Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

93. Telegram 15497 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 12, 1974, 1640Z.

15497. Subject: TTBT/PNE Negotiations—Review of First Week’s Meetings.

1. At the conclusion of the first week’s meeting, the concerns of the two delegations have become clearer. The Soviets appear to recognize that our primary concern is with adequate verification of PNEs under Article III of the TTBT, whereas they have stated that their objective is a more comprehensive agreement with minimal restrictions on PNE activities. In this approach, the Soviets are apparently offering us some sort of a partnership in PNE matters in which it is implied that we would then have all the information needed to verify that no weapons related benefits were being obtained.

2. Their approach to verification as presented would consist of primary reliance on national means for PNEs below the threshold, and above the threshold information exchange including yield, purpose, place and time prior to event and actual yield and results afterward. They have stated that consideration of more extensive information and other arrangements going beyond their view of Article III of TTBT could only be in context of broader agreement on PNEs. Morokhov has repeatedly stressed the need for a broad agreement. In the expressed Soviet view, broad agreement would include U.S. cooperation in Soviet PNE activities on a reciprocal basis and they claim that this would obviate the need for observers. They have indicated that arrangements for cooperation might allow the presence of “representatives” which would be considerably more acceptable to the Soviet bureaucracy than “observers.”

3. The Soviets have repeatedly stressed the importance of the NPT generally and Article V, in particular, and the direct linkage of NPT to Article III of the TTBT. They have also been somewhat critical of our position (para 5, State 221218) as being inconsistent with their understanding of our agenda. It is not clear at this time whether multilateral PNE projects under Article V of the NPT are really a primary Soviet objective or whether they are simply using NPT Article V as an argument for pressing for the kind of agreement they prefer.

4. The limited character of Soviet comments thus far suggests that the Soviets may be assuming that the Limited Test Ban Treaty might not represent a serious problem in these negotiations. Their statement is (reftel Moscow 15373) that preambular language should reaffirm commitment to the goals of the LTBT, whereas we have stated as a criterion that any PNE agreement must be consistent with the provisions of the LTBT. Without further elaboration, they might assert that our views are equivalent.

Stoessel

1. Summary: Ambassador Stoessel provided a review of the first week’s meetings of the TTBT/PNE negotiations in Moscow.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740291–0716. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 221218 to Moscow, October 8, and telegram 15373 from Moscow, October 10, are ibid., D740284–0658 and D740289–0008.