1975 situation. End summary.
1. Military situation: In early evening of Nov 26, loyal troops were fully in control of Lisbon and remainder of country. Only unit not in control of government is Almada Artillery Regiment. Army, with exception of Almada Artillery, has been pulling itself together and has moved against certain key leftist units in Lisbon. Navy is supporting Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Although there is some question over status of Montijo and Tancos units, Air Force has been able to fly aircraft over Lisbon at several points during the day in support of loyal troops.
2. Armed civilian militia have not been heard from, nor do we expect them to oppose government. There have been some rumors of attempts by civilians to get arms at Beirolas Arsenal and in Setubal, but this does not appear to be a serious development.
3. PCP lays low: Last Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) communiqué was issued late Nov 25. Drafted by the political commission of [Typeset Page 566] the Central Committee, the communiqué noted that “progressive forces were losing ground” as the crisis developed and cautioned that “leftist forces would be committing a grave error in overestimating their own force and attempting any desperate act.” The PCP called for a “political solution” to the crisis. These diffident statements were balanced by a warning to moderate forces, which stated that any attempt by the right “to impose a hegemony” would only aggravate the situation and would lead, “in the short run, to renewed and graver conflicts.” According to the PCP, the only solution to the crisis lay in the restructuring of the MFA and the VI Provisional Government along “progressive” lines. The communiqué added instructions to party members which said, in effect, sit still.
4. Comment: The moderates, led by Pinheiro de Azevedo, have just about won a striking victory. On the military side, however, it should be borne in mind that the pro-government forces—while uniformly successful—are stretched thin in the Lisbon area. The commandos and the Santarem Cavalry Regiment, which have carried most of the burden, are not heavily-manned outfits. But they are clearly on top and have the momentum bred by success.
5. On the political side, basic question is whether moderates will be able to exploit their victory to its full political advantage. Problems could arise out of misguided magnamity, residual fears of a rightist counter-stroke, or just plain ineptness. We anticipate that Costa Gomes will resist the expulsion of the Communist Party and its allies from influential positions (he could argue even more strongly than before for a PCP–PS Government); it is likely, however, that Pinheiro de Azevedo, his prestige enhanced, will take a much tougher line. We would expect that both the Socialists and Popular Democrats will urge a strong stance. This time the moderates should be able to handle Costa Gomes if they remain firm and unified.
6. Early signs are that the moderates do intend to exploit their victory. Prisoners are being shipped up north. Otelo is in trouble, and Fabiao is vulnerable. The fatalities incurred by the commandos in taking the military police regiment are being stressed in GOP communiqués. This could provide the psychological spark necessary to restrict drastically radical-leftist influence in Portugal. We doubt whether the pendulum will swing back to the pre-March 11, 1975 situation, but expect that it will cut a deep and damaging swath through the left. The PCP will try to duck under the pendulum as it swings, laying the blame on the far left.
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Summary: The Embassy reported the status of the Portuguese paratroop mutiny as of the evening of November 26.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975, [no film number]. Confidential; Flash. Sent immediate for information to Bonn, London, Madrid, Moscow, the Consulate in Oporto, Paris, the Consulate in Ponta Delgada, Rome, Stockholm, the Mission to NATO, DIA, and USCINCEUR. In telegram 7090 from Lisbon, November 28, Carlucci recommended sending riot control equipment for the police as “a convincing demonstration of our desire to assist Azevedo and the GOP in a concrete fashion.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 11, Portugal—State Dept Tels To SECSTATE—NODIS (4)) On November 29, the Department instructed Carlucci to notify the Portuguese that the U.S. would send the equipment. On December 4, Carlucci reported that it had arrived. (Telegram 282402 to Lisbon, November 29, and telegram 7231 from Lisbon, December 4; ibid., Portugal—State Dept Tels From SECSTATE—NODIS (2) and Portugal—State Dept Tels To SECSTATE—NODIS (5))
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