73. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • UK
  • James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
  • Ambassador Sir Peter Ramsbotham
  • Alan Campbell, Deputy Under Secretary
  • Jeremy Greenstock, British Embassy
  • France
  • Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet
  • Francois de Laboulaye, Political Director
  • Jean Pierre Masset, Counselor, French Embassy
  • FRG
  • Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Deputy Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Berndt von Staden
  • Guenther van Well, Political Director
  • Dr. Heinz Weber, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • U.S.
  • Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
  • Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff


  • Southern Flank; Third World

Southern Flank

[The four principals met privately in the Secretary’s living room from 6:00 p.m.–7:33 p.m. They discussed, interalia, the European Socialists’ Solidarity document on Portugal, Tab A. They were then joined by the others.]

[Page 287]

Kissinger: We thought we would meet for an hour before dinner. Then perhaps after dinner the four Foreign Ministers would meet again for an hour.

Jim, I think that is the best way to proceed.

Callaghan: Right.

Kissinger: You want to lead off, and go to your agenda.

Callaghan: The Agenda is in two parts—analysis and action. Actions to prevent Communist takeover and to deal with it if it happens. Then coordination.

We thought we would have a discussion tonight. The Regular Session of the General Assembly will provide another opportunity for us to discuss these matters. We would tonight see what is possible for our individual action or in concert.

The southern flank is in the worst-case scenario and many countries may go Communist by the end of the ’70’s—Spain, Portugal, Italy and conceivably Greece and Turkey.

The causes are different. The virus isn’t travelling north at the moment. It is not a trend, but there are increased opportunities. Wherever the forces of democracy are weak and divided, there are opportunities. I assume that the Russians wouldn’t be adverse to helping this process along whenever it doesn’t cost much. They will continue to be opportunistic. Their ideology will militate for this—seeing the crisis of capitalism.

There are limitations on the Soviet Union. We start with the assumption that they don’t want military confrontation with NATO. They are not in a hurry to take on expensive clients—like another Cuba. They don’t want to inject a vaccination into Western Europe, which would set it back ten years. The major Western Communist Parties are warning against it. Moscow doesn’t want new theoreticians—a new Tito or Mao. They don’t want to aim too high and suffer a loss.

As to the Brezhnev doctrine and its reverse, as we were talking about now, in spite of CSCE, we assume the Soviet Union would follow the Brezhnev doctrine and the Czech model. They would probably acquiesce militarily and politically to the reverse doctrine, except in their propaganda. But to do this would be repugnant to us and to one of the principles of democracy.

CSCE has drawn a line between the two spheres of influence. So we have to find something in the gray area between methods repugnant to us and deterring Soviet influence.

As for our own public opinion—which we have already had a word about here—futile gestures would compound the bitterness.

We needn’t be so pessimistic. Democratic forces exist in all the countries. We can give help when we are asked. We can show contin[Page 288]uing concern. We have coped with threats to Trieste, and Berlin; we have coped with conventional and nuclear military threats. We can cope with these. If we need new policies and new institutions, we can adopt them. If not, we can intensify the kind of actions we have already taken.

There are the traditional responses of a military situation, which we don’t need to go into. There is the possibility of civil war, or near civil war, in Portugal. How would we react? We don’t need to go into this question tonight. We can give economic aid—but the sums are so large that we couldn’t really provide it individually. Here the EEC and the U.S. could join to encourage pluralistic institutions.

We can’t deal with the problem by just economic aid. There is also the phenomenon of “prosperity Communism”—as in Italy. Aid shouldn’t be excluded, but there are limited countries where it could be used.

There is the possibility of aid to individual trade unions and leaders and churches and expatriate communities. Especially at election times.

Then there is the question of the media. The most effective method is exposure of the aims of the Communists and the means they would use to dominate society. Television and the media have been very effective in Western Europe on this. The chief task should be to continue this. So that the vaccination I have spoken of will take.

Then there is the question of speeches the Ministers can take, linking events there and détente.

Then, collective alliance responses. This seems to conflict with the Helsinki principles of détente. But we shouldn’t be cautious. I think Henry said we don’t want to lose the war like gentlemen.

Kissinger: I think I said you don’t get awards for losing like a gentleman.

Callaghan: NATO this December could state something on this.

That is the way I would introduce the agenda. I did this by way of analysis. Now we should move to consider responses in the situation of pre-Communist takeover, and then what we should do in case of Communist takeover.

Sauvagnargues: It is a very good analysis. Thank you, Jim. I agree with almost everything you said.

To start the discussion, we should discuss the problem of aid. As for our position, we discussed it very thoroughly at Helsinki. Our position is that we give aid only to a Portugal that is a pluralistic Portugal. The other possibilities are that we dangle it. Or do we give conditional aid? But that is our position.

[Page 289]

Kissinger: I agree with the EC view: to aid only a democratic Portugal. I would say aid only to a non-Communist Portugal. If Antunes takes over, it may not be so pluralistic.

Sauvagnargues: It may be pro-Western, but not such a pluralistic democracy. This could be a criterion.

Callaghan: This is going to be a problem, but we have to face it. We will face a left-of-center Portugal, unless Spinola comes back. Which I, for one, would strongly oppose.

Sauvagnargues: Is it a possibility? Their Ambassador told me it is possible.

Sonnenfeldt: All of us have the same reports of a possible right-wing coup. It is a low probability.

Sauvagnargues: Very low.

Callaghan: If we are asked, I take it we are against a Spinola-backed coup. He would be a force that would divide the non-Communist groups in Portugal.

Genscher: To come back to the criteria, we would have to come back to a non-Communist or non-Communist-dominated Portugal. They can’t have a pluralistic democracy as we know it in the Western countries because the liberals and conservatives can’t get in. So the criterion has to be non-Communist-dominated.

Sonnenfeldt: We are in the first phase.

Sauvagnargues: So if we had a coup tomorrow with Communist participation through an Armed Forces government, would it still apply?

Sonnenfeldt: We are in an awkward situation because Soares has now said he would want Communist participation in a pluralistic situation.

Sauvagnargues: That is why I said it.

Kissinger: We don’t necessarily care what Soares thinks.

Sauvagnargues: The Portuguese Ambassador said something like this. President Giscard said to me we should avoid giving the impression to the outside of a coordinated response. But I said to the Ambassador that we would give no help to Portugal unless it was truly a democratic government, with no Communist influence. I was clear on that. He told me there were encouraging developments in the north, and in elections in the trade unions, particularly for the Socialist parties. He said there could be a coalition government. He didn’t mention Communist influence. He asked me: “Would this affect the French position? Would your condition be met?” I said we couldn’t tell; we would have to see what the situation was. If there was clearly no Communist influence, then the condition was met.

[Page 290]

Callaghan: If the Portuguese economy is on the point of collapse, and the Communists are excluded at our request, they are also excluded from any responsibility for the collapse if it takes place. If they are in—in a minor capacity—I don’t think we should say we won’t help.

Sauvagnargues: It depends on what positions they have.

Callaghan: If they have a Minister of Interior, no. But if the other parties bring them in, to share the responsibility, maybe.

Kissinger: We are talking about a situation where we prevent economic chaos. If they have some role in the government and we pour in massive economic aid, on the basis that pluralism has prevailed, we may give a precedent for Italy.

Callaghan: We do want to prevent it. But if it were basically a Socialist Government, with the PPD and some Communists in relatively minor posts, we shouldn’t hang it up on principle.

Genscher: I spoke of a Communist Government or Communist-dominated government. Unless there occurred fundamental changes in Portugal, any government that joined the political parties could come about only with the inclusion of the Communists. Because all parties have come out for participation by the Communists. If we say a government with Communists is pluralistic, and if we give aid to it, we may create a disastrous situation for other countries like Italy. It would be dangerous to work out a rule to be automatically applied. We should decide case by case.

Sauvagnargues: Yes.

Callaghan: But there is this rule: If it is Communist-dominated, then there is no aid. This we can put to one side.

Genscher: I am greatly concerned that we think of giving aid to a government where the Communists only hold minor posts because it could be a precedent for Italy. Because I am sure if the Communists join the Government in Italy, they would say “We don’t want the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of the Interior, but we will settle for the Ministry of Labor.” They want to enter through the back door.

Callaghan: We won’t follow precedent. Portugal is just coming out of a dictatorship. Italy is different.

Kissinger: Hans isn’t saying that because we aid Portugal we will aid Italy. He is saying that this removes the one symbolic barrier to Communist participation in Italy—that it would isolate Italy from the West. The Communist Party in Italy would say there is now proof they can do it. We wouldn’t necessarily give aid to Italy but that is a different problem.

We had this discussion in the spring. I have always felt that a Portuguese Government with Communists in it isn’t a good candidate for [Page 291] aid. If they come in and share the responsibility for chaos, we could take a hands-off policy. The only risk then is that the Russians will step in.

Callaghan: So we can’t take a decision now. We should work to prevent it.

Kissinger: Just to emphasize my doctrinaire nature: I think the United States would not give aid to a government with any Communist participation. I mean, if it is the Minister of Sports or something . . . .

Callaghan: That is a hard attitude now.

Kissinger: [To Hartman] Does Carlucci understand it?

Hartman: He does; Soares doesn’t.

Sauvagnargues: The Portuguese Ambassador told me Soares’ position was he would be ready to take part in a coalition government, and he would even propose it, if the powers of the coalition were defined, and the meetings of the Armed Forces Movement should be public. So that the two main powers in the government were defined in their roles.

Otherwise, we are better off with the powers in the hands of the Armed Forces Movement.

Callaghan: We are back where we were an hour ago.

Sauvagnargues: There is no real government. The power structure is different from the power structure of a Western democracy. So we can wait and see.

Kissinger: As long as you all understand the United States won’t give aid to a government that has Communists in it.

Callaghan: I won’t take that as a final position. You don’t want to cut off your nose to spite your face. You don’t advocate aid to a Communist-dominated government.

Sonnenfeldt: The only ones that are advocating that are the Swedes.

Callaghan: The U.S. isn’t going to like any government that emerges in Portugal.

Kissinger: No. It will be a novel experience once our Congress realizes what an Antunes government is like. That is a different problem. Or Soares.

Sauvagnargues: It will be a something with a philosophy of nonalignment; something like Algeria.

Kissinger: I will distinguish something like the left wing of the Italian Socialist Party, which we wouldn’t like, but we wouldn’t fight, and we would even consider giving aid. There is a strategic importance and a symbolic importance. I am worried about a government in Portugal opening the floodgates in Italy. If everyone thinks of it as a mod[Page 292]erate government and they get massive amounts of aid. So the Italian Communists can say they can be members of the government and Italy will get massive aid.

We won’t like Antunes, or Soares, but we can live with them. As long as it is not a precedent for Italy.

Callaghan: Soares won’t be neutralist.

Kissinger: No, but Antunes might, and we would be prepared to give this some economic support. At least until Congress caught on to what it stood for.

Kosciusko-Morizet: Don’t forget that in 1947 and 1948, the U.S. gave aid to the Socialist Government in France, to get rid of the Communists.

Kissinger: I agree with Jim to this extent. If some Portuguese leader said to us: “We have got to have a few Communists in the government for a few months so I can get the economy going, and then I can get rid of them.” But I see no leader strong enough to do that.

Genscher: That is the difference between a Communist-dominated government and Communist participation.

Sonnenfeldt: If they get 12 percent, there is no reason why they have to participate in the government. There are a lot of countries where they get 34 percent and are in the opposition.

Genscher: In Germany, yes. [Laughter]

Kissinger: You will talk with Soares.

Callaghan: Yes. Why don’t we talk about Italy next. I had a talk with Rumor. In July I came back with the impression there is nothing to prevent a Communist takeover. The Christian Democrats are divided.

Kissinger: I can’t even get Rumor to stay awake when I talk to him. [Laughter]

Callaghan: You are more European than the rest of us! Now Moro has said they wouldn’t cooperate at all with the Communists.

Sonnenfeldt: He said he wouldn’t let them in the government.

Callaghan: That is right.

Kissinger: But we understand that Moro’s checking all legislation with the Communists.

Callaghan: But if they don’t let them in, how can they be in the government? I even check our legislation with the Liberals once in a while.

Kissinger: That is pretty low. [Laughter]

Genscher: I think their strategy in Italy is different. They are trying at the local level to cooperate with the Christian Democrats and at that level to create majorities. They are aiming at getting the Christian Democrats used to cooperate with the Communists, so it will have effect at [Page 293] the Party Conferences. So a majority at the party conventions may vote for a continuation of this cooperation and make their policies dependent on these regional groupings. It is not weeks or months; it is a long-term thing.

Kissinger: I agree. And because the right wing of the Christian Democrats are against cooperation only because they are not Catholic. It will be a strategy of gaining respectability by being invited to the United States. So if they gain, what Moro says about not participating will be irrelevant.

On Italy, I am stuck. Some of my people want to support the left wing of the Christian Democrats. The young people.

Hartman: It is not necessarily the left wing.

Kissinger: It will end up that way. Our ability to reform the Christian Democratic Party is limited. I don’t have any brilliant ideas. All our schemes are theoretical and aren’t worth a damn, Jim. Some of our people are playing with a slight shift to the right.

Callaghan: What it needs is a party that cleans up the garbage.

Kissinger: And cleans out the bureaucracy.

Callaghan: We should think about what we do in NATO planning. This is one bit of contingency planning we must do.

Sauvagnargues: With respect to Italy, it is extremely difficult to do anything. The relationship of Italy in the EEC, and in NATO.

Callaghan: But what is the value of NATO with an Italy and Portugal that are Communist?

Genscher: I am afraid we are speaking about this or that particular country. But there is a fundamental question involved here, of how democratic countries and democratic parties in this era of détente can fight Communism domestically. When I was Minister of Interior, one Land President said we should close the doors to Italian laborers. The Italian Ambassador told me this would be disastrous for Italy because those laborers were financed not by the Italian Government, but by the Communist Party. Because the Communist Party was identified with the status of a democratic party. So détente—which I agree is necessary—can’t be identified with toleration of Communism domestically. Otherwise, we wake up some morning with some surprises.

Callaghan: I agree. Détente is making it difficult to fight the facile argument that if we can have détente with governments, how can we resist having a “dialogue” with Communist Parties. It is a problem for France too.

Kissinger: On the other hand, if there were no détente, we would have a polarization within our societies on the issue of peace and war.

Callaghan: I am not criticizing détente at all.

[Page 294]

Kissinger: There would be polarization in the name of peace.

Jim, you said something that is attractive: Why don’t we try for the NATO meeting, or some other suitable meeting, to have some declaration—not a declaration; we have had enough experience with that—on the nature of détente, and domestic Communism. We don’t have a problem of Communism here, but we have a problem of defending defense budgets in an era of détente. Maybe just the four of us.

Callaghan: Could we carry the Italians along?

Sonnenfeldt: Impossible. Not those Italians. A lot of the problem has to do with how we define détente for our people.

Kissinger: Dinner is ready. Why don’t we go in?

[The party moves to the Dining Room at 8:35 p.m.]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to NATO’s southern flank.]

Southern Flank

Kissinger: Could we go back to the southern flank? Although this was a valuable discussion.

On Italy, I derived no conclusion. Unless I missed a point. [Laughter] Do we let nature take its course in Italy?

Callaghan: I don’t think Moro will continue. I see such debility in the parties there.

Kissinger: I agree with Hans it won’t happen in the next six months.

Laboulaye: The next important event is the election for the Mayor of Rome.

Kissinger: What happens in Spain if Franco dies tomorrow? He is in better shape than five years ago when I saw him with President Nixon.

If we want a pluralistic system—for which nothing in the history of Spain offers any great optimism—how do we do it?

Genscher: I would like to repeat what I said in Dublin at the Foreign Ministers Conference of the EC—and is still my conviction: I was sure that Franco hasn’t made up his mind yet and is still amenable to influences by outsiders—family, old friends from the liberation movement. So we should use all our influence to persuade him. I don’t know what your President said. Arias made an excellent impression on us in Helsinki, and the way he was treated may have helped him stay in office. Because it was in doubt.

If they execute the two Basques, this could be a setback, because we will be confronted with an excited public opinion and it will harm our efforts to bring Spain closer to us. We should all use our influence to do this.

[Page 295]

Callaghan: We will do that next week. That is very short-range.

Genscher: But it is very important.

Kissinger: I find it difficult to see what we should want to bring about. And how to do it. I understand your point about the Basques and we will do that.

Callaghan: In Spain we have an excellently organized Communist Party, and unlike Portugal we have a middle class in Spain. But the church is, to put it mildly, open-minded towards Communism. So if Franco died, we would have a situation like Portugal, with the Communist Party becoming active immediately.

Kissinger: We are hearing reports that the middle-level military are sympathetic towards Communism.

Genscher: So the only advice we could give is to continue to oppose the Communists.

Sauvagnargues: Their man is a very second-rate man who can’t do anything.

Kissinger: Their Foreign Minister will be our undoing. [To Callaghan:] Do you want our bases there?

Callaghan: If you take Gibraltar!

Kissinger: We don’t stop at Torrejon anymore on the way to the Middle East because each time, he comes out to greet me with a one-hour lecture I can’t understand.

Callaghan: It’s a permanent problem with me. The last referendum [in Gibraltar] showed 13,000 in favor of staying with Britain, and 27 against.

This fills me with gloom because in each country we end with nothing we can do.

Kissinger: Portugal may be manageable. But I can’t accept the proposition that we just let the southern flank disintegrate.

Let me ask what if there is a civil war in Yugoslavia?

Genscher: That is exactly the question Franco asked!

Kissinger: I don’t make personal remarks about you!

Sauvagnargues: All we can do is to make threats against the Soviets. As you did in 1973.

Kissinger: But they may just keep going.

Sauvagnargues: No, the real danger is infiltration. And they will probably hesitate to do that because of Yugoslav nationalism.

Kissinger: Sometime—not in Yugoslavia maybe—they will just keep going and we will have to escalate. When there is a new generation in power, the abject behavior they have shown in crises won’t be repeated. With the strategic reality as it is, where the local reality favors them, they will just continue.

[Page 296]

Sauvagnargues: The local realities don’t favor them there. There will be guerrillas.

Kissinger: Totally ruthless people are successful.

Callaghan: But we can deter them if we make our position clear.

Kissinger: But I heard Italy wouldn’t join us. Could the four of us make a statement?

Sauvagnargues: I would favor that. About Yugoslavia, or about intervention?

Kissinger: There would be some value. About détente, nonparticipation of Communists in government.

Callaghan: If Italy is complaining about being left out, here is a case for them to join us. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I would welcome Italy to join.

Callaghan: What about the rest of NATO? What about Holland, Belgium, Denmark? Do we just go ahead and issue a declaration?

Kissinger: I wouldn’t object trying it out on all of NATO. We certainly won’t get the Dutch. Or do you think we will?

Callaghan: I think we will.

Sauvagnargues: You mixed up non-interference and nonparticipation of Communists in governments of the West. Of course, this is a pretty explosive combination. I don’t know the effects. It would be useful to put the Soviets clearly on notice that any interference would have strong consequences. But the statement about nonparticipation—including a strong statement by you—would have negative consequences in French public opinion.

Callaghan: A shift of 2 percent in opinion could mean non-cooperation with France.

Van Well: Could there be a statement in the NATO communiqué about non-intervention?

Kissinger: Soviet intervention isn’t the issue. In Portugal, the Soviet contribution wasn’t decisive. In Italy it isn’t the issue. They took an opportunity and made a marginal contribution. In Yugoslavia, it will be Soviet intervention.

If in the French election, 2 percent vote differently. . . . That would mean Spain, France, Italy—and it would mean a radical shift in American foreign policy. To keep our troops in Europe—well, maybe in Germany—our public opinion wouldn’t support it.

Callaghan: That is why we are here. We have to make our position clear. How do we affect our opinion in an era of détente?

Sauvagnargues: But “CIA meddling” has been one of the explosive issues in France for 25 years.

Callaghan: That is not responsible for the emergence of Communism.

[Page 297]

Sauvagnargues: But in France in the 1940’s, when America helped Europe tremendously . . . .

Kissinger: I was struck at Helsinki by the total bankruptcy of the Communist system where it’s been in power for 30 years. They can keep in power only by a kind of petty bourgeouis nationalism of the 1930’s variety. But in the West, with prosperity, and security, that is the only place where it is growing. It is an absolutely inexplicable phenomenon.

Genscher: I think we have come off our original subject, namely the distinction between domestic developments in Portugal, Italy and Spain, and the situation where there is one possibility of Soviet intervention, namely, Yugoslavia. The question is whether we should put in the decision-making process in the Soviet Union that the West will acquiesce or will take action. Yugoslavia is not in the West, and the Helsinki documents would be relevant. They would come in there only if asked, and it won’t happen. They should know this is impossible and it would mean the end of détente.

Kissinger: Is this the only penalty? Will there be military intervention? Or is it just the end of détente?

Genscher: This is just the first phase. One must not forget that other types of intervention, after a short interval, didn’t prevent the restoration of détente. In 1968.

Sauvagnargues: Stop technical exchanges with the Soviet Union. Stop exports, credits. I would say military intervention is practically excluded.

Callaghan: Well, let me worry this one a little. Are we saying as a result of Helsinki that the present borders are inviolate except by peaceful means?

Genscher: Well learned! [Laughter]

Callaghan: Are we saying Soviet intervention is unacceptable?

Kissinger: What does “unacceptable” mean?

Callaghan: I think “unacceptable” means that if they intervene militarily this will be met by military means. If they know this, they will be less likely to do it.

Kissinger: That is what I meant. If you say it is unacceptable, it has to mean we are prepared to consider military intervention. If it is only the end of détente, it will be like 1968, where they will do a fait accompli and start a peace offensive three months later.

Callaghan: Is it right to make the criterion that the Soviet Union may not take a country that is not in the Communist orbit into the Communistic sphere? Take Finland.

Kissinger: Finland—probably the U.S. would not go to war. I am open to correction.

[Page 298]

Callaghan: Austria?

Kissinger: In Austria it would happen so quickly we would have no choice.

Callaghan: The thing is to make our position clear beforehand.

Genscher: I am somewhat concerned about the course of our discussion, trying to lay down rules of thumb—how to react in the case of Finland, Yugoslavia, Austria. When we talk of the end of détente, all consequences would have to be given careful consideration. I am worried about 20 people here in this room trying to lay down alternatives for this or that case. Real responsible discussion of these matters can take place only if we have a basis. Four of us should have a discussion and put it down in writing. You know me—I don’t take a soft position—but when we say the risks of war are different here and different there, we risk being taken by surprise.

Kissinger: My nightmare is: If Yugoslavia were invaded and the President asked me “What note should we send?” or “What should we do in the NATO meeting” “What instructions should we send to our NATO Ambassador?”—I can’t get it clear in my own mind.

Callaghan: Hans isn’t saying we shouldn’t discuss it at all; he is saying we shouldn’t discuss it lightly.

Kissinger: He said we shouldn’t lay down precise rules. But Yugoslavia could happen literally any day.

Sauvagnargues: If we laid it down in advance, it could help deter the Soviets, but it could help the pro-Soviet side in Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: That is a different problem. The difference between what our intention is and what we say. I am not saying we should issue a declaration of protection of every non-Communist government.

Callaghan: One side in Yugoslavia might invite the Soviets in.

Sonnenfeldt: And one group might invite NATO in.

Genscher: Both will happen.

Kissinger: We could assign individuals here to come up with papers, or as Hans suggested, a group of four could do a paper, if there is time.

Callaghan: I think it should be a concerted effort.

Sauvagnargues: Yugoslavia is urgent.

Kissinger: On Italy we have no policy at all in the U.S. In Spain, we have a preference but no policy.

Sonnenfeldt: We have an alliance problem.

Kissinger: But I don’t have any idea of what group we should favor in Spain.

Sauvagnargues: I think we should bring Spain closer to Europe, and to NATO.

[Page 299]

Callaghan: We should pull out individual problems first. And we should start with Spain and Yugoslavia.

If we are going to look at individual countries, one we should be able to agree on is Yugoslavia, because it is sui generis.

Kissinger: All right. I will designate Sonnenfeldt. They should get together somewhere. No doubt he will opt for Bermuda.

Sonnenfeldt: Bermuda is half way.

[The party returned to the suite at 9:40. The four Ministers then retreated to the dining room to continue their private discussion until 10:25 p.m.]

  1. Summary: Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, Genscher, and Kissinger, as well as British, French, West German, and American officials, discussed NATO’s southern flank.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 12, NODIS Memcons, Aug. 1975, Folder 9. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s Apartmment at the Waldorf Towers. In a September 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Lord provided strategy and talking points. (Ibid., Box 14, Briefing Memos, 1975, Folder 2) On August 28, Kissinger directed that an undated 57-page paper prepared in S/P, with help from EUR and INR, entitled, “Problems of Southern Europe,” be given to British officials as a working paper. (Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, August 23; ibid., Policy Planning Council, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, Entry 5027, Box 354, Aug. 16–31, 1975)