Portugal, 1973–1976
123. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Pickering) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Pickering discussed the renewal of the Azores Base Agreement.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2). Confidential. Executive Secretariat Staff member Raymond Seitz signed the memorandum on Pickering’s behalf.
124. Telegram 202479 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal
Summary: The Department instructed the Embassy to inform Portuguese officials of the U.S. desire to use the Lajes Base as a refueling stop for defense matériel-laden aircraft on the way to Israel.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973, [no film number]. Secret; Flash; Exdis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Pickering; cleared by Stabler, Scowcroft (in substance), Atherton, and DOD (informed); and approved by Pickering. In telegram 3779 from Lisbon, October 13, the Embassy reported Patricio’s suggestion that Portuguese compliance with the U.S. request would depend on U.S. willingness to “provide GOP with surface-to-air missiles for use against expected air threat in Portuguese Guinea,” as well as “provide GOP with general political support, treat GOP in a non-discriminatory manner.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (1 of 2))
125. Telegram 203571 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal
Summary: The Department forwarded a letter from Nixon for delivery to Caetano on the use of the Lajes Base for Middle East resupply.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Pickering; cleared by Stabler and Eagleburger; and approved by Kissinger. In telegram 3781 from Lisbon, October 13, the Embassy reported that Patricio, “visibly upset by” the tone of Nixon’s letter, argued that Portugal was neither bargaining nor being unresponsive and, given the “serious risks” Portugal faced, it needed more than vague reassurances that the United States and Portugal would consult. (Ibid., Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (1 of 2))
126. Telegram 203651 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal
Summary: The Department reported a conversation with Themido on the use of the Lajes Base for Middle East resupply.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2). Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Thomas Martin in EUR/IB; cleared by Pickering; and approved by Stoessel. In telegram 3782 from Lisbon, October 13, the Embassy reported that when Patricio notified it of Caetano’s approval of the U.S. request, he “did not hide fact that he had been overruled by Caetano” and “that he was extremely unhappy at the decision.” (Ibid., Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (1 of 2)) The memorandum from the Portuguese Government, October 13, is ibid., Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2).
127. Letter From Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano to President Nixon
Summary: Caetano replied to Nixon’s October 13 message on the use of the Lajes Base for Middle East resupply.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 1 PORT–US. No classification marking. According to telegram 220957 to Lisbon, November 8, Themido delivered the letter to the Department on November 2. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (1 of 2)) The memorandum of conversation recording the meeting with Porter during which Themido delivered the letter is ibid., (2 of 2).
128. Memorandum From the Government of the United States to the Government of Portugal
Summary: The U.S. Government responded to Portuguese concerns regarding the use of the Lajes Base for Middle East resupply.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2). Secret. On November 2, Porter gave the memorandum to Themido. (Memorandum of conversation, November 2; ibid.)
129. National Security Study Memorandum 189
Summary: The President directed a priority review of the U.S.-Portuguese Azores Base negotiations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–201, Study Memorandums, 1969–1974, NSSM–189. Confidential. Copies were sent to the DCI and the Chairman of the JCS. Scowcroft signed the memorandum on Kissinger’s behalf. In a November 6 memorandum to Kissinger on the Azores Base agreement negotiations, Sonnenfeldt wrote that the use of the Azores Base during the Middle East crisis had changed the proposed U.S. negotiating position that “mutually beneficial cooperation between two members of the NATO Alliance should not involve compensation.” Rush now wanted an interagency review of the U.S. position; Sonnenfeldt agreed that it was necessary because “the Portuguese can be expected to ask for compensation for future use of the Lajes facilities, and accordingly it is important that a coordinated State/Defense position for the negotiations be developed within the NSC system.” (Ibid.)
130. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Patricio discussed U.S.-Portuguese relations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversation, Memcons—December 1973, HAK + Presidential (1 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Palacio das Necessidades. Attached but not published is Tab A, an undated Portuguese memorandum on “The Açores Agreement” that states Portugal’s military requests as ground-to-air missiles (HAWKs and Redeyes), anti-tank systems, C 130 and Orion planes, and sea-to-air missiles; a notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “Given to HAK by Rui Patricio, Lisbon, 17 December 1973.” Memoranda of conversation recording Kissinger’s second meeting with Patricio and a December 18 meeting with Portuguese President Admiral Americo Deus Rodrigues Thomaz and Patricio are ibid.
131. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Lord briefed Kissinger on the status of the Azores Base negotiations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, Entry 5027, Box 345, March 1974. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Willard De Pree and Anton DePorte in S/P on March 7; cleared by Jack Smith in EUR/IB, PM, and L. Kissinger’s January 28 staff meeting was devoted to a discussion of the U.S. position in the Azores Base negotiations. (Ibid., Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 2, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, January 28, 1974) In telegram 54891 to Lisbon, March 19, the Department reported that on March 18, Themido responded to Rush’s February 8 offer by suggesting that the U.S. and Portugal announce the failure of their negotiations. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974))
132. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Summary: Kissinger discussed the coup in Portugal.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In telegram 807 from Lisbon, March 5, the Embassy reported the eruption of a political crisis precipitated by the publication of a book calling for Portuguese African self-determination by the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Antonio de Spinola. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, [no film number])
133. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant (Haig)
Summary: Haig reported on a June 19 meeting between Nixon and Spinola.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 4. No classification marking. Nixon was in the Azores from June 18 to 19 to meet with Spinola. Scowcroft forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a July 11 memorandum, in which he characterized Haig’s memorandum as “inadequate” and recalled that Spinola had requested that the meeting be head-to-head, “since he felt there was no one in his party whom he could trust.” Scowcroft reported that Nixon had subsequently directed that Walters “visit Portugal, Spain and Italy to get a first-hand assessment of the situation in each country and the overall capability of our Country Team in each” and that Ambassador Henry Joseph Tasca “be tasked to do an initial ‘think piece’ on the contemporary threat of Communist subversion.” Scowcroft noted that he had not implemented either of Nixon’s directions, pending Kissinger’s approval. (Ibid.)
134. Telegram 163339/Tosec 56 From the Department of State to the White House
Summary: The Department forwarded a message from Scott reporting his July 26 meeting with Spinola.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1314, NSC Secretariat—Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Portuguese Contingency Plans. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. On July 16, Kissinger discussed with his staff the Portuguese political situation and whether Spinola understood “that we wouldn’t be too happy with a Communist Government.” Kissinger decided that Scott should return to Washington for early consultations. (Minutes of Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting, July 16; ibid., RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 4, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, July 16, 1974) In telegram 169650 to Lisbon, August 3, the Department directed the Embassy not to approach Galvao de Melo, pending further instructions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files, Europe, Portugal, Vol. II (1972–1974) (2 of 2))
135. National Security Study Memorandum 208
Summary: The President directed a revision of the study prepared in response to NSSM 189, Azores Base Agreement Negotiations.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Decision Memoranda and National Security Study Memoranda, 1974–1977, Box 2, NSSM 208—Azores Base Agreement Negotiations. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of OMB. The study prepared in response to NSSM 189 is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–201, Study Memorandums, 1969–1974, NSSM–189. On August 2, Themido gave Hartman a letter from Soares to Kissinger requesting the resumption of the Azores negotiations. (Telegram 169643 to Lisbon, August 3; ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, [no film number]) On August 5, Themido told McCloskey “that Portuguese government now suffering financially and that principal reason for reactivation of negotiations would be financial compensation that Portugal hopes USG can provide.” (Telegram 170940 to Lisbon, August 6; ibid.)
136. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee
Summary: The memorandum outlined a proposal for covert action in Portugal.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “Votes requested 9–30—JCS–OK 2 Oct, DOD–OK 8 Oct.” No indication of how the other 40 Committee members voted was found, but the proposal was apparently approved by the 40 Committee.
137. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford
Summary: Kissinger discussed Spinola’s September 30 resignation and its implications.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 10, Portugal (1). Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote at the top of the memorandum, “President has seen.” In a September 30 memorandum to Ford, under cover of which he forwarded an apparently earlier assessment of the Portuguese situation, Kissinger commented, “Events in Portugal over the weekend seem clearly to demonstrate that the situation there is moving inexorably in a leftist direction, with the Communists and Left Socialists in a controlling position.” Kissinger asserted that there was “every reason to believe that the moderate forces in Portugal have suffered a severe setback and that the position of extremist elements has been substantially enhanced. The Communists and Socialists appear to be the only organized political forces in Portugal. In sum, I consider the situation to be very grave.” Ford initialed Kissinger’s September 30 memorandum. (Ibid.)
138. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Colby discussed a proposed covert action program in Portugal.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF. Secret; [text not declassified] In an October 7 meeting with Ford, Kissinger said of Portugal: “I predicted this in April. We should have mounted a massive covert program—but in this environment it’s impossible. I sent Walters and all we have done is spring [dollar amount not declassified] If we don’t get in shape, in a year we will be in the same condition in Greece.” Kissinger added, “It may be too late in Portugal.” Ford asked, “Do we have people there?” Kissinger replied, “The Ambassador is a disaster. Portugal is probably down the drain. But I could get Walters in, tell him we want to do something massive in Portugal, [less than 1 line not declassified]” Ford asked, “Are they good there?” Kissinger responded affirmatively and Ford said, “Let’s do it.” (Memorandum of conversation, October 7; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6)
139. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford and Kissinger discussed the situation in Portugal, Europe, and Ford’s upcoming meeting with Costa Gomes.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified, or omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Kissinger and Ford met from 9:08 to 10:32 a.m.; Scowcroft joined them at 9:15 a.m. Rumsfeld entered the meeting at 10:00 a.m., followed by Javits, Jackson, and Vanik at 10:02 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) On September 20, Soares told Kissinger that Portugal needed U.S. economic aid “to counteract Sov[iet] bloc influence and tendency among military officers to be attracted by Nasser-style or Peruvian-type regimes.” Kissinger said that he would seek Ford’s approval of an “exceptional program for Portugal, such as put forth for Greece and Turkey in 1947.” (Telegram 208886 to Lisbon, September 22; ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 11, Portugal—State Dept Tels From SECSTATE—EXDIS)
140. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Costa Gomes discussed the situation in Portugal.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Costa Gomes made a private visit to Washington on October 18. During their October 18 lunch, Kissinger warned Costa Gomes about the danger of Communist ascendancy in Portugal and suggested “that if non-Communist government results from elections, we will make efforts, within Congressional limitations, to support it.” Kissinger and Costa Gomes agreed that U.S. and Portuguese experts would discuss Portugal’s economic and technical needs. (Telegram 233020 to Lisbon, October 23; ibid., Presiden-tial Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 11, Portugal—State Dept Tels From SECSTATE—NODIS (1))
141. Memorandum From the 40 Committee Executive Secretary (Ratliff) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown)
Summary: Ratliff forwarded, with comments, an updated proposal for covert action in Portugal.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached but not published is a November 18 memorandum prepared for the 40 Committee outlining a covert action program for Portugal; it is an updated version of Document 136.
142. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Colby forwarded a report on the exploratory phase of the covert action program in Portugal.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF. Secret; [text not declassified] Attached but not published is an undated 7-page paper on the “Status of Operations Proposed for 40 Committee Consideration.”
143. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: Scowcroft summarized a memorandum from Kissinger concerning economic assistance to Portugal.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 10, Portugal (3). Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published is Tab A, a December 10 memorandum from Kissinger to Ford on assistance to Portugal. Ford initialed Scowcroft’s memorandum.
144. Memorandum for the Record
Summary: The memorandum recorded a February 1 40 Committee meeting on Portugal.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975 GRF. Secret; Sensitive. On January 20, Kissinger told Ford: “Portugal is going as predicted. Soares is massively incompetent. The fight now is over the unified labor law. If he leaves the government, the Communists will be the only organized force and either they will take over or the army will. We should have a covert action plan, but it could leak.” Ford replied, “Let’s do it if it leaks or not.” (Memorandum of conversation, January 20; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 8) Three days later, Kissinger told Ford: “I am really worried. We are paralyzed. We have delayed a long time on Portugal. We should be infiltrating the AFM, even though our capacity may not be too great.” (Memorandum of conversation, January 23; ibid.)
145. Memorandum From the 40 Committee Executive Secretary (Ratliff) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Ratliff discussed the status of the proposal for a covert action program in Portugal.
Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for action. Attached but not published are Tabs A through F. Tab A is an undated and unsigned memorandum from Kissinger to Ford; Tab B is a February 4 CIA memorandum for Kissinger summarizing Carlucci’s plan; Tab C is a February 15 memorandum from Colby to Kissinger; Tab D is telegram 1021 from Lisbon, February 24; Tab E is a February 28 memorandum from Colby to Kissinger; and Tab F is a March 4 memorandum from Sisco to the 40 Committee. A handwritten notation on Ratliff’s memorandum reads, “OBE.” On February 25, Kissinger told Ford: “What we are doing to ourselves—like Portugal. I don’t dare do anything.” Ford replied, “I think we should.” Kissinger said, “Okay, let’s vote the Portuguese program. I guess a half-hearted program is better than none.” Ford responded, “Let’s do it.” (Memorandum of conversation, February 25; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9)
146. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed the proposal for a covert action program in Portugal.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
147. Telegram 61177/Tosec 726 From the Department of State to the Consulate in Jerusalem
Summary: The Department forwarded an action memorandum on Portugal to Kissinger.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 35, NSSM 221—U.S. Security Interests in the Azores (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Lukens, William Kelly in EUR/IB, Edward Streator and Vladimir Lehovich in EUR/RPM, Herbert Hagerty in PM, Ray Caldwell and Robert Baraz in INR, and Anton DePorte in S/P; cleared by Hartman, Vest, Lord, Hyland, Clift, H, S/S, and S; and approved by Sonnenfeldt. On March 11, an attempted right-wing coup was quashed in Portugal. From March 8 to 23, Kissinger was shuttling among a number of countries in the Middle East discussing Egyptian-Israeli disengagement.
148. Telegram 607/Secto 437 From the Consulate in Jerusalem to the Department of State
Summary: The Consulate reported Kissinger’s decisions on the action memorandum on Portugal.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 17, Portugal 1975 (4) WH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In a March 21 message to Schmidt, Ford said that he shared Schmidt’s view that events in Portugal were a “top priority” for NATO action. (Ibid., Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany (3)) On March 24, Kissinger told Ford: “I think Schmidt is wrong about telling a country how to compose its Cabinet. We are sending the Ambassadors in in a general sense.” Ford said, “There are some encouraging signs. These four in the Revolutionary Council.” Kissinger replied, “Soares had a rally today for 30,000. If we had mounted a campaign. . . .” [Ellipsis in original.] Ford asked, “Should we do it now?” Kissinger responded, “I would wait until the Cabinet thing sorts out, then if there is a chance, we should move.” (Memorandum of conversation, March 24; ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10)
149. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Ford, Kissinger, and Brandt discussed Portugal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office, and ended at 11:45 a.m. (Ford Library, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Earlier that morning, Kissinger told Ford that Brandt “says the Portuguese need some money.” Kissinger continued, “They would like $100,000. The Europeans have set themselves two objectives: elections, and no Communist takeover. I think we could get both those and still lose the country—because they [the Communists] will rule through the AFM. What do we do if this kind of government wants to stay in NATO? What does this do to Italy? France? We probably have to attack Portugal whatever the outcome and drive them from NATO.” (Memorandum of conversation, March 27; ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10) On April 12, Ford approved covertly providing [text not declassified] (Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, April 11; National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF)
150. Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Clift discussed the possibility of armed uprisings in the Azores.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 1, Azores. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A, telegram 1878 from Lisbon, April 2; and Tab B, a March 24 intelligence information cable. A handwritten notation at the top of Clift’s memorandum reads, “Noted by HAK.” Clift sent Kissinger the draft NSSM under cover of a March 24 memorandum that is ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 35, NSSM 221—U.S. Security Interests in the Azores (1). In an April 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Hartman requested his guidance on U.S. policy towards Azorean independence. On April 21, Kissinger approved this option: “That we continue to maintain a posture of neutrality towards these Azorean groups, advising them in response to any approaches that they are acting entirely on their own and that we do not intend to become involved; and that we respond to press questions about our position by saying that the status of the Azores is strictly an internal Portuguese matter.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 206, Portugal, April–June 1975)
151. National Security Study Memorandum 221
Summary: The President directed a priority review of U.S. security interests in the Azores.
Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 35, NSSM 221—U.S. Security Interests in the Azores (2). Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS.
152. Telegram 2395 From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy provided an initial assessment of the April 25 Portuguese elections.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975, [no film number]. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Madrid, Paris, the Mission to NATO, and USCINCEUR.