56. Telegram 68767/Tosec 111 From the Department of State to the Delegation in Acapulco1
Subject: Message from Foreign Secretary Callaghan. Following is personal message from Callaghan to you delivered by Ramsbotham to Sonnenfeldt today. Ramsbotham requested strictest confidence.
Begin text:
When we talked in London I promised that we would have a shot at producing a new draft declaration which might be issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers at a special session to celebrate the 25th Anniversary. I have now thought a good deal more about this and have looked at the draft which has been under discussion for so long in the Alliance, and also your own suggestions for adding to it.
We have made an honest attempt to produce a new draft, the object being to find something which would be acceptable to all the fifteen members of the Alliance. In doing this I have had to keep in mind a [Page 231] number of major considerations. First, it is important to get the essential defence points right. Here there are some problems with the French, though I do not think they are insuperable. Secondly, there is your requirement that there should be a satisfactory passage about consultation. On the other hand if we are to get an agreed document we have to take into account the serious French hesitations about formalizing any procedure, particularly where the Nine are concerned. This is a personal message between us, so I can say that at the recent meetings in Luxembourg where I was exposed to French obduracy on this point despite the efforts of Walter Scheel and myself, I realized the wide political differences that seem to exist on this matter, I cannot accept the French position. Then again as I said to you when we met, there are some phrases in the existing NATO text, and particularly that referring to European Union, which cause difficulties for us here. As against this, many of the European governments, and particularly the Germans, consider this to be an essential feature.
I could send you the draft which we have come up with, although it is in a very preliminary stage, but I think that this would be a waste of time. I am pretty sure that it does not wholly meet any of the considerations set out above—and they are, after all, somewhat contradictory—and I am now convinced, having looked more closely into the matter, that it is unrealistic to think we can get agreement on a substantial declaration to meet all our considerations, within the sort of time-scale that you and I had in mind. It may never prove possible but we certainly cannot do it in time for a special 25th Anniversary session in the month of April.
In addition the death of President Pompidou has created another major uncertainty in European affairs and I very much doubt whether the caretaker French Government will be willing to agree to any major initiative or declaration before the new Presidential elections have determined the future Government of France.
As to a special session to celebrate the 25th Anniversary, I asked our representative in NATO to float the idea informally with his colleagues. Apart from a somewhat lukewarm expression of support from the Germans, there was very little enthusiasm and all concerned, including Joe Luns, focussed on the difficulty of producing in the time available a satisfactory document which could emerge from such a meeting.
I have been wondering what we should do in the circumstances. I have considered the holding of a 25th Anniversary special session which would be followed by a very simple communiqué, basically reaffirming the purposes and principles of the original NATO Treaty. I enclose a very tentative draft to illustrate the kind of document which might be signed in these circumstances. But given the apparent lack of [Page 232] enthusiasm for a special session I doubt if this would work unless you, the Germans and we were really prepared to put a major push behind it and we might run into difficulties about drafting even the simple communiqué. I imagine you would feel, like me, that such a limited outcome would be unfavorably compared with the aim you set last April and would not be worth the effort and risk involved.
All in all, since international affairs, like politics, represent the art of the possible, I think that the realistic course is to celebrate the 25th Anniversary at the regular spring session in June for which I understand the Canadians have now offered Ottawa. There will have to be a communiqué at the end of that meeting and, if we decide to abandon the declarations or put them on ice indefinitely, it could include appropriate references to the anniversary year and to the fact that the Alliance has served us very well over a period of 25 years. Such a communiqué might still meet some criticism if by then the fundamental problem of consultation and the transatlantic relationship had not been solved, but I think we could live with this, in this more neutral and low-key context.
I find it disappointing to have to come to this conclusion but I think it is right. By all means let us have a word about this on the telephone some time if you would like to do so, or else you can let Peter Ramsbotham know your thoughts. Callaghan
Following is text of communiqué referred to in foregoing message:
The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on. . . .
Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, they recalled that the primary purpose of the Alliance was, and remains, to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
Ministers reviewed the achievements of the Alliance in the 25 years since it was set up. They recognized that during that period peace had been preserved in Europe and the foundations for a better relationship with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had been laid. Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that the Alliance was as much an instrument for pursuing détente as for assuring collective defence.
Ministers nevertheless recognized that the essential elements in the situation which originally led to the North Atlantic Treaty had not yet changed. In spite of the improvement in relations between East and West, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had continued to build up their military strength. Ministers reaffirmed that an attack on one or more of their countries should be considered an attack against them all. They saw no alternative in the foreseeable future to [Page 233] the security provided by United States nuclear forces based in the United States and Europe, and by the presence of North American forces in Europe. They also recognized that the maintenance of security within the area covered by the treaty could be directly affected by events in other parts of the world. They took this opportunity to renew their commitments and obligations to each other, and expressed the belief that each country should undertake, according to its place in the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of maintaining the security of all.
At the same time Ministers expressed their determination to seek further improvement in relations between East and West. Those representing countries participating in NATO’s integrated defense programme resolved to continue their efforts to secure international agreements which would ensure undiminished security at lower levels of forces and a more stable relationship in Europe.
Ministers agreed that their common efforts to preserve the independence, to maintain the security and to promote the well-being of their peoples could only be pursued effectively in a spirit of close cooperation and mutual trust. With this in mind they resolved to strengthen the links between them in the knowledge that their unity of purpose would enable them to fulfill their wider obligations towards the world at large.
End text.
- Summary: The
Department forwarded the text of a personal message from
Callaghan to Kissinger.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, United Kingdom (15). Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. From March 30 to April 9, Kissinger was in Mexico. On March 28, Kissinger met with Wilson, Callaghan, and other UK officials, finding them “skeptical of many of the actions of the Nine, though they do not want to confront them head-on.” Callaghan pledged “full consultation with the US,” while Kissinger promised to “resume our old practice of close contact.” Kissinger noted that while Callaghan had no interest in an EC Declaration, he did wish to conclude a NATO Declaration. (Message Hakto 19 from Kissinger to Scowcroft, March 28; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 48, HAK Trip Files, HAK Trip, Bonn, Moscow, London, Mar 24–28, HAKTO/TOHAK) Kissinger’s April 6 reply to Callaghan, in which he agreed to defer the NATO commemoration until June and expressed his desire to complete the NATO Declaration by then, is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 4, Britain 1974.
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