Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

95. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the UN General Assembly (Symington)¹

New York, October 21, 1974.

U.S. Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. General Assembly Debate

As we start our annual disarmament debate, my government believes it appropriate to devote its initial statement on disarmament questions exclusively to one of the most critical matters before the 29th General Assembly—the objective of limiting the growth and spread of nuclear weapons.

Since the advent of the nuclear age, we have been forced to live with the dilemma of the dual nature of nuclear energy. We have held high expectations concerning the contribution that nuclear energy could make to human welfare; but we have always been painfully aware that tied to these expected benefits is a growing potential for mankind’s destruction. The rapidly expanding use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power in recent years has made this dilemma one of the most urgent issues of our time.

An inevitable result of the massive growth of nuclear-generated power will be the tremendous increase in worldwide production of plutonium. Estimates are that by 1980 close to 1 million pounds of plutonium will have been produced worldwide in electric power reactors, enough to manufacture over 50,000 nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, rising demands for enriched uranium as a nuclear reactor fuel will require a marked expansion of uranium enrichment capacity.

Widespread development of enrichment facilities, perhaps involving new enrichment techniques, could create a capability for producing weapons-grade uranium at many locations throughout the world.

This increasing availability of nuclear fuels and materials, as well as the continuing dissemination of nuclear technology, threatens to place a nuclear explosive capability, and the accompanying capability to produce nuclear weapons, within the reach of an ever-widening group of states. As perilous as the situation was when there were only two states with a nuclear weapons capability—and is now with six—stability would be vastly more precarious in a world of many nuclear powers.

Such a world is not to be feared more by one group of states than another. All nations would stand to lose.

States fortunate enough to be located in regions now free of nuclear weapons would suddenly find themselves faced with nuclear-armed neighbors. This would bring them under strong pressures to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. Even minor conflicts would then involve the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The probability of the use of nuclear weapons—whether by design, miscalculation, or accident—would increase sharply. Prospects for significant arms control and disarmament measures would deteriorate as all states felt the need to prepare for a larger and more disparate range of contingencies.

Many have assumed that time was on our side—that every year without the use of nuclear weapons, every year without an additional nuclear power, every step in East-West détente, and every measure to curb the arms race have all been part of a steady progression to where we would no longer fear the possibility of nuclear war. But it is obvious, in light of the worldwide energy crisis and the emergence after a 10-year hiatus of an additional state with a nuclear explosive capability, that we cannot afford to be complacent.

Hopefully, these developments will at least have the positive effect of making us fully alert to the dangers of the further spread of nuclear explosives and of encouraging a determined international effort to avert that possibility.

We are now at an important juncture, perhaps a decisive one. The challenge, as Secretary Kissinger well described it to the General Assembly on September 23, is “to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them.”

The United States does not believe that a world of many nuclear powers is inevitable. Nor does it believe that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must necessarily be cut back because of the risk that nuclear technology will be diverted to military purposes. However, we cannot expect to take full advantage of the expanding use of nuclear energy unless we are willing to strengthen the system for assuring one another that there is nothing to fear in the continued diffusion of nuclear materials and technology.

While working toward a more universal and effective system of assurances or safeguards, we must also strengthen the political and economic incentives for resisting the temptation to acquire nuclear explosive capabilities. Those capabilities would inevitably be perceived as a threat to others and therefore trigger a competition in the destructive potential of nuclear devices.

No state or group of states can meet the challenge alone. What is required in the months and years ahead is a sustained and concerted international effort involving nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, nuclear suppliers and importers, parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and states which have not yet seen it in their interest to join the treaty. My government would like to suggest several tasks which members of the world community, individually and collectively, should undertake in meeting this challenge.

First, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be continued. It could be argued that the most appropriate response to the increasing risk of diversion of nuclear technology to hostile purposes would simply be to cut back on international cooperation in the nuclear energy field. The United States does not believe such a course of action would serve nonproliferation objectives, nor would it be responsive to the pressing need throughout the world to receive the benefits of this important new source of energy. The United States recognizes fully that the vast potential benefits of nuclear energy cannot be monopolized by a handful of advanced industrial states. This is especially true at a time when many of the world’s developing countries are among the hardest hit by global economic difficulties.

As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the Congress, I have been privileged to participate in U.S. efforts to make the peaceful applications of atomic energy widely available. The U.S. Government has facilitated the participation of American industry in atomic power activities abroad. It has sponsored large international conferences to share our technical know-how. It has shipped materials abroad to help others move ahead in nuclear technology. And it has given strong support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to that Agency’s programs in the nuclear field. All told, it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to promote peaceful uses worldwide. We intend to continue this effort, both through our bilateral cooperative arrangements and our support for the work of the IAEA.

Second, we should intensify our search for effective measures to curb the competition in nuclear arms. We are mindful that serious risks are involved in the further accumulation of nuclear weapons by states now possessing them, as well as in the spread of weapons capabilities to additional states. Moreover, we know that we cannot expect non-nuclear-weapon states to show restraint unless nuclear powers also practice restraint.

As one of the principal nuclear powers, the United States recognizes its special responsibility in this area. We are aware of the concerns expressed by a number of countries about the pace of progress in nuclear disarmament. Although proud of achievements already made, we would agree that progress has been disappointingly slow. We understand the impatience of others, and ourselves are anxious to proceed faster. But it must be recognized that these complicated issues, touching upon the vital interests of all states, are rarely susceptible to quick and easy solutions.

U.S. and Soviet negotiators recently reconvened their talks in Geneva on strategic arms limitations. We attach the utmost importance to these negotiations, in which members of this body have also expressed much interest.

The talks are currently aimed at concluding an equitable agreement placing quantitative and qualitative limitations on offensive strategic weapons. We will make every effort to reach such an agreement at the earliest possible date. In addition, the United States remains firmly committed to seek an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in Moscow last summer, has significance not only for its restraining effect on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms competition but also as a step toward our ultimate goal of a comprehensive ban. Indeed, in the first article of that treaty, we reaffirm our commitment to pursue further negotiations toward that goal.

Third, steps should be taken to insure the widest possible adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is noteworthy that, while treaty parties have sometimes urged faster implementation of provisions of the NonProliferation Treaty, there is virtual unanimity among them that the treaty’s basic concepts and structure are sound and that the treaty continues to provide a valuable legal framework for dealing with both the peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy. My government continues to regard the NPT as one of the most significant international agreements of the post-World War II era. Recently, President Ford called the treaty “one of the pillars of United States foreign policy.”

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been criticized as discriminatory in that it divides the world into two categories of states: those with nuclear explosive devices and those without. But the NPT did not create that distinction, nor is it intended to condone it. The negotiators of the NPT recognized that the only promising and realistic approach was to start with the world the way it was. Accordingly the treaty calls for a halt to the further spread of explosive capabilities and obligates existing nuclear powers to speed limitations and reductions of their own stockpiles.

If there had been no effort, such as the NPT, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons or if the effort had been postponed until nuclear-weapon states had abolished their arsenals, we would have found ourselves in a world of so many nuclear powers that further attempts to stop “vertical proliferation”—that is, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons—would be futile.

The distinguished leader of the Swedish disarmament delegation, Mrs. [Inga] Thorsson, put this matter in the proper perspective at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on July 30 of this year when she said:

The NPT is by nature discriminatory, but its purpose is such that it has been supported by the majority, and needs to be supported by the entirety, of the world community. It is in the interest of every single country in the world that this purpose be fulfilled.

As we approach the May 1975 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty, we should consider ways of making the treaty more attractive to existing and prospective parties. Last summer my government announced that parties to the NPT will be given preferential consideration in the donation by the United States of special nuclear materials—primarily enriched uranium for use in IAEA medical research projects. We have also decided to give preference to NPT parties in allocating training and equipment grants for IAEA technical assistance programs. And we encourage others to adopt similar policies.

We would welcome further suggestions for increasing incentives for NPT membership.

Fourth, thorough international consideration should be given to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). The dilemma of the dual nature of nuclear energy is nowhere more evident than in the problem of PNEs. Indeed, because the technologies of PNEs and nuclear weapons are indistinguishable, it is impossible for a non-nuclear-weapon state to develop a capability to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without, in the process, acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon. For this reason, the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the development or acquisition of peaceful nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon states.

Article V of the NPT was developed to assure the states that give up the option of developing nuclear explosives that they will receive any benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions that eventually might materialize. To date, however, the commercial utility of PNEs has not been proved. Moreover, the use of PNEs is a highly complicated matter politically and legally, which has ramifications for the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the case of excavation projects and which would pose problems in relation to any test ban treaty.

The United States stands ready to honor its Article V obligation to make the benefits of PNEs available on a nondiscriminatory basis when and if their feasibility and practicability are established. In the meantime, we support the steps already taken in the IAEA context to implement Article V, including the development of guidelines for PNE observation, the adoption of procedures for responding to requests for PNE services, and the approval of a U.S.-sponsored resolution authorizing the Director General to establish, at an appropriate time, an office in the IAEA Secretariat to deal with PNE requests.

We are willing to consider other suggestions concerning organizational arrangements for an international service.

Fifth, we should work urgently toward strengthening the system of international safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and technology to the manufacture of nuclear explosives. The interests of nuclear exporters and importers alike would be served by a system which provided confidence that nuclear technology was not being misused. Actions designed to inhibit the abuses of nuclear technology should not impede the full exploitation of its peaceful potential. The realization of peaceful benefits should be facilitated by a broad international commitment to curb the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities.

We should step up our efforts to improve the effectiveness and achieve the broadest possible acceptance of IAEA safeguards. In this connection, let us note that in his message to the recent IAEA General Conference, President Ford reaffirmed the U.S. offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. We have offered to permit such safeguards to demonstrate our belief that there is no threat to proprietary information and no risk of suffering commercial disadvantage under NPT safeguards.

Nuclear exporters should make special efforts to insure that their transfers of nuclear materials and equipment do not contribute to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities. The U.S. will shortly approach the principal supplier countries with specific proposals for making safeguards more effective.

One of the problems to be faced in the years ahead is the challenge of meeting rapidly increasing demands for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing services without undermining safeguards. An alternative to developing national facilities for these services—one which would be both economical and conducive to effective safeguards—might be the establishment of multinational plants capable of satisfying world demands.

Sixth, steps should be taken to insure the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials. As the civil nuclear industry expands throughout the world, nuclear materials will become an increasing factor in international commerce and the threat of theft or diversion could become acute. While physical security must be the primary responsibility of national governments, we believe the world community can play an important role. Accordingly, Secretary Kissinger stated on September 23 that the United States will urge the IAEA to develop an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material.

Such a convention should outline specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer. The United States, moreover, agrees with Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund’s recommendation that the IAEA should prepare itself to be a source of advice and assistance to nations that wish to improve their physical security practices.

Seventh, and finally, we should support and encourage the development of regional arrangements which contribute to nonproliferation objectives. While the NPT has played a central role in efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, the United States believes that complementary tools should also be used to serve that objective. Accordingly, we support the treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America, so far the only densely populated region in the world to set up a formal regime to ban nuclear weapons.

We also welcome the interest shown in nuclear-free zones at this General Assembly, in particular in the proposals for creating nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.

On several occasions my government has put forward four criteria for the establishment of nuclear-free zones:

1. The initiative should be taken by the states in the region concerned.

2. The zone should preferably include all states in the area whose participation is deemed important.

3. The creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements.

4. Provision should be made for adequate verification.

We would take these criteria into account in assessing any specific regional arrangement.

Another factor my government would take into account would be the treatment of PNEs in any nuclear-free-zone proposal. When the United States adhered to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, it was with the understanding that the treaty does not permit nonnuclear states party to the treaty to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices. We accordingly regard the Latin American nuclear-free zone as consistent with our objective of curbing the spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities.

We have suggested the principal tasks which we think should be undertaken in dealing with the vital issues of nuclear arms control and look forward to hearing the views of other delegations on these suggestions. A broadly based collective effort should be made by all—nuclear and nonnuclear, NPT parties and nonparties, industrially advanced and developing states alike—if we are to save our own and future generations from a world of many nuclear powers and unrestrained nuclear arms competition.

1. Summary: Symington, in a statement made before the UN General Assembly, outlined several tasks the world community needed to undertake to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.

   Source: Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1975, pp. 72–76. All brackets are in the original. Symington made his statement in Committee I (Political and Security) of the UN General Assembly. Statements by Joseph Martin, Jr., U.S. Representative to the CCD and adviser to the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly, are ibid., pp. 76–80. President Ford’s message to the IAEA General Conference is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1974, p. 552. For Kissinger’s September 23 address before the UN General Assembly, see Document 84.