211. Telegram 16290 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
16290. Subj: Soviet Assessment of Gromyko Proposals: CTB, CW, Indian Ocean. Ref: Moscow 15482.
1. Summary. At October 13 reception, Chief of Disarmament Section of MFA’s International Organizations Division, Boris Krasulin, singled out CTB, CW, and Indian Ocean as the most important items in Gromyko’s UNGA proposals and placed great importance on the willingness of the USSR to accept on-site inspection for CTB and CW. On Indian Ocean he underlined the importance of the questions of foreign bases and military transit in the Soviet position. USA Division Multilateral Affairs Counselor backed him up on verification and Indian Ocean in separate conversation. End summary.
2. Krasulin, in an expansive mood, gave a detailed analysis of Gromyko’s UNGA speech and related documents. He focused his attention on the memorandum to UNSYG, calling it a most important document for Soviet foreign policy and one to which they expected to refer constantly in the future. He stressed that much careful preparation went into its formulation and throughout the conversation showed evident pride in the role that he and others in MFA had played in producing it. He indicated several times that there were difficulties in getting the document through the bureaucracy and that the new elements in it faced substantial opposition. The thrust of his remarks was that other countries should be pleased that the proposals have seen the light of day. In separate conversation at same function MFA USA Division Counselor (for multilateral affairs) Sokolov made same point to Acting Pol Counselor re positions on verification and Indian Ocean, adding that resistance to the Indian Ocean proposal was particularly strong.
3. EmbOff suggested to Krasulin that “platter” Gromyko placed before UN was so extensive that there must be some priorities placed [Page 675] on the topics by Soviets. Krasulin responded affirmatively saying that the most important parts of the memorandum were sections on CTB, CW and Indian Ocean.
4. On CTB, which he placed at top of list, he said that acceptance in principle of on-site inspection was major step by USSR. He referred to this as an extension of inspection agreed to for PNE agreement (which he characterized as “revolutionary step for us”). However, in explaining concept further he said that Soviets were suggesting something like “Swedish formula” in which the “country suspected” of violation of agreement would invite “suspecting countries” to conduct on-site inspection to assure themselves. When asked if such a voluntary approach could reasonably be expected to work, Krasulin replied that it could work and that Soviet proposal could serve as the basis for negotiations on the issue. This question, however, as well as the specific modalities could, he said, be discussed in negotiations.
5. On CW Krasulin also stressed the importance of Gromyko’s remarks concerning “control” which he said represented a substantial step forward. Here too the Soviets were willing to accept in principle on-site inspection with respect to destruction of chemical weapon stocks. He said that US concern over verification had prompted Soviets to take this “extra step” and that now “the ball is in your court.” He commented very favorably on the utility of the recent experts’ consultation in Geneva and looked forward to a new round of such talks soon.
6. On the Indian Ocean Krasulin noted that this was the first time the Soviet Union had shown a willingness to attend a conference on the Indian Ocean provided “minor conditions” are met. EmbOff noted that question of foreign bases was given great importance by Gromyko. Italian PolCouns (who joined conversation at this point) asked if Krasulin might clarify the relationship of this issue to the overall question of a conference; was the solution of the issue of bases a precondition for the conference? Krasulin said he would not use the word “precondition” but, he continued, it was evidently an issue of primary importance. Asked if there was any significance to the use of the word “activity” in describing what would be mutually reduced (as opposed to “presence”), Krasulin said he did not think so, and went on to say that Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean was necessary for transit from the Soviet Far East to Europe. Any attempt to reduce military activity would have, he said, to take account of “Soviet needs” for free transit. He recognized the “need” that “others” might have for “presence” in the Indian Ocean but implied that he did not consider such needs on the same order as those of the USSR.
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Summary: The Embassy reported that Chief of the Disarmament Section of the International Organizations Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Krasulin had emphasized to Embassy officials the importance of several aspects of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromkyo’s UN General Assembly disarmament proposals.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760389–0198. Confidential. Repeated for information to Canberra, the Mission in Geneva, the U.S. delegation to the SALT II talks in Geneva, Leningrad, London, the Mission to NATO, New Delhi, Paris, USLO Peking, Rome, Tehran, USUN, and the U.S. delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna. Telegram 15482 from Moscow, October 1, is ibid., D760372–0390. For a summary of the Soviet proposals, see Document 210.
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