Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

69. Telegram 171545 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, August 6, 1974, 2248Z.

171545. Dakar pass Banjul. Subject: Nuclear Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB) and Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNEs). Refs: A. New Delhi 8974 (Notal); B. Bonn 10705 (Notal); C. Tokyo 9170 (Notal).

1. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB) signed during Moscow summit, when ratified, will ban underground nuclear weapons tests above 150 KT, effective March 31, 1976. This treaty provides for separate agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). There has been some international comment that this acknowledges a distinction between nuclear weapon explosives and nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. This cable reviews the U.S. position on this issue and provides updated guidance for use in responding to questions in this area.

2. U.S. has for years steadily maintained in CCD, IAEA, and elsewhere that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons. (Para 2 contains recent statement of this position.) Purpose of separate PNE agreement under TTB would be to ensure that bonafide peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would not be used to circumvent intent of TTB to ban further underground nuclear weapons testing above 150 KT. Reftel A reported Indian press reports to effect that TTB provision for separate treatment of PNEs supports distinction made by India between nuclear weapon tests and PNEs, and that TTB implies “that an underground explosion need not necessarily have the motive of developing nuclear weapons.” In this connection, posts may use following statement, drawn from speech delivered by Ambassador Martin at CCD on July 16: “It should be emphasized that the PNE agreement referred to in the present treaty and protocol between two nuclear weapon states would not be applicable to the problem posed by a non-nuclear weapon state’s development of nuclear explosive capability. It is clearly impossible for a non-nuclear weapon state to develop a capability to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without, in the process, acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon.”

3. Posts may also draw upon following information as needed: With regard to nuclear weapon testing, verification of compliance with provisions of Threshold Test Ban Treaty will be focused on specified test sites. Detailed geological data on these sites, as well as the yields of a limited number of actual explosions at the sites, will be exchanged in order to assist in establishing calibrations for the yields and locations of weapon tests. To prevent circumvention of TTB, it is necessary to work out special arrangements to verify that nuclear explosions by TTB parties outside test sites are solely for peaceful purposes and are not used for testing weapons. Such arrangements will have validity only for nuclear weapon states that have reached advanced stage of nuclear explosion technology, since purpose will be to make sure that advanced weapons development, which would normally involve sophisticated designs and instruments, is not carried out in the course of PNE projects. Similar arrangements could not be applied to other states that are at beginning or in early stages of nuclear technology since any nuclear explosions conducted by such states will add to their nuclear weapons capability regardless of motives or intentions of such explosions.

4. FYI: Above should not be read as implying that we have made basic policy decisions on problems raised by Indian nuclear explosion. Purpose of message is solely to provide talking points refuting contention that we now recognize that technology of PNEs can generally be distinguished from that of nuclear weapons. End FYI.

5. For Bonn: Para. 1, reftel B should, of course, read 150 KT, not 150,000 KT.

Kissinger

1. Summary: The Department of State provided guidance to all posts regarding the recently signed Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740215–0424. Limited Official Use. Drafted by P.S. Corden (ACDA/NWT/AT); cleared by Buchheim, David Brown (EA/J), S. Thompson (AEC), Charles Flowerree (PM/DCA), Huberman, John Marcum (INR), Miller, Sonnenfeldt, Jon Gibney (NEA/INS), Kahan, S/S, Scott George (EUR/CE), and in substance by T. George (OSD), C. Wilmot (JCS), and CIA; approved by Iklé. Telegram 8974 from New Delhi, July 6; telegram 9170 from Tokyo, July 11; and telegram 10705 from Bonn, July 5 are ibid., D740179–1140, D740185–0056, and D740179–0284. Martin’s July 16 statement to the CCD is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 348–352.