Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

213. Telegram 16455 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 19, 1976, 1502Z.

16455. Subject: Soviet Priorities in Disarmament; CTB Gets High Rating. Ref: Moscow 16290.

1. Summary. Asked what was most significant in Gromyko’s UNGA arms control memorandum, Timerbayev as much as dismissed the non-use-of force treaty; described MDW and CW passages as “going public” with positions the U.S. is familiar with; alluded to the importance of new passages on conventional arms limitations and the Indian Ocean; and concentrated on CTB verification. Soviets have no text, but have in mind “Swedish idea” of on-site inspection, voluntarily accepted, to allay doubts of treaty parties who present evidence to establish concern that seismic event may not be natural. There is a problem with maintaining PNE regime and extending it downward, but May 28 agreement is “good basis” for discussion, and Soviet offer intended to facilitate opening of negotiations where all issues can be discussed seriously. End summary.

2. Asked what he considered to be highlights of Gromyko’s UNGA memorandum on stopping the arms race, MFA IO Deputy Timerbayev basically elaborated on points made by his Deputy Krasulin (reftel), but with some interesting fillips.

3. Flipping jovially through the first sections of the document, Timerbayev said that “naturally” the main point is to stop the arms race, and that “of course” the first task is to sign a universal treaty on non-use of force as rapidly as possible. The Soviets have also gone public with “what you already knew” from experts’ discussions on weapons of mass destruction and verification of stockpile destruction for chemical weapons.

4. More seriously, he continued, new elements in two areas are worthy of attention: the reference to limitations on conventional armaments, which had not appeared for several years (outside the limited context of Brezhnev’s remarks on the Middle East in the 25th Congress reports; and the willingness to discuss a conference, on the one hand, and military “activities,” on the other, in the Indian Ocean.

5. Finally, he said, there was the question of CTB verification. It had not been spelled out in the memorandum, and (he repeated several times) the Soviets do not have a draft text to present, but they are willing to enter into immediate discussion of a text which would provide parties to the treaty with assurances that natural seismic events are not nuclear explosions. What they have in mind, he said, is the “Swedish idea” of voluntary on-site inspection conducted by treaty parties who present evidence supporting concern that a seismic event is not, in fact, natural. The suspected state would be free not to accept on-site inspection; in that case, however, the suspecting state could present additional concrete evidence, and, if it were still not accepted as a valid reason for inspection, they might concert action with others who suspected a violation or appeal to public opinion with their evidence to bring pressure on the suspected nation to assent to inspection.

6. Asked what format he envisaged for negotiation of such a treaty, Timerbayev replied that there is a UN resolution calling for negotiation by all five nuclear powers—“all five,” he repeated—and by the twenty-five or thirty other states which might be interested. The Soviet Union, he added with a smile, is ready to start tomorrow, “or January 21,” in New York or even in Shanghai.

7. Asked whether he could envisage any half steps between current conditions and the full CTB he was describing, Timerbayev said there was of course a problem, which the Soviets recognize, with extending the PNE regime downward. The Soviets would like to maintain the possibility of PNE’s not only for themselves but for non-nuclear states, but there are obviously many technical obstacles, in this regard, to negotiating the kind of CTB they have in mind. Nevertheless, the agreement signed May 28 “provides a good basis” for exploring these issues. The Soviets have no fixed ideas or texts, he stressed in conclusion: the Gromyko offer is meant to facilitate the opening of CTB negotiations during which all aspects could be examined in detail.

Matlock

1. Summary: The Embassy reported on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s arms control memorandum.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760392–0745. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, the Mission in Geneva, London, the Mission to NATO, USLO Peking (Beijing), Paris, Tokyo, the U.S. delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna, the U.S. delegation to the SALT II talks in Geneva, and USUN. Telegram 16290 from Moscow, October 15, is Document 211.