174. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko


  • Soviets:
  • H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
  • The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • U.S.:
  • The Secretary
  • Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
  • Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Gromyko: I see in this room as well as in the other room that Americans like concealed lighting. We don’t make a big secret of our lighting.

Secretary: There are a lot of changes around here. Since I went away, Secretary Rush has introduced a whole new cuisine.

Our press is going crazy over the question of whether or not we are making progress.

Sonnenfeldt: The ticker stories this afternoon are all based on your comments in the elevator.

Secretary: They are saying that we are not going to achieve a permanent SALT agreement but if we had told them we had no intention of doing that, they would then call that a failure.

Gromyko: I suppose you are having many visitors this week.

Secretary: Yes, I have seen the Algerian and today I saw the Egyptian and tomorrow I have breakfast with the Dutchman van der Stoel.2

Gromyko: Do you plan to see Fahmy again?

[Page 832]

Secretary: I have no plan to. He told me he would see you on Sunday.3 I gather you are leaving on Monday. Why don’t you get up and leave after I begin my speech and then the press can make a big story out of that—GROMYKO WALKS OUT.

Seriously, I plan to add several paragraphs to my speech about how détente contributes to our ability to cooperate with all countries. I am told that your speech was very moderate.4

Gromyko: Yes, perhaps it was too moderate.

Dobrynin: It stressed the basis for cooperative efforts.

Secretary: That is not inconsistent with what I will say.

Dobrynin: You see, Henry, you are beginning to use double negatives too.

Gromyko: I know how to use triple negatives, Anatoliy.

Rush: You know that a double negative equals an affirmative.

Secretary: We are talking to the greatest double negative expert of them all. (At this point the Secretary toasted the Foreign Minister.)

Gromyko: With respect to the UN General Assembly, we set forth our viewpoints. We think that this session can give a general direction for work that should proceed but that there can be no document adopted before the next session of the General Assembly. We think that the Economic and Social Council of the UN should be told to draft recommendations for the next session. This session we cannot get into specifics or details.

Secretary: We aren’t prepared either to get into specifics at this time. We should stick to general objectives and not talk about specifics at this session. Maybe I will be able to let you see my draft speech in case you wish to comment on it.

Gromyko: And your Allies, what position will they take?

Secretary: We haven’t coordinated very well for this meeting. I don’t have any knowledge about specific proposals.

Sonnenfeldt: The only thing I can remember is that the French have proposed a UN monitoring system.

Hartman: There are several proposals for commissions and groups to study specific proposals such as commodity arrangements.

Secretary: I think that we were both attacked by the Chinese.

Gromyko: Your Chinese friend accused us both of super-powerism. Are you going to reply?

[Page 833]

Secretary: No, I don’t intend to reply. If I comment at all it will be very general, saying something critical about people using slogans.

Gromyko: I didn’t directly reply either.

Secretary: I am having dinner Sunday night with the Chinese. I don’t know how to interpret what is going on in China. By the way, they took the initiative for my meeting.

Gromyko: Do you know Teng Hsiao-ping? I met him a long time ago but I don’t know him very well. We met in Moscow and Bucharest.

Secretary: I know Chiao Kwan-hua well.5 He has been at every meeting except the first.

Dobrynin: He is an older man. He must be over seventy.

Secretary: Yes.

Gromyko: I think so but by Chinese standards that is young.

Secretary: Do you know Wang Hung-wen?6

Gromyko: I have never met him.

Secretary: I have never met him either.

Dobrynin: Didn’t you meet him in Shanghai?

Gromyko: You visited Shanghai, didn’t you?

Secretary: Yes, but I don’t recollect meeting Wang.

Gromyko: May I raise the question of Berlin if it won’t spoil your appetite? You will recall that we discussed this question in Washington and also when you were in Moscow. We said that the best solution to this problem is to suspend de facto the establishment of the Federal Environmental Office7—only Allah knows why they took the decision to establish it in the first place. We have information that if the United States agreed the Federal Government is prepared to go along with suspending the establishment of this office. Thus the problem depends on you. You can dispose of this matter.

Secretary: That can’t be the right information but let me say that if the Federal Government asks our approval for their not proceeding, we will not stand in the way. If you are saying that we should order them not to proceed that is a different matter. If the German Government considers that they do not wish to go ahead, we will not stand in the way. If we have to take the initiative, however, that is a different matter.

[Page 834]

Gromyko: Let us say that there could be an understanding without any political/legal steps on your part and that you register this understanding to their agreement not to proceed. Your attitude could be made known to them. That would be the way out. If you are concerned about the Berlin situation that could solve the problem. You register your understanding on the basis of facts. Thus you would be making a gesture in favor of the Quadripartite Agreement.

Secretary: This reminds me of messages I receive from our Ambassador in New Delhi, who says that he has received “idiotic instructions.” That leaves me with the choice of either saying that I didn’t know about the instruction or that I am stupid.

Gromyko: Mr. Rush who has great responsibility for the Quadripartite Agreement should “jump for joy” if we can solve this matter. Of course, this would not absolutely satisfy us even then because the Federal Government has still taken a decision in principle to establish the office but at least the factual situation would be frozen.

Secretary: I am not absolutely sure I understand. If there was a German decision not to establish the office on its own, we would not object.

Gromyko: I have the information that this is the German view.

Secretary: That is news to us.

Gromyko: I may say I have more than an impression that this is the German position.

Secretary: They have not conveyed this to us. Let me do the following: I will ask the Germans what their intentions are. If they have no intention of implementing their decision, then we have a new situation. If your information is incorrect, I will inform you.Art, will you see that a message is sent off immediately?

Rush: I very much doubt that this is the German position.

Secretary: I just had a conversation yesterday with Scheel and he said nothing about this.

Gromyko: Did you discuss this question?

Secretary: Yes, we reviewed our conversation in Moscow and agreed that this was now a common Allied position. No new institution would be created in Berlin without full consultation and approval of the three Western Allies. The Germans accept that they will recognize our decisions when we refuse approval. The British and French also agree.

Dobrynin: They know then?

Secretary: Yes, but that does not include the [Page 835] Federal Environmental Office. Perhaps you have confused the idea of no new institutions without our approval but the new institutions does not cover the Federal Environmental Office. In any case, I will ask the Germans if anything is new.

Gromyko: So the Federal Environmental Office you think is still going to be established? You should check that with the Germans.

Rush: They have never indicated that to us. In fact, politically this would be very difficult for Brandt to do. He has lost several recent elections. The CDU is now showing more than 50 percent in the polls for the first time. The SPD is in a very weak posture.

Gromyko: What province is this in?

Rush: This is an overall percentage for the whole country.

Secretary: It is hard to understand the decline of Brandt.

Rush: I think it is due in large part to the inflation. When I first went to Bonn, Schiller8 told me that the SPD would stay in power as long as the inflation was kept below 3 percent.

Secretary: They have three years to go before elections.

Sonnenfeldt: The law on the Federal Environmental Office is in the Bundestag now.

Rush: It would be too late for them to withdraw. Politically Brandt could not do it.

Gromyko: I will verify my information.

Secretary: Do you want me to proceed with the Germans?

Gromyko: No, you wait until my Ambassador communicates with you. I will verify the information. I am sure that it is from a reliable source. I received it while I was in New York. Our Ambassador will phone when he has the information or whether my information is correct.

Secretary: I do not believe it is correct.

Gromyko: I don’t want your hands tied. Therefore, I will verify the information.

Now I would like to turn to another kind of environment and I hope that you can be more forthcoming. What do you think of our proposal on making an agreement with respect to changes in the environment?

Secretary: We are going to have a meeting on it soon.

Sonnenfeldt: A report9 is overdue but we should have it in a few days.

[Page 836]

Secretary: I am not optimistic about the results.

Dobrynin: Why?

Secretary: Our people say that there is no way to verify what others will do with respect to weather modification.

Gromyko: I would like very much to pretend that I did not hear your reply that you were not optimistic. So let us both do what the fishermen in the story did. There were two fishermen who met on the road and they were both hard of hearing. The first said “Are you going fishing?” And the second replied “No, I am going fishing.” And the first answered again, “No, I am going fishing.” So you can see, I did not wish to hear you. Really, I am not at all encouraged. This is another area where we can get into competition and the consequences will follow. Years from now our successors will say “Why didn’t we take this matter up before?”

Secretary: Can we get a report and answer by the end of the month? I will have to have a meeting to hear what my genuises have to say.

Gromyko: This problem could consume billions of dollars with only doubtful results if we get into competition.

Secretary: What you want is a declaration not to use it?

Gromyko: I don’t care about the form. I have a completely open mind.

Secretary: Then Jobert and the Chinese can make speeches that we have agreed not to use it against each other but we are free to use it against others. Am I right that you want to renounce the use?

Gromyko: We will consider any effective form. A declaration might be a good way to proceed and contain the substantive matters. You should not underestimate the effects. This could be like the ABM but it could consume several times more money. We will look back and say why didn’t we stop this. This is the joint opinion of our political, scientific and military advisors, especially our political and scientific people.

Secretary: It might be possible to agree to prohibit the use or the first use or the production of agents or the belligerent use.

Gromyko: We want to be specific and concrete.

Dobrynin: Can’t we agree to enter into negotiations at the Summit?

Gromyko: We could agree in principle that this is the general direction we wish to move in.

Rush: What about peacetime peaceful uses?

Gromyko: Those are all right. If it is to save a great harvest, that is permissible.

[Page 837]

Secretary: Let me look at this again. Perhaps we could announce at the Summit that we intend to enter into negotiations or to study this problem.

Gromyko: I hope that you can stretch your position and see that this is in our mutual interest.

Secretary: Your suggestions have been helpful. I think we might look into the question of whether we can agree to a joint examination of how to avoid the use of the environment for belligerent purposes.

Gromyko: With our geography we have a lot of room for experimentation.

Secretary: You also have a lot of bad weather to export. I understand what you are saying. I will think seriously about whether we can have a joint examination.

Gromyko: If we can move in this direction it would be useful.

Secretary: There might be some symbolic value in this agreement. I will look to our study and see what the problems are. Ever since Mr. Rush left the Pentagon they have been more bellicose but you have given me an idea.

Dobrynin: Maybe we can have more sunny days.

Secretary: I will study and see what can be considered. I am sympathetic. I will let you know by May 1.

Gromyko: Can you turn to the Middle East?

Secretary: Let us talk about SALT and then have a preliminary discussion of the Middle East so that we can consider it further tomorrow.

On SALT we are getting trapped in a public debate which is dangerous and absurd. On the one hand people are accusing us of total failure. If we say we made some progress then they say we have given something away. Seriously, I think we have to set some time limit about what could come out of the Summit and how realistic the possibilities are. There are several possibilities: 1) We could make an agreement along the lines of our discussion in Moscow as we discussed with the President today.10 2) Without an agreement we could make a statement like we did in May of 1971 that we will work toward an agreement on a numerical ratio but have not worked out all the details. 3) Or we could have a combination of the two. We should decide in the next three weeks what we have in mind. Let me say what our difficulty is. You have three kinds of land-based missiles which you can MIRV plus the submarine problem. We have only one land-based missile type. Our problem is simpler and, of course, through no fault of yours, we [Page 838] have decided to go for a smaller land-based missile design. Now people are saying that you have a big missile and we are at a disadvantage.

Gromyko: How many times the Hiroshima-type bomb do you have in one part of your MIRV—that is, one-tenth?

Secretary: Several times Hiroshima in one-tenth. The problem is the distribution of each other’s land-based missiles. I came back from Moscow determined to take another look. We had always focused on the number of missiles not on the number of warheads. You can see here I carry around a piece of paper with all the numbers on it because I want to learn them. The problem is you say you want one thousand and how that number is composed is meaningless. You could have all your land-based missiles MIRV’d in the first four years and then shift to submarines in the fifth year. This would be no technical violation but it would affect the rate at which MIRV’s are installed.

Gromyko: General Secretary Brezhnev told you that this was a practical impossibility for us.

Secretary: You have talked about exchanging information and I think that this is a constructive idea. Would you do this at the beginning of the process?

Gromyko: This should be specified in the negotiations. Information could be exchanged several times, not just once. It could be exchanged initially, in an advanced stage and in the middle. What you want to know can be obtained through this process of exchanging information. This is the way you can find out about intentions.

Secretary: The problem is that if you say, for example, at the beginning that you are going to have 700 land-based missiles and 300 sea-based missiles, then we can compare this with the actual deployment. If you give us information at the beginning and it only covers the first year we cannot plan our reaction.

Gromyko: We can exchange information at the beginning and tell you what our intention is for the next year and when that time expires each side will say what it intends to do in the second year and so forth each year for the duration of the agreement. We could exchange this information simultaneously.

Secretary: But you will know our intentions because they are public.

Gromyko: How will we know?

Secretary: Your Ambassador meets with more Senators than I do.

Sonnenfeldt: It is all in our budget.

Secretary: This would not be equal. Our deployment is ahead of yours. We may be finished in 1976.

Gromyko: What do you prefer?

[Page 839]

Secretary: Our preference would be for you to tell us that there will be X number of land-based missiles and X number of sea-based missiles. We would accept that. We would have so many land and so many sea-based missiles.

Gromyko: We cannot accept a condition to the exchange of information.

Secretary: But you would be free to change your mind.

Dobrynin: We would be free to give any information.

Gromyko: What we are talking about is an exchange of information not an agreement on figures. It would be an understanding by each side on a mutual basis.

Secretary: I could conceive—leaving aside the assumption of an understanding—that you tell us you plan so many land and so many sea-based missiles. We tell you the same thing and we tell each year what we plan to do each year. But doing this year by year is useless.

Sonnenfeldt: If we have an agreement for five years year by year doesn’t really help very much. Our main problem is that you have told us your silos can take MIRV’s without any change.

Secretary: We are talking about launchers and counting silos. There is a problem in exchanging information and I hope that the General Secretary did not misunderstand. I said that to MIRV a missile without modifying a silo was not a violation of the agreement. We think it is possible to install a different missile by digging the hole deeper and that is not a violation.

Gromyko: The General Secretary understood the point you made.

Secretary: The problem is that if you MIRV without modifying the silo we have an almost insoluble problem. We don’t know if the missile has been MIRV’d and, therefore, we must count it as MIRV’d if you tell us that the silo requires no modification. That is a factual problem. Do you intend to modify your silos to install MIRV’s? If so, then your proposal for exchanging information has merit because we can then tell him you have modified a silo to install a MIRV.

Gromyko: Is that a concrete question? Doesn’t exchanging information solve the problem in principle?

Secretary: We can examine if there are other criteria on modifications or the question of whether they can be put in submarines.

Gromyko: Is this a pre-condition of the understanding or in the beginning should we only consider an algebraic formula and the exchange of information?

Secretary: For us this is a tough intellectual problem. There is enormous difficulty which is fed by the opponents of an agreement. It is conceivable that we could accept an algebraic formula and have an understanding about exchanging information but to be convincing it [Page 840] depends on what we can say about our ability to tell when missiles are MIRV’d. If we can say they have been MIRV’d when a silo cover is removed for a period of months, then we can say that we have counted the number of MIRV’d missiles. If we say that we have no way to judge and you can just pop a missile into the old hole, then we have to count the full number allowed under the agreement.

Dobrynin: How can we convince you?

Gromyko: There is no violation unless the holes are made wider.

Secretary: Strangely enough, if there is suspicious activity it is better and easier to reach an agreement. The problem is that you have very large missiles and if there are no MIRV’s on the largest missiles or if you accept a ceiling, then your figures become more manageable.

Gromyko: We cannot accept any division within the ceiling. There can be no exchange of information if that is the case.

Secretary: We are not ahead on numbers of launchers.

Dobrynin: No, you are ahead on warheads.

Secretary: But your missiles are heavier.

Gromyko: Count how many warheads you can have on your thousand missiles.

Secretary: It is not excluded that we could accept a thousand missiles of which the largest or 50 or so could be MIRV’d. Then we could exchange information each year.

Gromyko: This makes exchange of information useless. It is a condition to the agreement. What we should do is to facilitate understanding. What you are suggesting just means one more condition and you would have the advantage and I am not speaking yet of FBS. Gradually you are washing out the idea.

Secretary: I think you have made some constructive suggestions but your idea needs greater precision.

Gromyko: We could have an exchange of information each year or twice a year if you want.

Secretary: No, we have more interest in long-term developments.

Sonnenfeldt: If we can assume that silos must be modified, then we have some means to verify other than watching the testing program.

Secretary: The problem is how to reassure each other.

Gromyko: We believe that national means should be used. What other alternative is there?

Secretary: The present agreement is easy to deal with by national means because it talks only about numbers. The choice before us is that you can modify your missiles with no external change, then we have serious difficulties. If it requires external change our problems are easier to deal with. We will have to respond to your suggestions.

[Page 841]

Gromyko: If you set an inner limit, then the agreement to exchange information falls and there can be no progress in the negotiations. Frankly, the agreement on exchanging information was not simple for us. I would say that this is not a usual step for the Soviet Union to take.

Secretary: I agree with that but, as you know, we publish everything. I can still remember Smirnoff’s face when I described the characteristics to him of your SS/9. But you managed to calm him down.

Gromyko: Then we will wait for your reply.

Secretary: Now let us turn to the Middle East. I don’t want to try to find a solution now but I would like you to sum up once again what it is you want. (Before we have the translation I must say that you are hard to please. At first you accused us of not doing enough over the last six years and now you tell us we are doing too much.

Gromyko: Not quite.)

Gromyko: Let us proceed from the following basic understanding:

1. In all questions pertaining to the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the United States will act in a coordinated way. Both Powers will take part in the consideration and solution of these problems.

Secretary: I can imagine the rest.

Gromyko: 2. Syrian disengagement.

Secretary: By those problems do you mean the overall peace settlement?

Gromyko: Yes in the broadest sense to include all matters.

2. Disengagement. With respect to the disengagement between Syria and Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States and, of course, Syria and Israel and Egypt, if it wishes to participate, should take part in the consideration of this question. But in practice this is only possible after the Syrians say that what the Israelis have proposed can serve as a basis for further discussion. If the Syrians say that there is no basis to proceed, then it is pointless to have a meeting.

3. If it is seen by the Syrians that there is a basis—cause for the group to meet, then such a meeting should take place within the framework of the Geneva forum. We have discussed this with the Syrians and they are prepared to do this and I can assure you that it was no simple matter to get them to agree.

4. It is important to secure a positive outcome to the disengagement process. The United States is in a position to influence Israel—I am convinced of that and your President intimated as much. Therefore, you should bring your influence to bear on Israel to get it to take a reasonable attitude (a) to secure a withdrawal which is not just symbolic but involves a substantial part of Syrian territory and (b) that that withdrawal should be an integral part of the total withdrawal and general [Page 842] settlement. I trust that this presents no difficulty. Disengagement must be part of a general settlement.

5. Withdrawal is withdrawal. The overall settlement still lies ahead. We can continue our consultations every day. You and I can meet. Dobrynin can meet with you. But the Geneva Conference is the appropriate forum for the overall settlement and it has been paralyzed. Therefore, we should move in parallel with our bilateral conversations to reactivate the Geneva Conference. I emphasize that this should not impede our talks.

6. We could specifically reach understandings with regard to the way we should move ahead. We can meet together in Geneva—so that neither of us has to travel too long a distance. We could meet there bilaterally to exchange information and see where things stand. We could agree on how things could be moved forward or chart future steps. There would be no secret about these discussions. We could announce them. Perhaps we could meet in two or three weeks or a month from now.

7. (And like Beatrice in Dante, this may represent the Seventh Heaven), We—the United States and the Soviet Union—should agree to reaffirm our decision to act in agreed, concerted, coordinated, joint way or whatever word you wish to use. What better way to keep in touch and consult with all the appropriate relevant countries in the interests of world détente and peace in the Middle East. This procedure would assure the independence and sovereignty of all. And I would be willing to mention Israel too. I would say this out loud. I would not be shy about it. Perhaps our present meeting could put out a statement to this effect. Israel should not shrink or shudder about this very idea. They should have no cause to do so. We have no intention of pulling the rug out from under the existence of Israel. At the table there will be no name calling. You should convince them that this is so. What matters is that we begin the process.

There are other matters, of course, beside complete withdrawal such as Jerusalem, Gaza and the Palestinian question. But if we have a framework it will be easier to deal with these problems later. It is easier to influence the parties at the same table. By the way, we favor having the Palestinians in Geneva but we do not wish to make that decision now. We can discuss it later in our consultations.

Secretary: Tomorrow we can talk more about this. In the meantime I will study the seven points you have raised. You object to the United States acting separately but most of your concern is about form. Nothing has happened to embarrass the Soviet Union. We don’t want to enter a process where one side makes itself the lawyer for one or more of the parties and we don’t want a process which enables either side to achieve unilateral advantage. We have been greatly concerned [Page 843] about the Syrian disengagement. We are attempting to get some withdrawal behind the October 6 line. We have not been successful yet. If that is what you call symbolic, and you think more can be done I want to tell you that that is the maximum we think is possible. We are afraid that meetings will lend themselves to great agitation. We know what can be achieved. We are not looking for symbolic moves. What we will do is try to get the maximum obtainable. Both of us want to have a constructive attitude of cooperation and neither of us wishes to take unilateral advantage. But we must have a separation in form as well as in substance.

Your idea of a meeting in Geneva strikes me as a good one. We can set the time in the next few days. On your other points I will study them. I am not sure I can remember them all. I am not opposed to convening the Geneva Conference after the Syrian disengagement. To clarify the problem you said on the one hand there should be joint negotiations on disengagement but the peace settlement should take place under the framework of the Geneva Agreement. The only issue is the Syrian disengagement. We agree to re-open the Geneva Conference after that. With respect to the disengagement we can’t move until Syria has an indication of an acceptable Israeli proposal. I can visualize a continuing process in which we try to elicit an Israeli proposal and then we agree to work out the modalities of disengagement in some military commission in Geneva.

Gromyko: That is correct.

Secretary: I would like to explore this more thoroughly. This is actually close to what I had thought of suggesting to you. Let me sum up. 1) We should meet in Geneva in two or three weeks. 2) After the Syrian disengagement we will re-open the Geneva Conference. 3) To proceed with Syrian disengagement we will seek a line from Israel that is acceptable to Syria in principle. The modalities will be worked out in a larger framework.

Gromyko: We can discuss it. If the Syrians accept the basis they don’t necessarily have to sit at the table. What we are looking for are practical arrangements for Syria and Israel to meet with both of us being fully informed. We do not wish to cause trouble by our presence. Israel is just making up this story. That is a primitive idea of the Israelis.

Secretary: 1) As I told you we are realistic on this matter. Neither of us should seek unilateral advantage over the other. 2) As realists we also know that all the parties in the area will try to take advantage by creating rivalry between us. It is a mistake for us to fall for this. People will change but our policy should not be to take unilateral advantage. 3) (Gromyko interrupts)

Gromyko: Not words but deeds.

[Page 844]

Secretary: On both sides. We know that our diplomatic activity and coordination must be genuine.

3) On the Syrian problem we have a concern that Israel not produce an uproar and, therefore, that we do not introduce extraneous issues. Our biggest concern is to get a line that Syria can accept. Other details are not fundamental. Therefore, it is not a question of closing our eyes to the Soviet Union. In the back of the Israeli minds I am sure they think they can benefit by our rivalry. I don’t exclude that.

To sum up: 1) We should agree to act in a coordinated manner. 2) We should agree to meet in several weeks in Geneva. 3) We agree that the overall peace talks should take place in the Geneva framework. 4) On Syrian disengagement you have opened up the perspective of reaching agreement on a line and then working out the modalities.

Gromyko: Does Israel agree?

Secretary: We are using the same process with Israel as we did with Egypt, moving them along in a way that prevents a domestic explosion here. When we started out in Egypt and we were talking about Resolution 339 which talked about the October 22nd line, Mrs. Meir was so angry with me that she refused to talk to me all during dinner at the Israeli Embassy. You remember, Ken, you were there. Even though I was the guest of honor she conspicuously thanked all the Democrats present for their help. That was October 30. If we had talked on November first, I would have said that I had gotten nothing but, as you can see, we finally got them there. I think I can work this my way. No confrontation. No big plan. I hope I will succeed. If I fail, there will be some merry old times and an explosion. This is my view. I think if we can get a line and get the process moving that is what we need.

Gromyko: I will study what you have said. I have outlined our position in the clearest possible way.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room.
  2. Kissinger met with Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy, and Netherlands Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel.
  3. April 14.
  4. See footnote 10, Document 173.
  5. Qiao Guanhua (Chiao Kwan-hua) was PRC Deputy Foreign Minister and head of the Chinese Delegation at the UN General Assembly.
  6. Wang Hongwen (Wang Hung-wen) was the Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party from 1973.
  7. See footnote 4, Document 160, and footnote 2, Document 170.
  8. Karl Schiller was the West German Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance from May 1971 to July 1972.
  9. The report was sent to Nixon by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements under a May 1 covering memorandum. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional/Historical Records, Box 13, Senior Review Group Meeting—Environmental Warfare (2), August 28, 1974)
  10. See Document 173.