339. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- President Ford
- President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, President of the French Republic
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Amb. Kenneth Rush, U.S. Ambassador to France
- Amb. Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, French Ambassador to the United States
SUBJECTS
- Rambouillet II; Lebanon; Djibouti; Nuclear Non-proliferation
[Omitted here is discussion of a follow-up to the November 1975 Economic Summit at Rambouillet.]
Giscard: [Omitted here is additional discussion of a follow-up to the November 1975 Economic Summit at Rambouillet.]
On Lebanon, our man is waiting to see Sarkis. We do not in any way support Frangieh. He is a foolish man who has done harm.
Sauvagnargues: Our Ambassador has gone two times to Frangieh to make that clear. There can be no doubt whatever.
Giscard: Perhaps we could have him go to Sarkis to try to accelerate the process.
The next issue is intervention. It is a question of sending a few thousand troops if we are asked by the Lebanese authority and if they would be useful. They would go only if Sarkis asked. We would have to avoid the impression of collusion among the US, Syria and France. We [Page 1039] must remain in a more balanced position. We have some modest Iraqi support and some Egyptian support. We can keep this only if we demonstrate balance. So Gorse will go to Egypt and Iraq to maintain this contact.
Ford: What is the reaction of Assad to what you have in mind?
Giscard: At the beginning, they wanted a joint French-Syrian action. Now they are more reserved because they are afraid it might weaken the Syrian position. We would have to be careful about that.
Kissinger: We first thought it would be good to have the Syrians clean up on the left; we were then afraid that they would then clean up on the Christians.
One can conceive of your force in two ways: one is to limit the gains of any one faction there; or to be a stalking horse for the Syrians. The Syrians may want to match your force. Yours could leave sometime, with then Syria left in control. The Israelis are already suggesting there is a French-Syrian collusion to get massive Syrian troops into Lebanon.
Sauvagnargues: The force would be in Beirut and as a buffer to the South.
Kissinger: The Syrians would not be allowed to introduce matching forces? You would be, as I understand, partly protecting the left from the Syrians.
Sauvagnargues: It is to keep all forces separated.
Giscard: We need to talk to Sarkis and the Egyptians. We will let you know before we do anything. It will take several days.
Kissinger: It would be very helpful if we could get an explicit statement that this wouldn’t import Syrian forces. Otherwise we would have Israel and the Jews all over us.
Ford: Would you discuss Djibouti?
Giscard: We are seeing a sort of peaceful invasion by the people of Somali and Ethiopia for whom it is a kind of paradise. We are being asked to avoid leaving the area, especially the port facilities, to the benefit of the Soviet Union.
We have a local government headed by a man called [omission is in the original]. We planned to make him the head of state, but the situation is getting out of hand. There is agitation against him led by the Somalis. Perhaps a coalition government is best. If that is not possible we could force the resignation of the present man. The Somali-supported forces would dominate and eventually it would be annexed.
Ford: Is it a viable state?
Giscard: No. There is nothing there. The other option would be to support the present government. There would be some violence then.
[Page 1040]My preference is to give them the kind of government they want and just hold on to the naval base there. It would be irresponsible not to hold that.
Ford: One item I wanted to bring up again is the nuclear reprocessing issue. We would be willing to refuse reprocessing plants by all suppliers.
Giscard: France for years has wanted to develop its nuclear capability. When I came in I didn’t know the situation. I do not want France to be the cause of nuclear proliferation. I resisted the sale of a plant to South Korea. If the question were open, I guess we would accept a ban on all reprocessing plants. The fact is we don’t know the position of the other suppliers—especially Germany. It is curious to see the way the Brazilian deal was done. Even the normal controls were not accepted. There is not a very clear line between the reprocessing plants and institutes of research. Some of the research results in plutonium. I think we need to go more deeply into the problem. One may be as big a problem as the other.
The Shah seems to be making a big issue of his request. Iran says it doesn’t intend to build a nuclear bomb. I presume they are sincere.
Kissinger: It is irrelevant what they now say.
Giscard: If they are building a number of nuclear plants, they do have a need for reprocessing. It is a difficult question here. And they say they have a German and a US offer.
Kissinger: No. Not from us. The German aspect could be. It is an option to build one if it appears needed over the next 10 years. We don’t like that. We originally thought we could support regional plants. That looks more dubious now and we would prefer no plants at all.
Sauvagnargues: Is there a German offer of a reprocessing plant to Brazil?
Kissinger: No, not specifically.
Our common studies indicate that the sale of reprocessing plants should stop. And Congress may prevent us from providing enriched uranium in dealing with countries that are selling reprocessing plants. That would be a very bad situation—Congressional legislation against our allies.
Giscard: That wouldn’t hurt us. We are self-sufficient.
Kissinger: It would be counterproductive; it would induce other countries to build enrichment facilities.
Giscard: Politically and for our own sake, I will study this issue. I have it under review now and I am not satisfied with the answers yet.
Kissinger: Could we have some bilateral discussion on it before putting it to the wider group—the difference between reprocessing and research institute?
Giscard: We should study the Iran case to see what kind of guarantee of supply we could give them.
[Page 1041]Kissinger: Could we each designate someone so we are not competing with each other?
Giscard: The Iranian matter is a difficult one.
Kissinger: We have not agreed with Iran, but we think they are so confident they can get the plant in Europe that they are accepting whatever restrictions we ask.
Giscard: There is for the future the question of stopping the transfer of reprocessing plants.
- Summary: Ford, Giscard, Kissinger, and Sauvagnargues discussed a
follow-up to the November 1975 Economic Summit at Rambouillet,
Lebanon, Djibouti, and nuclear non-proliferation.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 19. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. For the portion of the meeting dealing with a follow-up to the November 1975 Economic Summit at Rambouillet, see Document 138 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976.
↩