195. Telegram 6464 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
6464. Subj: Israelyan on CTB. Ref: State 95642.
1. Summary. When I asked MFA International Organizations Division head Israelyan April 26 whether Gromyko’s suggestion April 12 that the U.S. and USSR discuss CTB represented a departure from previous Soviet positions, he replied:
—That it was his impression Gromyko had in mind initial talks among the three depository states of the Moscow Treaty, the USSR, U.S. and UK, which would not exclude subsequent participation of other nuclear weapons states;
—That the main point was to move the CTB idea forward, following its identification at the 25th Soviet Party Congress as a main task;
—That the 1974 Soviet suggestion of bilateral talks remained on the table, as Brezhnev had noted in Warsaw on July 21, 1974;
[Page 624]—That the Soviets had resorted to the UN only after the U.S. had not assented to more limited talks and would continue to press their CTB initiative in the UN, though he was not optimistic about the ad hoc committee;
—That the 1975 NPT Review Conference had highlighted non-aligned criticism of both the U.S. and USSR for lack of further progress;
—That the Soviets recognize the importance of the verification problem, see some merit in the precedents provided by the way it was handled in the BW and seabed agreements, but are not rigid. He did not respond when I noted I understood the CTB verification problem to be concentrated in the rather narrow band of explosions of 20 KT and below. End summary.
2. During my April 26 call on MFA International Organizations Division head Israelyan, the following exchange took place on CTB.
3. I introduced the topic by noting that as I had understood him in our April 12 talk, Foreign Minister Gromyko had stressed the importance of our two countries reaching some sort of agreement on CTB. As I recalled it, he had said that perhaps other nuclear weapons states might not be prepared at the outset to join in, but it was important for U.S. to agree. Since this seemed to depart somewhat from the previous Soviet position that all nuclear weapons states participate in bringing a CTB into force, I said I would appreciate any comment Israelyan would care to make on the subject.
4. Israelyan (who seemed well-prepared to discuss the matter) replied that there was a certain historical background. The Soviet side had suggested the possibility of bilateral agreement on a CTBT to the U.S. in May 1974 at the summit. As he understood it, the American side had responded that it was not ready. Subsequently, Brezhnev had alluded to this exchange on July 21, 1974, in Warsaw, in connection with the Polish National Holiday. (Later he called for and read the appropriate passage from Brezhnev’s speech. Referring to the recent TTBT agreement, Brezhnev had said we want to go even further and are ready to go further; in particular, the Soviet Union was ready to conclude a CTBT agreement; it had not been possible to reach agreement on this matter, but giving life to the Soviet proposal would be a new contribution which would be generally welcomed, and, Israelyan continued, Brezhnev had concluded “we hope the time will come when agreement will be possible.”)
5. Then, Israelyan went on, mainly on the basis of the discussions at the NPT Review Conference in Geneva in 1974, where both sides were criticized for lack of further progress, the Soviets decided to push the matter forward with a new UN proposal. The result was their UNGA resolution. Unfortunately, the U.S. was still not ready to negotiate in accordance with UNGA Resolution 3478.
[Page 625]6. The Soviets are now seeking new possibilities for moving this matter along, Israelyan continued. Brezhnev had named this as a major task at the 25th Party Congress. Concerning Gromyko’s suggestion, Israelyan understood on the basis of the report he had seen that Gromyko has raised the possibility of moving the idea forward among the three depository states of the Moscow Treaty, the USSR, the U.S., and the UK.
7. As Brezhnev had said, the proposal made in 1974 stands. His private opinion, Israelyan noted, was that if the U.S. is interested it would be possible to start CTBT negotiations among the Soviet Union, the U.S. and the British, having in mind that they could be joined later by others. The question of when and how this could be done remained, but as he understood it the Minister was not excluding this possibility, merely suggesting beginning with the Moscow Treaty depositories as a first step. The important thing was not to leave the possibility of moving forward open forever.
8. I interjected that I had understood the Minister to say that others might at some time see the advisability of participating. Israelyan merely reiterated that the CTBT had been named as one of the first arms control talks at the 25th Congress. If you are interested, he said, I see a real possibility of forward movement. He was not very optimistic about prospects in the UN ad hoc committee, he said. The Soviets had taken their new proposal to the 30th UNGA without illusions about possible changes in the attitudes of the Chinese “or even” the French, after not succeeding in their approach to the U.S. in 1974. They would continue their initiative in the UN, however; frankly, they would take advantage of the mood in the UN, where the world majority supports the initiative. But, since the Party Congress had identified CTBT as a task to be implemented, they were thinking of ways to move it practically, and one of the conclusions of the Geneva Review Conference was that something had to be done, and the non-aligned states were criticizing both our countries. Thus, the Soviets are ready, he concluded, on condition that other nuclear nations are too.
9. When I pointed out that, as he knew and I had told Gromyko, verification remained a very important problem for us, Israelyan asked if we had received the document on national means of verification submitted by the Swedes in the CCD. When I replied that we had a report, but not the document, he said the Soviets did not have it either, but that it might be a very important document, which should be studied and might help to move verification matters forward.
10. When I recalled that the Soviets had not sent experts to the CCD verification meeting, Israelyan said that the ad hoc committee was to discuss a draft tabled by the USSR, and the Soviets did not favor parallel work in several fora. However, the fact they had not sent [Page 626] experts did not mean they never would. The main idea he wished to convey was that the Soviets are very much interested in implementing the CTBT concept in general. There can be different approaches to a CTBT with the participation of all nuclear powers; Gromyko was expressing one idea for helping to reach this goal.
11. When I asked again about verification, Israelyan replied that our PNE experience indicates that if good will is there much is possible. Certain treaties, for example on bacteriological weapons and mass destruction weapons on the seabed, establish verification procedures which are satisfactory at least to the Soviets, and these practices might be used again. However, the Soviet approach is not rigid; verification is certainly a problem to be discussed.
12. I noted that as I understood it the verification problem with regard to CTB was concentrated in the area of blasts of 20 KT repeat 20 KT and below, where there was a real danger of confusion with earthquakes and other seismic events. Thus, the problem band was not excessively wide.
13. Israelyan responded only that the Soviet side would be grateful for a response, and especially a positive response, concerning its suggestion. I promised to report our conversation to Washington.
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Summary: Ambassador Stoessel reported on his April 26 meeting with Chief of the International Relations Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Israelyan, during which they discussed a potential CTB agreement and Soviet positions on other disarmament initiatives.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760158–0587. Confidential. In telegram 95642 to Moscow, April 20, the Department provided points to raise in response to disarmament questions Gromyko had raised with Stoessel. (Ibid., D760149–1018)
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