Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

180. Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, March 9, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you on the subject of nuclear proliferation—one of the most urgent problems facing the United States and the world community and one which will vitally affect the security of all nations for the rest of this century.

As the committee is aware, your concerns over the dangers posed by further nuclear proliferation are widely and deeply shared throughout the U.S. Government. To convey to you both the seriousness with which we view this issue and the steps we are taking to deal with the proliferation problem, I propose to address the following questions in my statement:

First, how does nonproliferation fit into the framework of our overall foreign policy?

Second, what multilateral efforts to deter proliferation have already been initiated, and what further measures do we contemplate?

Third, what actions are we taking as a matter of U.S. national policy to reinforce and extend our international nonproliferation activities?

Fourth, how do we assess the longer term prospects for containing further nuclear spread through an evolving diplomatic and technical strategy?

Before turning to these broader aspects of nonproliferation, I should note that I fully approve of the position on Senate bill 1439 set forth by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll before the committee. For the reasons outlined during his January 30 appearance, we cannot support this bill.

Nonproliferation Perspectives

Nonproliferation has been a primary foreign policy goal of the United States through six Administrations, with major accomplishments stemming from U.S. initiatives demonstrating the seriousness with which this policy has been pursued. I cite, for example, the adoption of bilateral safeguards and controls in our government-to-government cooperative agreements, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, and the entering into force of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. As a result of these steps, the number of nuclear-weapon states has been substantially limited.

After I assumed the office of Secretary of State, however, it became apparent that changing circumstances warranted a new look at our nonproliferation strategy:

—Other industrialized states were entering the international nuclear market, thereby challenging our longstanding dominance as a commercial nuclear exporter and threatening to diminish the ultimate effect of our national safeguards and control policies.

—The oil crisis has stimulated many developing as well as developed states to accelerate their peaceful nuclear power programs, both as a means of lowering the cost of generating electrical energy and reducing their reliance on imported petroleum products.

—The nuclear test by India underscored the fact that additional states, even those not part of the highly industrialized world, were capable of using nuclear technology to construct explosives.

In my speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September of 1974, I underscored our concerns over the rapid spread of nuclear technology with potential explosive implications. I chose this forum to address the pressing problem of proliferation since it is clear that the danger of further nuclear-explosive spread is a problem vital to every nation on this planet. At that time, I warned against complacency by observing that:

The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today, technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear-explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.

Let me emphasize that pursuit of a vigorous nonproliferation strategy remains a fundamental dimension of this Administration’s overall foreign policy:

—We see the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war as the centerpiece of our policy. If additional states acquired nuclear weapons, global stability would be endangered, and regional conflicts would run the risk of leading to nuclear war, with potentially catastrophic consequences not only for the nations involved but for all major powers.

—We view the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and a more stable world order as crucial U.S. objectives. Yet a world of many nuclear powers would result in heightened political tensions and increased instabilities flowing from fears that nuclear weapons might be used, whether deliberately or through miscalculation.

—We support the worldwide goal of finding alternative sources of energy to reduce reliance on oil. Yet a progressive pattern of proliferation could set back, if not cripple entirely, the continued growth of peaceful nuclear energy to serve mankind’s needs, as exporters and importers alike came to lose confidence in the ability of the international system to find effective techniques for realizing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy while eliminating its inherent security risks.

To meet these new dangers, I emphasized in my 1974 U.N. General Assembly speech—and again a year later before the same forum—the importance the United States attaches to nonproliferation. In both addresses, I outlined practical steps we saw as necessary to move forward effectively and comprehensively in this vital field. These included proposals for the major suppliers to strengthen nuclear safeguards; efforts to gain the widest possible support for the international safeguard system and the Nonproliferation Treaty; physical security measures to protect nuclear material against theft or diversion; and steps to prevent the unrestrained spread of sensitive nuclear facilities, such as national reprocessing plants.

I am pleased to take this opportunity to report to this committee on the progress we have made and the problems we still face. There have been solid accomplishments to date, and I will go into the details of these successes in a few moments. But we are far from complacent, and even as we consolidate our gains, we seek to strengthen our nonproliferation strategy.

I do not have to tell this committee how difficult it is to devise a strategy that can guarantee success in preventing the number of nuclear-weapon states from increasing during the coming decades. But I cannot emphasize too strongly our belief that the effort can and must be made to contain nuclear spread, even if we cannot be certain of completely and effectively blocking additional nuclear proliferation.

It is within the foregoing framework that we have mounted a major effort during the past two years to strengthen the worldwide nonproliferation regime. This strategy has had two reinforcing elements:

—Multilateral actions to move forward with other states in meeting the nonproliferation challenge; and

—National nuclear export policies to insure that the United States continues to exert responsible leadership in nonproliferation.

Let me now describe in some detail the key elements of our nonproliferation strategy, what has been accomplished during the past two years, and what needs to be done to further advance our position.

Multilateral Strategy

Suppliers Consultation. I have noted earlier that the United States, practically speaking, does not have complete, unilateral freedom of action with respect to its nuclear export policy. Other major industrial powers have the capacity and desire to contribute to the world’s needs for peaceful nuclear energy, and they fully recognize the need to safeguard their assistance.

It is important, however, that safeguards not become an element of commercial competition. U.S. constraints by themselves will have little effect if other nuclear suppliers decline to exercise the same restraint. In recognition of this, we have pursued a policy of consulting with other nuclear-exporting countries in an effort to devise a common set of standards concerning safeguards and other related controls associated with peaceful nuclear exports. I believe these efforts have met with a significant degree of success.

As a result of these consultations, the United States has decided to adopt, as a matter of national policy, certain principles which will govern our future nuclear exports. We have been informed that a number of other countries intend to do the same. As other Administration witnesses have testified in recent weeks before another Senate committee, these principles include:

—Provisions for the application of IAEA safeguards on exports of material, equipment, and technology;

—Prohibitions against using assistance for any nuclear explosions including those for “peaceful purposes;”

—Requirements for physical security measures on nuclear equipment and materials;

—Application of restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies (such as enrichment and reprocessing);

—Encouragement of multinational regional facilities for reprocessing and enrichment; and

—Special conditions governing the use or retransfer of sensitive material, equipment, and technology.

These are significant principles which have moved the level and comprehensiveness of international nonproliferation controls substantially beyond where they were only a few short years ago. But it is important to recognize that further efforts are needed to improve and extend these principles and that our efforts are part of a progressive and evolving process which we will continue in close consultation with other suppliers.

NPT Adherence. A second important element of our international nonproliferation strategy is our effort to secure the widest possible adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Adherence to the NPT is a key element in prevention of nuclear proliferation because it involves a comprehensive commitment by non-nuclear-weapon states not to develop nuclear explosives—a commitment verified by IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear facilities in that country—and also because it requires safeguards on nuclear exports.

While NPT adherence is still far from universal, nearly 100 states are now party to the treaty. The past 18 months have seen a number of important new adherents, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, the Republic of Korea, Libya, and Venezuela, as well as submission of the treaty by Japan, which has already signed the treaty, to the Diet for ratification.

We must continue to do whatever we can to increase support for this most important treaty in the hope that non-nuclear-weapon states who see the disadvantages of acquiring nuclear weapons will perceive that their national interest would best be served by adherence.

IAEA Safeguards. Another essential feature of our international strategy—and, indeed, one that underpins the progress we have made in consultations with other suppliers and one that is basic to the Nonproliferation Treaty itself—is the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even in the case of recipient states not party to the NPT, the IAEA system provides internationally recognized safeguards arrangements to insure that nuclear exports are used for peaceful purposes.

IAEA safeguards entail techniques to account for nuclear materials, reinforced by containment and surveillance measures. Agency experts conduct on-site inspections to verify, through independent means, that safeguarded material and facilities are being used for declared purposes. These safeguards can provide a high degree of assurance that any significant diversions will be detected and thus provide a real deterrent.

While a safeguards system cannot provide absolute assurance that all conceivable diversions, however modest, will be detected, it does not have to. What it must do—and what the IAEA accomplishes with confidence—is expose the would-be diverter to a high risk of detection.

We recognize that some question the adequacy of the international controls related to nuclear facilities and materials that have evolved over the years. However, in the one instance where a nuclear device was exploded through the use of equipment obtained from outside, safeguards did not exist on the facility or its products. Consequently, the question of adequacy of safeguards in this case simply did not arise. In fact, since the inception of safeguards, we know of no nation that has acquired nuclear weapons through any diversion of nuclear material subject to either bilateral or IAEA safeguards.

We believe that the IAEA system—with the active technical, financial, and political support of key suppliers and all nations interested in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—will continue to fulfill this requirement. Indeed, the IAEA safeguards system continues to be a most vital and singularly important element in the battery of constraints developed over the years in support of our nonproliferation objectives.

Sensitive Exports. Another element in our international strategy is designed to meet what is perhaps the most troublesome nonproliferation issue confronting us; namely, dealing with sensitive technologies, such as reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water production. The problem has been made more acute as more countries become interested in acquiring these sensitive facilities. In terms of proliferation risks, plutonium-reprocessing plants abroad pose the most immediate problem. This is unfortunate, since for most countries—those without very large nuclear power programs—the economic benefits of reprocessing spent fuel remain dubious.

As a result of growing perceptions of the direct proliferation risks, suppliers as well as recipients appear to be exercising increasing restraint in such sensitive areas and have concluded rigorous safeguards agreements. In this regard, we greatly welcomed Korea’s decision not to acquire a national reprocessing facility and hope that it will enhance multilateral efforts to develop alternatives to national capabilities.

One course of action which might meet the future reprocessing needs of certain countries in a potentially economic manner and at the same time alleviate some of our concerns regarding the proliferation of such facilities is the concept of a multinational fuel-cycle center serving regional needs, to which I have given my personal support before the UN General Assembly last year.

Such plants—involving management, operation, and perhaps ownership by more than one country—would reduce the incentive for small and inefficient national plants and provide useful added assurances against unilateral abrogation of nonproliferation undertakings, particularly if co-located with other parts of the fuel cycle such as the fabrication and storage of nuclear materials. They would also facilitate the application of international safeguards. The IAEA is currently carrying out a study of the multinational concept.

Physical Security. The final key element of our international nonproliferation strategy concerns the question of physical security of nuclear facilities and materials and specifically the concern that a subnational or terrorist group might seize nuclear materials.

We have received excellent cooperation in our consultations with other countries designed to insure that adequate physical security measures are applied. Major suppliers are including provisions in their nuclear cooperation agreements which specifically require adequate levels of physical security systems in recipient countries to protect nuclear materials and equipment. Experts from member countries are assisting the IAEA in developing an authoritative body of knowledge on the establishment of effective national physical security systems.

Also, we are pursuing our proposal of an international convention, setting standards to protect the physical security of nuclear materials, that might serve to facilitate international collaboration and greater uniformity of practice in this area.

U.S. National Strategy

Basic Premise. I have been discussing those multilateral measures we are pursuing in support of our nonproliferation objectives. U.S. national policies and practices in this area reflect our special concern with the problem of nonproliferation and are, in some respects, more stringent than those of some other supplier nations.

The basic premise of U.S. nuclear cooperation for over 20 years has been worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective controls. Our approach has been to offer long-term assurances of enriched uranium supply, accompanied by the especially economical U.S. reactor technology, in exchange for agreement on effective safeguards arrangements.

In this connection, as I testified before another committee of the Congress last month in support of the Administration’s proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurances Act, many of the positive advances we have made in pursuit of our nonproliferation objectives can be traced directly to our capability and willingness to furnish enriched uranium on a reliable and long-term basis, along with other elements essential to peaceful nuclear development.

Policy Elements. As I observed earlier, our policies with regard to nuclear exports are fully consistent with the principles adopted as a result of supplier consultations and, in fact, in some areas go beyond them. For example, in the areas of reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water production activities, our basic approach has been to avoid the export of such sensitive technologies. To insure adequate control, the executive branch instituted, in 1972, special regulations governing all proposed transactions in these areas.

With regard to the general problem of reprocessing, the United States is providing significant technical and financial support to the IAEA in connection with its study of the concept of multinational regional fuel-cycle centers. We are also urging that relevant groups of countries initiate discussions of the potential of this concept among themselves.

In the area of international safeguards, I would note that in his most recent energy message, the President outlined the Administration’s decision to make special contributions of up to a total of $5 million in the next five years to help strengthen the Agency’s safeguards program. We will, of course, continue research programs and technical support activities aimed at assisting the IAEA to develop more effective safeguards procedures.

Pursuant to the physical security measures we have adopted as a result of supplier consultations, the United States has adopted the policy that significant quantities of sensitive nuclear materials will not be approved for export unless adequate physical protection measures are applied in the recipient countries, and U.S. physical security teams have visited numerous countries in this connection to observe their protection systems.

Proposals for Severe Constraints. Against the backdrop of the strategies that we are pursuing internationally and as a matter of U.S. national policy, I believe it appropriate that I respond to some of the critics of our nuclear export policies who have called for what I believe to be overly severe constraints which would seriously set back, rather than advance, our nonproliferation efforts. These proposals range from a complete moratorium on our nuclear exports, to an embargo on nuclear transfers to non-NPT parties, to proposals to agree to nuclear exports to states not party to the NPT only if they have accepted approved IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear programs.

In essence, it is our view that adoption of any of these proposals would, for example:

—Violate the spirit, if not the letter, of a number of international undertakings to cooperate in peaceful nuclear programs, including article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty;

—Damage our political relationships well beyond the nuclear area with a large number of countries who have entered into long-term arrangements with us;

—Cast further doubt on the credibility of U.S. supply commitments and the constancy of our policy at precisely the moment when we can least afford such doubts;

—Reduce the influence we are now able to bring to bear in support of our nonproliferation objectives inasmuch as it is unlikely that such proposals will be supported by all major suppliers; and

—Might well result in the breakdown of supplier cooperation and a return to relatively uncontrolled competition among other supplier countries.

I have commented negatively on these proposals, not because I question the motivation and concern that underlie them but because I do not believe they would achieve our nonproliferation objectives. The problems of proliferation are complicated and not susceptible to quick and easy solutions.

To avoid the further spread of nuclear-weapon capabilities will require the diligent pursuit of complex political and technical measures which minimize the pressures for proliferation and, at the same time, erect effective controls against it. This Administration is firmly committed to this objective, and I know we can count on the Congress to work with us in insuring we can achieve this vital goal.

Proliferation Prognosis

The arrangements I have described are designed to inhibit and detect any diversion. There remains the question of measures that could be applied in the event of a demonstrated diversion of nuclear material to nonpeaceful purposes or other violations of a nonproliferation or safeguards undertaking. This is a question of importance, since treaty assurances against proliferation, even when backed by effective safeguards, could lose much of their deterrent power if nations come to believe that violations of such arrangements would not be viewed with seriousness by the international community.

Under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, all further peaceful nuclear assistance would be discontinued in the event a state violated its IAEA safeguards commitments. If U.S. nuclear material was involved, our bilateral agreements call for halting further assistance. The IAEA Statute also provides for suspension of membership in the Agency in the event of a violation and reporting to the U.N. Security Council. In addition, both our bilateral agreements and the IAEA Statute include the right to call for the return of supplied materials and equipment.

These actions are substantial. The discontinuance of supply to a country which has committed a major portion of its electrical energy generation to nuclear energy is in itself a significant disincentive to any violation. More generally, I can assure you that the United States would treat a violation of one of its agreements with the utmost gravity. And I am confident that the world community at large would view such an action with comparable concern.

However, these considerations do not relieve us of the need to insure that we have taken all available and practical preventive measures to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, as I have indicated, we have strengthened and standardized the system of safeguards and controls in our national policies and through multilateral initiatives; identified the improvements needed to further diminish the likelihood that peaceful nuclear technology will be used to build explosives; and established procedural and institutional arrangements to enable us to consolidate our gains and move toward our future goals.

Perhaps most fundamentally, we recognize that proliferation is not a problem to be addressed solely through the technical and legal framework of safeguards and export controls—vital as these avenues may be. There is a direct link, as I have stressed, between our efforts in nonproliferation and our broader efforts to construct a more secure international climate.

If countries remain convinced that regional and global tensions can be reduced through cooperation, that disputes can be resolved in a peaceful manner, and that their legitimate security requirements can be met, there will be no need for them to develop nuclear weapons.

To be successful in our nonproliferation endeavors, we must sustain and build upon the multilateral and national policy foundations we have established. As I indicated earlier, this requires constant attention to consultations with other nuclear suppliers, peaceful nuclear cooperation with recipients, and constructive support for international mechanisms which can lend permanence to our nonproliferation policies.

This task warrants the most vigorous U.S. and international efforts. We hope to work constructively with the Congress in continuing to develop and implement a balanced U.S. nonproliferation strategy—balanced in the need to maintain our influence through prudent and reliable national export policies, the importance of pursuing a multilateral as well as a national approach, and the recognition that our overall foreign objectives can reinforce our nonproliferation goals as we work to create a more stable world order.

1. Summary: Kissinger, speaking before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, addressed a variety of nonproliferation issues, including multilateral arms control initiatives and the U.S. national strategy.

   Source: Department of State Bulletin, March 29, 1976, pp. 405–411. For Kissinger’s September 1974 speech to the UN General Assembly, see Document 84. His October 1975 speech to the same body is in the Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1975, pp. 545–553.