251. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • President Ford
  • Helmut Schmidt, FRG Chancellor (by telephone)

The President: I hope our friendship will continue.

Schmidt: I am glad to hear that. I wrote a long letter in which I mentioned the same thing.

The President: I won’t be in the government but I will be active and would like to maintain our close relations.

Schmidt: You are expressing my sentiments exactly. These things are bigger than the vicissitudes of political office. It was so close. I could have lost and you been elected.

The President: (Described what Callaghan said) My feeling is they should go back to try to accommodate on that half.

Schmidt: It is in the economic interest that we impose strong conditions on the British. We should not go so far as to overthrow this government. There is no one else to take the reins and there may be a period of disorder which could affect us all deeply.

The President: That is exactly what I told my people.

Schmidt: So we need to find a point which will do the job but not be politically unacceptable.

The President: That is what I think.

Schmidt: If Callaghan had to resign, that would set us back.

The President: Let’s go on that basis. I think Jim may be able to go farther than 9.5 but maybe not to 9.

Schmidt: I replied in a similar way to Callaghan.

I will come as far as possible but not take final decisions. I will send Poehl to London to meet with the British and Yeo or Simon.

The President: That is very good. May I raise one additional point—oil prices, I am very worried.

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Schmidt: So am I.

The President: We have been working very hard on the key OPEC states. We were working for a zero increase but certainly no more than 5%. 10–15% would be disastrous.

Schmidt: I agree. And I would be ready to add my voice to yours. But if so, could we have the arguments you are using so we can take the same line?

The President: I have considered a high level delegation, but we will try everything else first. We don’t want a delegation to go if it would only return empty handed.

Schmidt: Are you operating at the highest level with these countries?

The President: I have sent personal letters to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela.

Schmidt: Could I see what you have told them?

The President: Of course. Scowcroft will get them to you.

Schmidt: I am worried about UNCTAD, the CIEC meetings on raw material prices, the common fund, and debt settlement. Could we use the excuse of your new action to seek a postponement.

The President: All right if you do it. It wouldn’t be right for me to do so.

Schmidt: Do you agree on a postponement?

The President: Absolutely.

Schmidt: One other point. Should I get in touch with Carter?

The President: I think it is slightly premature.

  1. Summary: Ford and Schmidt discussed the UK economic situation, oil prices, and North-South relations.

    Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 21. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum is incorrectly dated “November 23 (?)”. Ford and Schmidt talked by telephone on November 24 from 9:22 a.m. to 9:38 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Earlier that day, Ford sent Schmidt a message on the UK economic situation. (Message WH61616 from Ford to Schmidt, November 24; ibid., Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 25, UK (23))