Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

68. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 6, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare

As a result of the interagency review of this subject in May, all agencies except the JCS consider that some restraints on environmental warfare are in our interest. The JCS prefer no restraints, but consider the restraints recommended by OSD below acceptable since they would do no serious damage to our military posture.

All agencies also agree that there should be no restraints on using weather modification techniques solely to protect forces from natural hazards and fog modification to aid in search and rescue missions.

OSD believes that we should prohibit the use of “environmental warfare” defined as any military use of weather, climate, ocean, or terrestrial modification techniques which could have long-lasting, widespread, or especially severe effects. This would in effect preclude all hostile uses except for tactical fog or precipitation modification, which could prove useful in some situations if natural meteorological conditions permitted. This choice would be verifiable within reasonable limits of error and is considered acceptable by the JCS.

State and ACDA strongly believe that we should prohibit not only those restraints recommended by OSD but also restraints on precipitation and fog modification for clearly hostile purposes. This is the only choice which would constitute a “peaceful uses only” policy and meet with more general acceptance as a definition of “environmental warfare.” However, tactical use of fog and preciptation modification would be more difficult to verify than the restraints recommended by OSD.

Following on this interagency examination and agreement that some restraints are in our interest, you agreed at the summit in Moscow to advocate bringing about the most effective measures possible against the dangers of using environmental modification techniques for military purposes and to begin discussions with the Soviets this year to explore the problem and what steps might be taken to bring about effective restraints.

Pursuant to your decision set forth in the U.S./USSR Joint Communiqué and the Joint Statement on Environmental Warfare, the draft NSDM at Tab A would instruct the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to prepare a scenario and approach for discussions with the Soviets to begin this October. The NSDM would also reflect a decision that the U.S. approach to these exploratory discussions should be consistent with the restraints supported by OSD and considered acceptable by the JCS.

This would not preclude discussions and perhaps a later U.S. decision on broader restraints if the Soviets raise them. Indeed, once we begin such discussions, particularly if and when a multilateral agreement were desired, we will in all likelihood have to address the question of a “peaceful uses only” policy or prohibitions along the lines recommended by State and ACDA. This prospect does not appear very troublesome since the military case, including our operational rainmaking experience in SEA from 1966–1972, for preserving the option for hostile uses of fog and precipitation modification techniques does not appear very strong.

There may well be some criticism by the Soviets or in any public airing of our approach that we are not including in these discussions the only things we know how to do and have done. Our use of rainmaking in SEA has been controversial. That problem should prove manageable, however, and I believe we should have a preference in mind for discussions with the Soviets. The OSD/JCS preference would focus on those restraints which would be subject to reasonable verification.

Recommendation:

That you approve the NSDM at Tab A requesting a scenario and approach for discussions with the Soviets on measures against environmental warfare and directing that the U.S. approach be consistent with the position supported by OSD and the JCS.

1. Summary: Kissinger summarized interagency views concerning restraints on environmental modification for warfare purposes. He noted that at the Moscow summit Nixon had agreed to begin discussions with the Soviets in order to “explore the problem and what steps might be taken to bring about effective restraints.” Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve a draft National Security Decision Memorandum instructing the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee to prepare a “scenario and approach” for discussions with the Soviets, to begin in October.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 23, Environmental Warfare (2) 1974. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon resigned the Presidency on August 9, and Ford became President. The NSDM as approved is Document 94. The May NSC Under Secretaries Committee report, prepared pursuant to Kissinger’s request, was not found, but is summarized in Document 74.