165. Memorandum From John Marcum of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
SUBJECT
- Status of PNE Negotiations
We have been engaged for over a year in negotiations in Moscow to develop an agreement governing the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). A separate agreement on PNEs is called for in Article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and was necessitated by strong Soviet insistence during the July 1974 Summit that PNE yields should be allowed to exceed the 150 KT limit of the TTBT.
From the outset, this has been the outstanding issue in these negotiations. We have strongly opposed any PNEs above 150 KT and the Soviets have been equally firm in asserting that they must have such exceptions. In spite of this impasse, considerable progress has been made in resolving differences in verification provisions, observer rights and developing a joint draft text.
The fourth round of these talks ended on October 31 and just prior to its conclusion the Soviets made two important concessions which bring us closer to an agreement:
—They accepted our method of yield verification, an electrical instrument called SLIFER. (This device consists of a long coaxial cable running from a recorder at the surface down to the nuclear explosive. As the shock wave moves out from the explosion, the cable is progressively crushed and by recording the shortening of its length with time, the yield can be estimated within 20–30 percent accuracy, far better than for seismic instruments.) The remaining problems concern differences on issues such as custody of the equipment and aggregate yield limits on PNE salvos which should be resolvable.
—They also softened their position on having exceptions above 150 KT. They now say that they would need only three such events per year and have suggested that special verification measures for such [Page 543] shots could be negotiated on a case by case basis in the Joint PNE Commission, which we have agreed to establish. Under this arrangement, the U.S. would effectively have a veto right if the verification issues could not be resolved to our satisfaction.
In addition to this movement on the exceptions issue in Moscow, Morokhov, (the Soviet Delegation Chairman) in a private conversation with John Kelly alongside the last nuclear suppliers’ meeting in London, stated that the entire Kama-Pechora Canal project could be carried out within the 150 KT limit and that it would be at least three years before they would need any exceptions.
Based on our PNE experience, there is little economic loss in restricting all PNEs to a 150 KT yield limit and, given their recent concessions, there appears to be some chance that the Soviets will simply drop this issue in order to achieve an agreement that is otherwise favorable to them in several respects, particularly in providing for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in PNEs. This would give us an agreement that for the first time would provide for on-site inspection, would be consistent with the Threshold Test Ban and should be acceptable to Congress.
On the other hand, if the Soviets persist on the exceptions issue, Morokhov’s statements suggest that we may be able to reach a compromise that would exclude any exceptions for the next five years (our proposed treaty duration, as in the TTB), but would leave open the possibility of events above 150 KT in the future provided that the Joint Commission could agree on the need for these shots and develop adequate verification measures. This approach would cause ACDA some concern, but would be acceptable to the other agencies and probably to Congress as well.
In view of the March 31, 1976 effective date of the TTBT, we need to begin our ratification effort with Congress early next year and the PNE agreement must be ready by that time. (We have told the Soviets that we will not ratify the TTBT until a PNE agreement is concluded.) Even if we reach agreement soon on the exceptions issue, several weeks would be needed to clean up the remaining details and complete the agreement.
In an effort to move the talks along, it may be desirable to press the Soviets on the exceptions issue by sending a private note stressing the lack of current economic need for PNEs above 150 KT and arguing the advantages, in terms of both domestic and international acceptance, of an agreement without exceptions. Given the recent softening of their position, the Soviets might be receptive to this argument. Alternatively, they might respond along the lines of Morokhov’s comments in London which would open the way to an acceptable compromise as discussed above.
There is some risk, however, that the Soviets would interpret any activation of the back channel at this time as a sign of anxiety and [Page 544] toughen their position. In this regard, the Soviets might argue that the present note does not differ materially from the one we sent them in June and that they had made all possible concessions in their response.
Another concern is that the Soviets, having learned their “linkage lessons” only too well, may reject this initiative on grounds somewhat similar to those in their recent SALT action—arguing that they made important concessions in the last exchange and that it is our turn to compromise. On the other hand they may be quite willing to move ahead in non-SALT arms control areas at this time.
We will review this issue in the context of this week’s sessions in Moscow and provide our recommendations in a subsequent memorandum.
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Summary: Marcum notified Scowcroft of two important concessions made by Soviet officials at the conclusion of the fourth round of PNE negotiations in Moscow on October 31.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 46, PNE Working Papers number 1. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Sent through Boverie. The fifth round of negotiations began on November 19 and concluded on December 17.
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