Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

56. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 20, 1974, 3:10–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• SALT

PRINCIPALS

• The President
• Secretary of State Kissinger
• Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
• JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer
• Director of Central Intelligence Colby
• Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Iklé

OTHER ATTENDEES

• State

  • Under Secretary Sisco
  • Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
  • Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

• Defense

  • Deputy Secretary Clements
  • Major General John Wickham
  • Mr. Robert Ellsworth

• CIA

  • Mr. Carl Duckett

• ACDA

  • Mr. Sidney Graybeal, Chairman SALT Consultative Commission

• White House

  • Mr. Kenneth Rush, Counselor to the President
  • General Alexander Haig, Chief of Staff
  • Mr. Ron Ziegler, Assistant to the President
  • Major General Brent Scowcroft

• NSC

  • Mr. Jan M. Lodal

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to a test ban.]

Secretary Kissinger: Fine. The Soviet Union first proposed to you, Mr. President, a complete ban on all underground testing. They proposed a moratorium while we worked out the detailed agreements. They also indicated that if all of the countries did not agree, both sides would be free to withdraw from the agreement. Since it is clear that the PRC and France would continue their tests, this was obviously just a maneuver directed primarily at China. Furthermore, there are verification problems with a comprehensive test ban. As a result, we rejected their proposals. The Soviets then proposed a threshold test ban. We reviewed this proposal at the Verification Panel. Several views developed. The threshold test ban would have a useful effect on Soviet programs—it would drive them down to lower yields. It would continue to permit a vigorous U.S. underground testing program and would not affect our basic strategic capabilities. It would also maintain the viability of our nuclear weapons laboratories and if the threshold is high enough, it would not have serious verification problems.

Let me now go to a review of our progress to date. We have been holding technical talks with the Soviets in Moscow. We have also done studies here and have concluded that an agreement based on yield would be better than one based on seismic signals, although these are related since a yield would have to be translated into a seismic signal for verification purposes. The position which we have generally agreed to is as follows:

—A threshold test ban is acceptable in principle.

—The ban should enter into effect no earlier than 1 January 1976.

—We could accept a yield approach if adequate geological information is available. This has been accepted by the Soviets.

—We would want the yield to be at least 100 kilotons and, in fact, we have set it for now at 150 kilotons.

—With respect to peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), we would have to be provided adequate information to determine their yield and they would have to be covered by the threshold in any event.

—With respect to explosions above the threshold, we could accept the Soviet proposal allowing for two explosions slightly above the threshold each year.

The Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission have also been directed to produce a program to complete essential testing before January 1976.

With respect to the position of the Soviet Union, they have not said what threshold level they would accept. They want two levels—a low level, around 5–10 kilotons, below which tests would be free and then a sandwich between this level and an upper level which has not been defined and a quota in between. They want to set the upper level high enough to include the PNEs.

Our position on this has been that a quota is not acceptable. It is not verifiable since they could set off multiple shots. We have said we could accept only one threshold, above which all such shots would be prohibited. On PNEs, we can not let them run free since this would eliminate the effects of the agreement. Nor can we accept a very high threshold; if the threshold is as high as 500 kilotons, with an uncertainty factor of 1½–2, the threshold becomes essentially meaningless.

So where we stand is this. We have agreed in principle to aim for a threshold test ban. We have not agreed on a threshold, nor have we solved the problem of quotas or PNEs. What this means, Mr. President, is that you will not have nothing to talk about at the summit. (Laughter)

There also remain some other technical issues, such as proof testing, but I don’t think these will come up at the summit.

Given all this, probably about the best we can expect at the summit would be an agreement in principle. Perhaps we could also agree on the time it would go into effect, the threshold level, and one or two other provisions, leaving all of the seismic details and other technical matters to be worked out by experts. [5 lines not declassified] Admiral Moorer and Secretary Schlesinger know these requirements better than I do.

In summary, Mr. President, in Moscow you will need to solve the problems associated with PNEs, and agree on the quota issue, as well as other matters.

President Nixon: What is the Kennedy proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: He has proposed a complete ban on all testing. Kennedy went to Russia and came back with the Brezhnev proposal, which we rejected in about 15 minutes. It is obvious that this is a move directed purely at China. We rejected this at your instructions.

President Nixon: Not to mention Egypt!

Secretary Kissinger: They won’t have nuclear weapons for six years!

Dr. Ikle: This is a resolution which has been around for about a year. It would have us start out with a moratorium on all further testing.

President Nixon: Well I hope we reject it—a moratorium is clearly one sided. One thing this does is indicate the direction of Congress on issues like this. We have to remember that we do not operate in a vacuum here.

Admiral Moorer: There are several outstanding weapons programs. [4 lines not declassified] We will need time to test these ongoing programs. We will also need a yield limit high enough to permit testing. We need to protect our options if new programs are needed.

Secretary Schlesinger: Three of the warheads could be completed by 1 July 1976. This was the AEC and DOD position—that we start any agreement not before 1 July 1976. [2 lines not declassified] But these are marginal items, depending upon the program you feel is needed.

I would like to make the point, however, that as a general proposition, if you look only at military considerations, ignoring basic foreign policy considerations, the threshold test ban is more advantageous to the Soviet Union than the U.S. First, the Soviet Union has considerable throw weight to be exploited. We have utilized our technology—accuracies and yield-to-weight ratios—and we have kept down our throw weight. This technology option is closed by a threshold test ban. Second, the Soviet Union has recently concentrated on high yields, and we haven’t. Threshold test ban would permit the Soviets to operate in an area we have been exploiting, but prohibit us operating in the area they have been exploiting. Again, these are purely military considerations. But in these terms, the test ban would be advantageous to the Soviet Union. Of course, this treaty is on the face of it absolutely equal.

Dr. Ikle: One other military consideration is that a threshold test ban would stop Soviet high yields. Without it they could continue to do perhaps even better in high yields. And a foreign policy consideration is that the higher the threshold, the more the advantages of the treaty vanish. It would be perceived as no limit at all.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree with Fred’s point. The difference to us in a threshold between 75 and 150 kilotons is not very great. It may be advantageous to the U.S. to have a lower rather than higher threshold.

President Nixon: There is another consideration here—one which goes back to our 1972 agreements. We talk about what we can do and what they can do and so forth. Certainly, we have the potential to do things, but there are political constraints on us, and they have none. We have to remember that we have a constant running battle with Congress. On the ABM, we won by only one vote. For example, people talk about what we gave up in the previous agreement. But we never would have done anything more, and they might have.

I never thought that a test ban was any damn good. I didn’t like the first one, nor do I like this one. I see the test ban pandering to the view that stopping testing will lead to a safer world. But we have to be realistic, and the world and the U.S. public believe the test ban is a great goal worth achieving in itself. In that context, if we can do something with no appearance of any inequality, maybe we can negotiate an agreement. We have to remember that they will do whatever is allowed, but we will not do as much as we are allowed. Restraints which we can negotiate are restraints on them which they would not do themselves. The U.S. will restrain itself, but the Soviet Union has no such restraints built in. From a pragmatic standpoint, we should realize that this is going to take quite a bit of doing.

Suppose in 2½ years, a U.S. President takes a Kennedy view. That is, he wants to satisfy the establishment, and by that I mean the eastern establishment view. As Fulbright put it, he would be for the right things for the wrong reasons. But in the years ahead the U.S. will have a tendency to restrain itself and the Soviet Union will not.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I do not believe you can accept the proposition that you are going ahead on political interest against the military interests of the U.S.

President Nixon: No, I agree. What I am saying is that when we have fought and bled to death for ABM, the B–1, Trident, and so forth, and only barely gotten these, if we can limit the Soviets in the future, when we may have Administrations which will not fight for these programs, we will have helped the country.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is important that we analyze what we mean by Soviet military advantage. We have an advantage currently in yield-to-weight ratios, and a threshold test ban would constrain yield-to-weight ratios. It would be a brake on transforming a throw weight advantage to a yield advantage for the Soviets. The threshold test ban would freeze them at their present level of technology, or force them to yield lower yields. Both of these would benefit the U.S. [2 lines not declassified]

President Nixon: There is another point. First, nothing can help us that does not provide for equivalence. But anything that provides for equivalence is pragmatically to our advantage. This is your point that you continually make about the [19] 72 agreements. We agreed not to do things we were not going to do anyway. We can’t tell the world this, but here we must make decisions on a pragmatic basis and try for agreements on the basis of equality.

Admiral Moorer: With respect to the time the agreement goes into effect, it should be set in such a way that we will have reasonable assurance that we can test the new weapons we need. Second, we should remember the Soviet response on the LTB. They surged forward with an accelerated program to finish all their testing before it went into effect. I think we should carefully examine their test sites to determine whether they are accelerating now. Bill, do you have anything on this?

Mr. Colby: They have some tests they are preparing for, including one which could be an air test, but we think not. We see no evidence of acceleration.

Admiral Moorer: I would think you need a careful study of that. We need assurances that we have the hedges available to update systems in terms of yield and throw weight if the Soviets show no restraint in the future.

President Nixon: We could accelerate our testing programs also.

Secretary Schlesinger: And we plan to do so. The AEC will emphasize yields greater than the threshold. With respect to the timing the AEC and Defense Department say July 1, the NSDM says January 1. Second, with respect to verification, we will need a continuing exchange between technical people so the Administration has confidence we can say roughly what yield the Soviets have tested. Third, with respect to a quota greater than the threshold, the AEC and Defense Department position is somewhat more liberal than the positions posed by Henry. We would feel that is not disadvantageous if a small quota, for example, one per year for three years, were permitted above the threshold. [1 line not declassified] Once again, though, improvement of weapons technology is no longer the pacing item in weapons development. Even if we stopped testing entirely, we would not be severly damaged. We would have been in the 50s but not now. The important measures are accuracy and RV development.

Mr. Rush: How effectively can you go ahead on our reentry vehicle development without testing?

Secretary Schlesinger: You may have to use other than the optimal weapons, and not be able to minimize the throw weight needed. But that’s the nature of arms agreements—that you are limited to something other than the optimal.

Secretary Kissinger: Again, if we are ahead now the test ban would freeze our advantage.

Secretary Schlesinger: But our advantage is in lower yields—an area still open to the Soviets for further work.

Mr. Clements: In answer to Ken, we can continue to do work on the yields and accuracy.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to clarify one thing. The Soviet proposal is for a quota below the threshold—it’s a sandwich approach—a quota between the lower and upper threshold. This would constrain the number of tests allowed below the threshold, and would be a constraint on us. This is the approach we rejected.

Mr. Clements: Oh, I’m sorry, I didn’t understand.

President Nixon: Yes, I did not understand that either.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that proposition is for a quota below the threshold. This we have said would be unacceptable.

President Nixon: It would be one-sided because it’s not verifiable. We would be constrained but they wouldn’t.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to a quota above the threshold, it would make the agreement essentially meaningless, at least for the period in which the quota was permitted.

Dr. Ikle: Another problem with the two threshold Soviet approach is that their lower threshold would be around 5 kilotons [1 line not declassified]. This would bring pressure for lowering the threshold to that level.

President Nixon: Well, we’ll be ready to wrestle on this issue in Moscow.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to a test ban.]

1. Summary: The principal attendees of the meeting discussed the status of the TTBT and PNE negotiations and proposed policy alternatives for consideration.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files, NSC Meeting Minutes, Box H–110, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1971 through 6–20–1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Lodal. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors or that remains classified and “[19]”, added for clarity. Portions of the minutes are also published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 68.