336. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to President Ford1
SUBJECT
- Cooperation with France
Incident to the May 17th visit of President Giscard d’Estaing, it may be time to review our policies with respect to some sensitive programs of assistance to France. The major elements of those programs currently underway in accordance with national directives are: (1) Missile Engineering, (2) Vulnerability Assessment, (3) Testing of Reentry Vehicle Material, (4) Basic Knowledge of Material Behavior, (5) Nuclear Safety, and (6) Underground Testing.
The relationship of France to Western Europe and the NATO Alliance being of priority importance, the extent of our technical assistance in the future should be based on these considerations:
[Page 1030]• If it is in the best interests of a strong Alliance to have France move toward closer military cooperation, then restraint in providing US help may offer incentive for that movement.
• Visible assistance to France, an inactive member of the Atlantic Community, could prove to be a harmful example to other NATO members.
• Considering the technology transfer factor alone, the disadvantages of lessened control over sensitive technologies should be measured against the fact that the French, over time, can develop it themselves. Our assistance, if provided in a timely fashion, can save them up to three to five years, as well as considerable expense.
• The advisability of our aiding French nuclear capability may, in itself, be questionable particularly in view of ongoing arms control negotiations. The independent nature of the French strategy and their apparent reliance on a “trip-wire” strategy give rise to worrisome questions about initiation of nuclear conflict.
• Communist participation in future French governments, which is possible, would threaten the security of any information we might transfer.
• There may be aspects of cooperation with the French Government which contribute positively to our mutual defense efforts.
Pending completion of this policy review, it is our present intention to continue our approach to this cooperation in a deliberate manner with increased caution at a slow pace. Inasmuch as President Giscard d’Estaing may refer to these programs during his visit, a current status is attached. Of immediate interest, the issue of reentry vehicle material testing may be raised during the visit. Discussion of this issue could be deferred pending completion of the policy review.
- Summary: Rumsfeld urged a review of the U.S.-French
nuclear cooperation program.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 60, NSDM 299—Cooperation with France (2). Top Secret. Attached but not published is an undated paper on “Cooperation with France: Missile Assistance, Nuclear Safety, and Underground Testing.” During a May 17 meeting with Ford and Scowcroft, Kissinger characterized Rumsfeld’s memorandum as “a cover-your-ass operation. I think you should have the review—principals only—to protect yourself, but you are pretty well committed to the policy at Martinique.” Ford replied, “I made my decision at that time and it is right.” Scowcroft noted Rumsfeld’s suggestion that Ford not tell Giscard “about the nuclear materials test pending the review.” Ford responded, “No, I will go ahead on that. Then we can look at future cooperation with them in connection with leverage, etc.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 17; ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 19) In a June 24 memorandum to Rumsfeld, Scowcroft agreed to an interagency review of U.S.-French nuclear cooperation; pending the review’s completion and Presidential review, NSDM 299 and Ford’s June 23, 1975 memorandum to Schlesinger would still apply. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 60, NSDM 299—Cooperation with France (2))
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