Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

164. Telegram 256194 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, October 29, 1975, 1843Z.

256194. Subject: Soviet Arms Control Initiatives.

1. Chief Soviet MFA International Organizations Division Israelyan called on ACDA Assistant Director Davies October 24 to convey Soviet thinking on recent Soviet disarmament initiatives. During conversation, he gave particular emphasis to ban on development and deployment of new weapons of mass destruction.

2. Turning to Soviet proposal to ban new weapons of mass destruction, Israelyan stated following. Soviets have as many questions about the “terrible” weapons ban as Americans. In spite of these questions, the Soviet proposal was very serious and not propaganda. In all frankness it had to be admitted that the Soviets had tried to define and enumerate specific types of new weapons subject to ban but had failed. He and others had asked Soviet scientists and academicians to ascertain what concrete types of new weapons could emerge in future years. The scientists had stated that it was impossible to predict what specific types would emerge. It was certain, however, that new types of weapons would come forth.

3. Israelyan continued that the Soviet proposal had two aspects: (a) banning new types of systems, and (b) banning new systems. New types of systems are those that differ from existing weapons. The identity of these new types of weapons had to be defined. (Comment: These new types presumably would include weapons based on new physical principles. Israelyan’s comment indicated that scope of the Soviet proposal had not been defined.)

New systems of weapons are new generations of existing weapons, such as those of a chemical and nuclear type. Examples of new systems are B–1, Trident, and binary gases. It is necessary, of course, to define what constitutes a “system.” Soviets, however, are ready to discuss restraints on new systems of all parties.

Israelyan said that questions related to this matter could not be discussed in the General Assembly since it touched on complex and even secret matters. It could, however, be discussed on an “expert” level, either among a small group or bilaterally. (Comment: In a later remark, Ambassador Israelyan stated that he was referring primarily to discussions at the UN, though bilateral discussions outside the UN could not be excluded.)

4. Israelyan said that Minister Gromyko had made it clear that while the “terrible” weapons ban proposal was “most difficult and delicate,” it had one key virtue—it did not challenge anyone. It is interesting to note that, in spite of “the tremendous hostility” of the Chinese toward the Soviet Union as manifested again during Secretary Kissinger’s visit to Peking, the Chinese had not attacked “terrible” weapons ban. This contrasted with Chinese attacks on other Soviet disarmament proposals. (Comment: Israelyan was markedly emotional in his reference to Chinese hostility. Chinese have, in fact, denigrated “terrible” weapons ban.)

5. Ambassador Israelyan said that, while the U.S. may have dozens of questions on the “terrible” weapons ban, the Soviets had hundreds. Discussions might take one, two, five or even ten years. Nevertheless, they are eminently desirable.

6. Ambassador Israelyan stated that disarmament was becoming an increasingly important issue at the UN. Trends, however, were not favorable for the “big powers” such as the U.S. and USSR. The negative trends were obvious at the NPT RevCon where the U.S. and the USSR were the target of criticism by the developing countries. The results of the RevCon would have been worse if the U.S., UK and the Soviets had not consulted and planned in advance. At the UN, in spite of our better relations, delegations do not closely coordinate. While there is little possibility for joint action on political matters such as the Middle East, Korea and decolonization, in the sphere of disarmament we can basically agree on all issues other than the world disarmament conference. Israelyan said what was needed is a joint active, parallel approach to lead the UN discussion. A defensive, passive stance, as the U.S. delegation has maintained in recent years will lead only to resolutions that “make no sense.” Typical of such possible resolutions are the Mexican proposal (to reduce great power strategic arms as more members adhere to the NPT). It would be a “shame” if the United States abstained on a question like this.

Ambassador Israelyan stated that UN consultations could include the Soviet Union, the U.S., and the UK. France could be asked, even though it is not a “big power” and would probably not be interested.

Admiral Davies stated that he would discuss the UN consultation suggestion with the appropriate American officials.

7. Ambassador Israelyan suggested that, in addition to UN consultations, it might be useful to conduct regular Soviet-American arms control consultations. The British agreed to such consultations during Prime Minister Wilson’s visit in February. The first two-day meeting was held in July and was a “great success.” Similar consultations are also held with the Italians. Ambassador Israelyan indicated that he intended to suggest to his government establishment of such Soviet-American consultations.

8. Admiral Davies asked for Israelyan’s assessment of the TTBT/PNE talks. Ambassador Israelyan stated that when he left Moscow in August, his Deputy Timerbayev had said everything would be settled by the end of September. A few days ago, Timerbayev had sent a letter saying that the talks are not nearly completed.

Admiral Davies indicated that the principal problems in the talks were verification and the observer function.

Ambassador Israelyan said these are very difficult problems.

There are many agencies involved. He indicated that if the American bureaucratic situation is bad, the Soviet situation is no better. (Comment: This may be admission of Soviet differences of view on the on-site inspection issue.)

Ambassador Israelyan said that the importance of PNEs seemed to be growing, especially in view of the energy crisis. Soviets are very enthusiastic about PNEs. Ambassador Israelyan said that Mr. Morokhov (Soviet TTBT/PNE negotiator and Deputy Chief of State Committee on Atomic Energy) had provided a briefing on the benefits of PNEs. Israelyan said that he was “very impressed by the way Morokhov explained the utility of PNEs.”

9. Admiral Davies thanked Ambassador Israelyan for his very frank and useful presentation and stated that his suggestions would be seriously discussed within U.S. Government.

Kissinger

1. Summary: The Department summarized a meeting between Chief of the International Organizations Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Israelyan and Admiral Davies, during which the officials discussed various Soviet disarmament initiatives.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750376–0061. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by J. Glassman (EUR/SOV); cleared by John Baker (IO/UNP), Davies, Kelley, Phelps, and Ortiz; approved by Garrison. Repeated for information to USUN and the U.S. delegation to the SALT II talks in Geneva. The Soviet draft resolution banning new weapons of mass destruction was submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 30. For the text, see Documents on Disarmament 1975, p. 495.