Italy, 1973–1976
344. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) for the President’s Files
Summary: The memorandum records a discussion among Nixon, Kissinger, and Andreotti on Italian politics.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 923, VIP Visits, Italy’s PM Andreotti’s Visit, April 17, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office from 10:30 a.m. until noon. Andreotti paid an official visit to Washington from April 17 to 18; a record of Nixon’s April 18 conversation with Andreotti, during which they discussed economics, Japan, Argentina, MBFR, and East-West relations, is ibid.
345. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Summary: Kissinger discussed Andreotti’s resignation as Prime Minister.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 756, Presidential Correspondence, (Italy) Prime Minister Andreotti, Colombo Successor (1972) (Feb 72–Jul 73) (1 of 1). Limited Official Use. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon wrote at the top of the memorandum, “K, Personal Ltr to him from RN [Richard Nixon].” Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a draft letter from Nixon to Andreotti under cover of a July 10 memorandum; Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the memorandum, “This is a mistake. Unnecessary + would be misunderstood. Hold.” (Ibid.) Andreotti was succeeded as Prime Minister by Rumor on July 4. In telegram 8289 from Rome, August 16, the Embassy discussed the new government’s prospects. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973)
346. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Summary: Kissinger discussed the upcoming Italian divorce referendum.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 696, Country Files, Europe, Italy, Vol. V, Jan 74–. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum on Kissinger’s behalf. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. On May 12, a majority of Italians voted to maintain the divorce law. On May 27, Leone told Volpe “that he had wanted to avoid the referendum and that it had not turned out the way he wanted it. He stressed to me the need for DC party unity. This is no time for squabbling and the party cannot afford internal battles. It was clear however that the economic situation is the problem he finds most worrying.” (Telegram 7280 from Rome, May 28; ibid.)
347. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for Economic and Business Affairs (Enders) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Enders discussed Italy’s financial difficulties.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany 1974. Confidential; Exdis. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. Enders did not initial the memorandum. Under cover of a June 7 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt forwarded to Kissinger a letter in which Schmidt urged the need to mobilize EC gold reserves and for Kissinger “to weigh in with Simon on the political necessity of the ‘gold solution.’” (Ibid.) On June 11, G–10 Finance Ministers and central bankers meeting in Washington agreed that a country could borrow against its gold reserves valued at a price determined by itself and the lending country, that is, above the official price of gold, which remained $42.22 per ounce. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 69.
348. Telegram 8866 From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported on Italian political and economic trends.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Confidential. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, Wellington, the Mission to the EC, and the Mission in Geneva. In backchannel message 246 to Scowcroft, June 20, Volpe urged an early visit by Kissinger to Rome to demonstrate U.S. “moral and political” support for the Christian Democrats. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 425, Backchannel, Backchannel Messages, Europe, Vol. II 1974 (2 of 2)) On June 26, while in Brussels to attend a NAC meeting, Nixon met with Rumor, discussing with him the Italian political situation, CSCE, and the Western Alliance. (Memorandum of conversation, June 26; ibid., Box 1029, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversation, Memcons, 1 June 1974–(Aug. 8, 1974) HAK + Presidential (2 of 3))
349. National Intelligence Estimate 24–1–74
Summary: The estimate assessed prospects for and consequences of increased Communist influence in Italian politics.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1313, NSC Secretariat—Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Italy Contingency Plan. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
350. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Leone discussed the Italian political and economic situation.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office, began at 11:40 a.m., and ended at 1:02 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Leone was in Washington on a State visit from September 25 to 27. On September 25, Kissinger told Ford: “One thing they must hear from you—tough—is that any Communists in government would change our relationship.” Kissinger added, “The problem with Italy is that with Communists in government—they would be competent—it would make them irresistible in France, isolate Germany, give Papandreos an opening in Greece. The Socialists never would have gained power in Germany if that nice idiot hadn’t taken them into a coalition. That makes them respectable. The same would happen in Italy.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 25; ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6) Ford, Kissinger, Leone, and Moro met again on September 26. (Memorandum of conversation, September 26; ibid.)
351. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Colby discussed the possibility of a covert action program in Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Published from a copy that indicates that Colby signed the original. In telegram 13042 from Rome, September 20, Volpe discussed his concerns regarding the Italian political scene. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974) On October 17, NSC staff member Robert Gates attended a session on Italy [text not declassified], where the general consensus “was that there is no rational assessment of Italy’s future that is optimistic.” (Memorandum for the file, October 18; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 12, Italy 1974 NSC)
352. Backchannel Message WH 42950 / Tohak 49 From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Scowcroft forwarded a message from Ambassador to Vietnam Graham Martin, the former Ambassador to Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. From 1971 to 1972, Martin personally directed a [dollar amount not declassified] covert operation program in Italy. (Backchannel message WH42951/TOHAK50, October 28; ibid.)
353. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Scowcroft discussed the new Italian government.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 8, Italy (1). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it, and Ford initialed the memorandum.
354. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee
Summary: The memorandum outlined a proposal for covert action in Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret; Eyes Only. During a 40 Committee discussion of the proposal on February 4, Colby suggested that “what could be done through covert action was marginal compared with the over-all policy position.” Kissinger said that it was “strange that we always turn to the Secretary of State when we are supposed to be talking about covert action. Everything is a game of inches. We will make it clear that we won’t hold still for a coalition with the Communists, but the question is, will covert action add an inch or two to our efforts and give us a better chance for success?” Colby responded “that a certain amount could be done under present approvals—the general ‘work with media’ concept, for example. We can do this much.” Hyland reported that Hartman opposed the program as too small to be of any likely value; given the risks involved, Hyland said that Hartman believed that the United States would be “likely to catch hell without any commensurate gain.” (Memorandum for the record, February 4; ibid., 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975 GRF)
355. Research Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: CIA study on the Communist Party of Italy.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79T00889A, Box 3, The Communist Party of Italy: An Analysis and Some Predictions OPR 311. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only.
356. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Ford discussed the June 15 to 16 regional and local elections in Italy.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those noting omitted text, are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In telegram 8480 from Rome, June 13, the Embassy discussed the importance of the June 15 to 16 regional and local elections, reporting that Italians regarded them “as a vote of confidence in the center-left coalition that has governed Italy since 1962 and on the balance of power (Socialists versus Christian Democrats) within that coalition.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975) On June 3, Ford visited Rome; a memorandum of conversation of his talk with Leone on the Italian political and economic situation, the Western Alliance, détente, the Middle East, Cyprus, and the EC, is ibid.
357. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford, Kissinger, Moro, and Rumor discussed Portugal, the Italian political situation, and Cyprus.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 12, NODIS Memcons Aug. 1975, Folder 7. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting took place in Finlandia Hall. Ford and Kissinger were in Helsinki to attend the signing ceremony for the CSCE Final Act. Kissinger and Rumor also met on July 31, when they discussed the EC, the Italian political situation, and Italy’s exclusion from economic talks among the United States, UK, France, and FRG. (Memorandum of conversation, July 31; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1758) Kissinger and Rumor met again in New York on September 22; a memorandum of conversation of their talk is ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron—Official, July–Sept. 1975.
358. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: The memorandum updated NIE 24–1–74, “Prospects for and Consequences of Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics.”
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01012A. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. For NIE 24–1–74, see Document 349.
359. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger, Volpe, and other U.S. officials discussed the Italian political situation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 13, NODIS Memcons Nov. 1975. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Harlan Moen of EUR/WE on November 13. On November 6, Volpe also discussed the Italian political situation with Ford. (Memorandum of conversation, November 6; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 16)
360. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Scowcroft sought Ford’s approval of a covert action program in Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside System. Sent for action. Tab A, attached but not published, is a December 4 Presidential Finding signed by Ford. Tab B was not attached. Ford initialed his approval of Scowcroft’s recommendation on December 4. The proposal, a November 13 memorandum for the 40 Committee that is ibid., was discussed at 40 Committee meetings on November 14 and 21. (Memoranda for the record, November 15 and November 21; both in National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975 GRF)
361. Telegram 373 From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State
Summary: Volpe discussed the effects of recent press stories on CIA activities in Italy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 7, Southern Europe 1976. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In backchannel message 56 from Rome, December 22, Volpe shared with Ford and Kissinger his concern that publication of CIA activities during the 1970 and 1972 Italian elections “would have the most serious implications for” U.S. interests in Italy. (Ibid., Southern Europe 1975) In the January 7 edition of the New York Times, Seymour Hersh wrote that the CIA had provided at least $6 million “to individual anti-Communist political leaders in Italy since Dec. 8 in an effort to prevent further Communist Party gains in national elections.” (“C.I.A. Is Reported To Give Anti-Reds in Italy $6 Million,” New York Times, Jan. 7, p. 77)
362. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee
Summary: The memorandum reported on the political action program in Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. An attachment, [text not declassified], is attached but not published.
363. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Yeo) for the Economic Policy Board Executive Committee
Summary: Yeo discussed the political and economic situation in Italy.
Source: Ford Library, L. William Seidman Papers, Seidman Subject File, Box 122, Economic Policy Board Memoranda, 1/1–8/76. Confidential. Concurred in by Katz and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs L. Bruce Laingen. Yeo did not sign the memorandum. Seidman initialed the memorandum. From March 7 to 10, Simon, Yeo, and Seidman visited Rome for discussions with Italian officials on the Italian economic and political situation. Telegram 4037 from Rome, March 11, summarized their talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976) Memoranda of conversation recording their March 8 discussions with Baffi and with Colombo, as well as their March 9 discussion with Moro, are in Ford Library, L. William Seidman Papers, Foreign Trips File, Box 314, Rome, March 7–10, 1976 (1).
364. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Scowcroft sought Ford’s approval of the suspension of the covert action program in Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside System. Sent for information. Ford initialed his approval of Scowcroft’s recommendation on February 9. The 40 Committee discussed the suspension of the Italian covert action program on February 3. (Memorandum for the record, February 3; ibid., 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975 GRF)
365. Note Prepared by Rob Roy Ratliff of the National Security Council Staff
Summary: Ratliff recorded a conversation with Scowcroft on Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret. In an April 6 meeting with Ford and Scowcroft in the Oval Office, Rumsfeld reported: “Italy. There was a conference here in town. The consensus was that Italy could go communist within a few months. We all have said we didn’t see how an Italy with communists in the government could participate in NATO. The question is what we can do. Brent said facetiously maybe a covert operation.” Ford replied, “Why not? If that is what we should do, then we should at least go to the Congress. For us to sit on our hands just because of Congress would be irresponsible.” Rumsfeld responded, “Structure a debate in NATO that a communist government means automatic suspension from NATO. If we lost Italy, we might lost [lose] France, too.” (Memorandum of conversation, April 6; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 18)
366. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Lord summarized and forwarded a paper entitled “Italy: If the Communists Come In.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 19, NODIS Briefing Memos, 1976, Folder 1. Secret. Drafted on April 13 by Jenone Walker of S/P. The attachment, an April 6 paper prepared by Walker, is attached but not published.
367. National Security Study Memorandum 242
Summary: The President directed the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake a priority review of U.S. policy toward Italy in the near term.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 44, NSSM 242—U.S. Policy Toward Italy (1). A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS.
368. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford, Rockefeller, and Scowcroft discussed the Italian political and economic situation.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 19. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those noting omitted text, are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Rockefeller and AID Administrator Daniel Parker visited Italy to assess the damage done by a May 6 earthquake in the northeastern part of the country. In a May 17 memorandum to Ford, Parker discussed the political considerations involved in the U.S. response to the earthquake. (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 8, Italy (5)) Reports on Connally’s activities in Italy are ibid., Outside the System Chronological Files, Box 4, 4/16/76–430/76; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 7, Southern Europe 1975; and ibid., Southern Europe 1976. In telegram 63163 to Rome, March 16, the Department told Volpe that it was “neither involved in nor encouraging” Connally’s fund-raising efforts and could not “confirm that such activities are in fact taking place. We share your misgivings about such a project and agree that you should not follow up with him or with others said to have been involved.” (Ibid.)
369. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Rumor discussed the Italian political and economic situation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820117–2454. Secret; Nodis. Approved by Collums in S on July 12. The meeting took place at the SAS Hotel. Kissinger was in Oslo from May 20 to 22 to attend a NATO ministerial meeting. In Backchannel Message 109 to Kissinger and Scowcroft, May 6, Volpe discussed the effects of the Church subcommittee investigations into the Lockheed affair on the Italian political scene. (Ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 7, Southern Europe 1976)
370. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Scowcroft sought Ford’s approval of a scaled-down covert action program in Italy.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Italy—GRF 1974–1977. Secret; Eyes Only. Outside System. Sent for action. Tab A, [text not declassified], is attached but not published. Ford initialed his approval of Scowcroft’s recommendation on May 22. On May 27, Ford signed a new Presidential Finding covering the revised covert action program. (Ibid.) The OAG discussed the proposal for a scaled-down covert action program on May 20. (Memorandum for the record, May 21; ibid., 40 Committee/OAG Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1976 GRF)
371. Executive Summary of the Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 242
Summary: The study responded to NSSM 242, “U.S. Policy Toward Italy.”
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 44, NSSM 242—U.S. Policy Toward Italy (2). Secret; Exdis. Sent to Scowcroft under cover of a June 11 memorandum from Hartman. For NSSM 242, see Document 367. In a June 15 memorandum to Scowcroft, Bush wrote: “The Executive Summary attached to NSSM 242 (page iv) [the third to last paragraph] lists CIA, along with State, as favoring Option IV in the event of a Left Front. This arises from a misunderstanding, and does not appear in the body of the text. Whatever the merits of this option in the contingency described, the Agency did not, and does not, take a position on the options set forth. Our role was to participate in the intelligence analysis and estimate aspects of this NSSM.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 13, Italy 1976 (5) WH)
372. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Scowcroft forwarded and summarized a CIA interim assessment of the June 20 to 21 Italian election.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 8, Italy (6). Secret. Sent for information. Tab A, attached but not published, is a June 24 memorandum from Bush to Ford forwarding the CIA assessment. Bush noted that while the elections had “avoided the ‘worst case’ outcome, they had ‘solved nothing.’ The immediate outlook is for some weeks or even months of intricate maneuvering as the parties sort out their relationships and a temporary government presides, a poor position for any attack on Italy’s economic problems—which will not wait.” Both the memorandum from Bush to Ford and the memorandum from Scowcroft to Ford were sent to Scowcroft under cover of a June 25 memorandum from Clift. Scowcroft wrote on this memorandum, “President has seen.”
373. Telegram 10955 From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State
Summary: Volpe discussed the Italian fall-out from the Puerto Rico economic summit.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 9, Italy—State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE—NODIS (4). Secret; Nodis. In telegram 170069 to Rome, July 9, the Department affirmed its disassociation from the idea of “‘programmatic’ cooperation of the Communists in order to solve Italy’s problems,” as well as U.S. “opposition to Communist participation in the government,” which extended “to any steps that point toward PCI’s ultimate acquisition to power even if, for the moment, they stop well short of it. Nothing said to the Italians at Puerto Rico could have given a contrary impression.” (Ibid., Box 8, Italy—State Department Cables From SECSTATE—NODIS (3)) Documentation on the June 27–28 Puerto Rico economic summit is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976.