Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

194. Telegram 3110 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, April 23, 1976, 1514Z.

3110. Disto. Subj: CCD—Wrap-up of Spring 1976 Session.

Summary. During its spring 1976 session CCD spent most time on environmental modification and procedural matters, with attention also being given to Soviet proposal on new weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons and question of a comprehensive test ban. This message reviews major developments at spring session with respect to CW, MDW, and procedural matters. Developments on environmental modification and CTB (primarily informal meetings with experts on CTB) are reported in septels. End summary.

1. Chemical Weapons (CW). Early in session several Soviet allies blamed U.S. for lack of progress on CW, particularly for inaction on joint U.S.–USSR initiative pursuant to 1974 summit. Later Sweden said joint initiative had “lost its credibility” and that CCD should proceed with CW work on basis of proposals before it (especially Soviet bloc and Japanese draft conventions and non-aligned working paper). Several other dels supported this view. At FRG request, committee scheduled informal CW meetings with experts for week of July 5.

2. After advance communication with SovDel, U.S. April 13 delivered major statement reiterating view that initial stage of phased CW agreement should cover all lethal agents rather than just highly toxic ones, and describing alternative approaches to framing scope of phased CW limitations. Statement explored associated verification problems in depth. It concluded with expression of willingness to pursue “two-track” approach (i.e., further contacts with Soviets and concurrent work on CW by CCD). Well-received statement at minimum should reinforce awareness of complexity of CW problems, and may serve to moderate criticism of U.S. for failure to make treaty proposal. However, there will be need for follow-up during summer session and, in particular, at July experts’ meeting (e.g., by providing working paper on stockpile destruction verification forecast in statement. Moreover, Italian Rep was told by Roshchin that there was “nothing new” in U.S. presentation perhaps indicating Soviet desire to counter favorable impact of statement. Japanese, Indian, and Argentine Reps have urged us to introduce joint initiative as soon as possible.

3. Preparation for experts’ meeting will also have to take into account recently introduced Japanese working paper on agents to be covered in initial agreement and last year’s FRG working paper on classification, both of which contain ideas on scope of first phase agreement that are at variance with U.S. view that such an agreement should cover all lethal CW agents. In addition to considering various proposals regarding questions of scope and definition, we would expect experts’ meetings to concentrate on CW verification. Sweden, which introduced working paper on verification of CW stockpile destruction April 22, has indicated desire to examine verification issues in depth, including ideas contained in U.S. statement such as technical exchange visits to chemical facilities. Interest in verification generated by U.S. statement and Swedish working paper has put Soviets on defensive. At April 22 plenary Roshchin supported as adequate verification provisions of Soviet bloc draft treaty and held that supplementary measures, such as direct technical means of verification such as soil sampling, could be performed by national control organs provided for in Soviet draft.

4. New Weapons of Mass Destruction (MDW). Soviets did not appear to make much headway in CCD with their proposal to ban new MDW and new systems of such weapons. Informal meetings with experts were held April 7–8 at USSR’s request. Despite Soviet and GDR experts’ fairly creditable efforts at explanation of possible new weapon development, meetings left Western delegations largely unsatisfied with answers to questions that they (U.S. included) had raised regarding substance and definition of MDW proposal. (Secretariat’s unofficial summary of informal meetings on MDW and summary of Soviet experts remarks, which was prepared by Soviet Del, being pouched to ACDA/IR.) Among non-aligned, only Sweden and India intervened; former joined Western dels in analytical queries, while latter offered gesture of encouragement for further CCD consideration of question. Soviet responded to “negative” Western and Swedish questions with repeated contention that all CCD members had obligation to help sponsors of proposal add content to it. Despite pervasive lack of support from West and non-aligned indifference, Soviet investment is already so substantial as to render it unlikely they will abandon MDW project. They may propose additional informal meetings with experts for summer session, although U.S. Del was not encouraging in response to private USSR feeler in this connection. We would expect Soviets to press us on MDW issue during recess.

5. Procedural Matters. U.S. proposal for comprehensive review of CCD procedures during 1976 prompted mixed reactions. Soviets were very skeptical of taking initiative in this area, seeing review primarily as opportunity for non-aligned to step up pressure for abolition of U.S.-Soviet co-chairmanship. However, they expressed willingness to cooperate with us in carrying out review and pressed for close coordination before it begins (now anticipated in second half of July). Non-aligned group appears sharply divided on procedural questions. While some, particularly Sweden and Yugoslavia, took strong stands for abolition of co-chairmanship, others, most prominently Nigeria, expressed surprisingly conservative views in favor of retaining co-chairmanship unless and until France (and China) indicated willingness to join if system were changed. Interest of Western dels in replacing co-chairmanship has cooled considerably as a result of their recent contacts with France, which contacts have indicated little change in aloof French attitude toward CCD (see septel). U.S. proposal served useful purpose in eliciting statements from several non-aligned endorsing existing rules, including especially decision-making by consensus.

6. No formal action to implement proposed review was taken during spring session as consequence of protracted consideration of organizational matters for 1976. Committee reached early agreement on extensive schedule of informal meetings focusing on specific topics (EnMod, new weapons of mass destruction, CTB, and CW), which allayed pressures for development of fixed program of work and “timetable” based on priorities established by UNGA.

7. Committee also agreed in principle to two procedural changes for 1976: a slight expansion of CCD communiqués to mention subjects discussed by speakers, and giving responsibility to Secretariat, rather than co-chairmen, for drafting CCD’s report to UNGA. Co-chairmen would nevertheless continue to sign and transmit report. The non-aligned, however, held formal approval of these changes hostage to agreement on a Mexican proposal for establishment of a permanent subcommittee to negotiate texts of agreements. This proposal proved highly contentious, with Soviets in particular stating vigorous opposition to idea, which they regarded as effort to undermine co-chairmanship by radical revision of CCD organization and operating methods. U.S. and, to lesser degree, Western delegations expressed opposition to permanent subcommittee, while indicating willingness to agree to ad hoc working group on EnMod during summer session. By end of spring session, committee had failed to find formula acceptable to all concerned, and matter was deferred to summer session. Imbroglio over creation of a subcommittee may have cooled the interest of some delegations in seeking major changes in course of comprehensive review. At same time, however, it may fuel criticism of the CCD at the upcoming session of the ad hoc committee on role of the U.S. disarmament. Comment: U.S. Del believes it would be useful to maintain contacts with Soviets on procedural issues during recess in order to improve prospects of compromise solution to subcommittee problem and, in general, of successful outcome on procedural questions during summer session.

Dale

1. Summary: The mission transmitted a summary of the spring Conference of the Committee on Disarmament’s spring session, emphasizing developments related to chemical weapons, the Soviet proposal on new weapons of mass destruction, and procedural issues.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760156–0150. Confidential. Repeated for information to Bonn, London, Moscow, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, ERDA, the Mission to the IAEA at Vienna, the Mission to NATO, the U.S. delegation to the SALT II talks in Geneva, and USUN. For the April 13 U.S. statement, delivered at the CCD plenary meeting, see telegram 2884 from Geneva, April 14. (Ibid., D760141–0612) The Japanese working paper is referenced in telegram 2093 from Geneva, March 25, 1975. (Ibid., D750104–0275) The German working paper is referenced in telegram 6154 from Geneva, August 5, 1975. (Ibid., D750270–0497) The Swedish working paper and a record of the April 22 plenary meeting are in telegram 3095 from Geneva, April 23, 1976. (Ibid., [no film number]) A record of the informal meetings on April 7 and 8 regarding the Soviet proposal on new weapons of mass destruction is in telegram 2926 from Geneva, April 15, 1976. (Ibid., D760143–0213)