Office of the Historian

40. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, April 12, 1974, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS

  • Soviets

    • H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
    • The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    • Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

  • U.S.

    • The Secretary
    • Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
    • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
    • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to weather modification.]

[Gromyko:] Now I would like to turn to another kind of environment and I hope that you can be more forthcoming. What do you think of our proposal on making an agreement with respect to changes in the environment?

Secretary: We are going to have a meeting on it soon.

Sonnenfeldt: A report is overdue but we should have it in a few days.

Secretary: I am not optimistic about the results.

Dobrynin: Why?

[Page 92]

Secretary: Our people say that there is no way to verify what others will do with respect to weather modification.

Gromyko: I would like very much to pretend that I did not hear your reply that you were not optimistic. So let us both do what the fishermen in the story did. There were two fishermen who met on the road and they were both hard of hearing. The first said “Are you going fishing?” And the second replied “No, I am going fishing.” And the first answered again, “No, I am going fishing.” So you can see, I did not wish to hear you. Really, I am not at all encouraged. This is another area where we can get into competition and the consequences will follow. Years from now our successors will say “Why didn’t we take this matter up before?”

Secretary: Can we get a report and answer by the end of the month? I will have to have a meeting to hear what my geniuses have to say.

Gromyko: This problem could consume billions of dollars with only doubtful results if we get into competition.

Secretary: What you want is a declaration not to use it?

Gromyko: I don’t care about the form. I have a completely open mind.

Secretary: Then Jobert and the Chinese can make speeches that we have agreed not to use it against each other but we are free to use it against others. Am I right that you want to renounce the use?

Gromyko: We will consider any effective form. A declaration might be a good way to proceed and contain the substantive matters. You should not underestimate the effects. This could be like the ABM but it could consume several times more money. We will look back and say why didn’t we stop this. This is the joint opinion of our political, scientific and military advisors, especially our political and scientific people.

Secretary: It might be possible to agree to prohibit the use or the first use or the production of agents or the belligerent use.

Gromyko: We want to be specific and concrete.

Dobrynin: Can’t we agree to enter into negotiations at the summit?

Gromyko: We could agree in principle that this is the general direction we wish to move in.

Rush: What about peacetime peaceful uses?

Gromyko: Those are all right. If it is to save a grain harvest, that is permissible.

Secretary: Let me look at this again. Perhaps we could announce at the summit that we intend to enter into negotiations or to study this problem.

Gromyko: I hope that you can stretch your position and see that this is in our mutual interest.

[Page 93]

Secretary: Your suggestions have been helpful. I think we might look into the question of whether we can agree to a joint examination of how to avoid the use of the environment for belligerent purposes.

Gromyko: With our geography we have a lot of room for experimentation.

Secretary: You also have a lot of bad weather to export. I understand what you are saying. I will think seriously about whether we can have a joint examination.

Gromyko: If we can move in this direction it would be useful.

Secretary: There might be some symbolic value in this agreement. I will look to our study and see what the problems are. Ever since Mr. Rush left the Pentagon they have been more bellicose but you have given me an idea.

Dobrynin: Maybe we can have more sunny days.

Secretary: I will study and see what can be considered. I am sympathetic. I will let you know by May 1.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to weather modification.]

  1. Summary: Kissinger, Rush, Sonnenfeldt, and Hartman met with Gromyko and Dobrynin to discuss weather modification and other related arms control concerns, in addition to other topics.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860123–1356. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. John D. Rendahl, Special Assistant and Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Group (EUR/NSC–IG) initialed for Hartman. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors and “[Gromyko:]”, added for clarity. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s dining room at the Department of State. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, as Document 174. On April 28 and 29, Kissinger met with Gromyko and Dobrynin in Geneva. For the memoranda of conversations, see ibid., Documents 175, 176, 177, and 178. The executive summary of the overdue environmental modification study that Sonnenfeldt references is Document 42 in this volume.

    ↩