Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

169. Memorandum From David Elliott and John Marcum of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, January 19, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Conclusion of the Nuclear Suppliers Agreement

After several meetings of the seven major nuclear supplier nations, substantial agreement has been reached on common safeguards guidelines for nuclear exports. The effect of these guidelines will be to lessen the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation. The key provisions of the guidelines are:

1. Recipients must assure suppliers that no export will be used in any nuclear explosive device.

2. Recipients will provide adequate physical protection so that nuclear material or facilities are protected against seizure or sabotage.

3. All nuclear exports, as delineated in a specific trigger list, will be under IAEA safeguards.

4. Any facility indigenously replicated from imported sensitive technology, such as enrichment or reprocessing plants, will be safeguarded.

5. Recipients cannot reexport equipment or technology without safeguards, or, in the case of sensitive technology, without agreement of the originating country.

These and other more detailed provisions are encompassed in the package at Tab B. State has sent this to you for information purposes (Tab A), noting that agreement to these common guidelines for safeguards and control on nuclear exports was achieved pursuant to the President’s instructions (Tab C). The U.S. is prepared to inform others of its intention to abide by the guidelines. This action will not constitute an international agreement but rather an embodiment of common policies adopted on the political level by each of the participants.

Adherence by the seven suppliers to these guidelines is the culmination of the U.S. initiative to reach a concerted nuclear export policy with the other major nuclear suppliers. It is intended that the number of participating countries will increase as more countries become suppliers, and the agreement calls for consultations and future meetings for the purpose of considering even stronger safeguard measures.

The suppliers agreement will not solve the problem of nuclear proliferation, nor would it prevent transfers of especially sensitive technology as in the FRG/Brazil agreement; however, it should considerably broaden the applications of IAEA safeguards. In addition, there is clear evidence that as a result of the suppliers discussions both France and the FRG have become increasingly sensitized to the problem of nuclear proliferation. In particular, France has reportedly made a policy decision not to export chemical reprocessing technology in the future, apparently including a reversal of their planned sale to Korea.

1. Summary: Elliott and Marcum reported that agreement had been reached on common safeguards guidelines for nuclear exports at the Nuclear Suppliers’ Conference.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Secretariat, Box 94, Logged Documents—1976—Log Numbers 7600058–760067. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation by Scowcroft on the first page of the memorandum reads: “Looks like clear progress. B.” Tab A, a January 5 memorandum from Springsteen to Scowcroft; Tab B, a November 5 paper entitled “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers;” and Tab C, telegram 215360 to London and Paris, September 10, 1975, containing the President’s instructions to the U.S. delegation to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Conference are all attached but not published.