77. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Commander in Chief, US Forces, Europe
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
- Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff (Notetaker)
- U.K.
- James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
- Alan Campbell, Deputy Under Secretary
- France
- Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Francois de Laboulaye, Political Director
- F.R.G.
- Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Guenther van Well, Political Director
- Dr. Heinz Weber, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
SUBJECTS
- East-West Relations (European Communist Parties); Angola; Spain; Yugoslavia; Cyprus; Italy
Kissinger: We have a rather full agenda. The Political Directors have been meeting and we have to discuss: Soviet relations (or East-West relations); Spain; Yugoslavia; Angola; Italy; Cyprus; Portugal; and the Northern Flank.
Is there any particular order you would like to discuss these?
Van Well: In that order.
Kissinger: East-West relations first?
Van Well: Yes.
[Page 308]East-West Relations (European Communist Parties)
Kissinger: On East-West relations, I outlined our thinking at the restricted meeting [of the North Atlantic Council]. Would my colleagues like to express a view?
Callaghan: I think the reading we haven’t yet had is the reaction of the Soviet Union to the other European Communist Parties who seem to be declaring their independence to a certain extent. To what extent, if any, will this affect Soviet policy? We didn’t cover this aspect in the NATO discussions. I have no particular information on it. Jean, what about France?
Sauvagnargues: The French Communist Party has shown some independence but not much. My general impression is that it didn’t come out just as Brezhnev wanted. The way Helsinki came out. He seems to be running into some trouble. I’ll bet there is some criticism of Helsinki in the USSR.
Kissinger: It’s not easy to have a conference that creates domestic difficulties in every country. [Laughter]
De Laboulaye: Two of our experts studied this problem. They looked into the relations of the Communist Parties after Helsinki, relations of the Soviet Union to Communist Parties, and détente itself. I gave copies to my colleagues.
With respect to the relations of the Soviet Union to the Communist Parties in the West, a discussion seems to be taking place in Russia regarding what advantage the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties can make of the so-called crisis of capitalism. They can’t agree. Their press indicates this. Also there is a doctrinal difference on whether they should accept alliances with left-wing parties. This too came out in their specialized press.
Kissinger: Did the Chinese give you a lecture on this?
Sauvagnargues: Yes. It was part of the aggressive Soviet policy. They are partly right. It is not consistent with détente.
Kissinger: To us the Chinese expressed opposition to all the European Communist Parties without distinction. They consider revisionism just a Soviet tactic. They showed uncompromising opposition to any alliance.
Callaghan: Can’t we make use of this to play on with the Italian Communist Party, to force them to declare their independence or not? Or would it backfire? If they are not dancing to Moscow’s tune, we can’t get Moscow to control them in our countries.
These parties will have considerable electoral appeal if they are independent of Moscow. When they say the capitalist system doesn’t work, they seem to have a good case when there are six million unem [Page 309] ployed. They may not be in government, but they could have substantial impact on government.
To the extent we can show they are not independent, it can be very useful to us electorally.
Kissinger: How do we know if they are independent?
De Laboulaye: I was with Rumor last night at dinner. He said that Berlinguer would have to be kicked out if they ever got to power. It is just a mask.
Kissinger: The acid test isn’t whether they would come to power democratically; the test is whether they would allow a reversal. It is difficult for a Communist Party to admit that history can be reversed, and allow themselves to be voted out of power.
Van Well: Their papers say they are for a change in power democratically.
Kissinger: Coming in?
Van Well: No, going out.
Genscher: We need some better assurance.
Kissinger: It is almost inconceivable that in power they won’t seek to bring about such political change that they couldn’t be voted out.
Van Well: The essence of that Conference was that they would accept democratic change.
Kissinger: To the extent one can trust the Chinese view, they claim the Spanish Communist Party is more independent of Moscow than the French or Italian.
De Laboulaye: The Soviet Union themselves know that a Communist Party in government isn’t compatible with détente.
Kissinger: They may realize that if one gets in, the right wing parties in the US and Europe will use it against détente.
Genscher: There is not one single Western Communist Party that has given up its final objective. They still want the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is the decisive point. The danger is they become more attractive to the voters. It is easier for us to accept orthodox parties than parties that give the appearance of being independent. They become more popular the more independent they become. The Italian Communist Party has one objective, to become independent.
Rumor was afraid that if there was a discussion of Italy’s internal affairs here, it would have a dangerous effect on the Socialists. In other words, he sees a Popular Front as possible.
There is no problem in Germany and in Britain.
Callaghan: Except that it weakens the alliance if it happens elsewhere. My point is we should recognize they are still the true enemy and not let them increase their appeal. Although the nuisance value is [Page 310] more from these little parties that worm into the trade unions, the Communists are in fact less trouble to deal with. But we shouldn’t be deceived.
Sonnenfeldt: No matter how much they are trouble for Moscow, their rise in our countries will affect the whole discussion of security issues and domestic priorities, and this will affect the balance of power over the long run.
Van Well: The question is whether to cultivate them or to expose them and challenge their pretentions. They might be pushed even more to prove their independence.
Callaghan: We’ve got to recognize that they are the real enemy, even if they are more independent. Secondly, presentationally, we should try to make them appear as not independent, to make them try harder to prove their independence.
Kissinger: The problem is, if we stress their independence, we create the impression that that’s the only obstacle. I agree with your first point: they’re the real enemy, partly for Sonnenfeldt’s reason and partly because it would weaken support for the Alliance in America.
Genscher: The problem would still be the same even if a party completely independent of Moscow—like Albania—came into power.
Callaghan: Where does this discussion lead to? Do we want them more independent or less independent?
Van Well: We have to confront them on both counts: as part of the international Communist movement and on their commitment to parliamentary democracy.
Sonnenfeldt: Make them prove their loyalty to democracy for 20 years, and then see.
Kissinger: But we don’t want to encourage our intellectuals to try a dialogue with them.
Genscher: It’s not just the intellectuals. The Church, too, and other groups.
Callaghan: We are strong enough intellectually to handle it; that’s why we are for détente. But not the trade unions. I find it very hard to talk to the trade unions on this.
Kissinger: I don’t know if contacts with Soviet groups are as bad as what the Italian Communists are doing in the U.S., making themselves respectable. To the extent they become accepted in the U.S., they can use this in Italy to prove their respectability. The Soviet groups are so clumsy.
Van Well: Refusal of contact means we ignore them.
Kissinger: What do we gain by talking with them?
Van Well: We should confront them, challenge them. Especially labor groups.
[Page 311]Kissinger: You mean the ILO?
Van Well: Yes.
Kissinger: That’s domestic politics. That was the price we had to pay to George Meany to avoid cutting off all UN funds.
Callaghan: My Labour friends asked me to raise this. I wasn’t going to.
Kissinger: Our objective is to use the next two years while we’re in it to get reforms so we can stay.
Callaghan: Let me know what reforms you want and our people will help.
The Soviet Union constantly is making approaches, and other East Europeans, saying: “Why can’t we have a dialogue?”
Genscher: It does make a difference with the Western trade unions whether they cooperate with the Communists in their own countries or whether they have contact with East Europeans. Our unions have contacts everywhere in Eastern Europe but are free of Communist influence at home.
Kissinger: The problem is people like Mitterrand or the Italians deliberately seeking high-level contacts in the U.S. and using that at home to prove they can conduct a pro-Western policy. That will lend to reduction of concern with security and an undermining of the Alliance.
Genscher: I didn’t make myself clear.
Kissinger: I understand your point.
I’m getting under pressure for blocking contacts with Italian Communists, and also some of your left wing people, Jean.
Back to the Soviet Union. The consensus of the Political Directors seemed to be that they would continue even after Brezhnev, and this age group, to conduct the same policy.
De Laboulaye: Yes, but there will be temptation, such as Portugal and Angola.
[Omitted here is discussion of Angola, Spain, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Italy.]
- Summary: Kissinger, Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher, along with U.S.,
British, French, and West German officials, discussed European
Communist parties within the context of East-West
relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 23, (Classified External Memcons). Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador’s residence. On November 25, Kissinger met with French Socialist Party First Secretary Francois Mitterrand for a discussion of West European Socialism and the French political scene. (Memorandum of conversation, November 25; ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2142)
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