Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

145. Memorandum From David Elliott and Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, May 15, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Follow-on Nuclear Suppliers Conference

Confidential talks on common understandings regarding nuclear export safeguards and controls were held in London on April 23. The seven countries participating were the U.S., UK, Canada, FRG, France, Soviet Union and Japan. The U.S. aide-mémoire on suggested export controls (Tab B), transmitted to the other six participants last November, was discussed and views were exchanged on the types of controls that each country would like to see implemented. There was generally agreement that suppliers should require as a condition of nuclear export that:

—The recipient agree not to use such exports to produce a nuclear explosive device.

—The recipient accept IAEA safeguards on such exports, with alternate safeguards being substituted only in special cases and after consultation with the other suppliers.

—The recipient agree to apply adequate physical security measures to such exports.

—Retransfers carry the same conditions governing the original export.

There was also an indication of willingness to have bilateral consultation among suppliers to discuss specific exports to sensitive countries or regions where the risk of instability or conflict is present.

The only area where considerable differences existed was on the types of safeguards and constraints to be implemented in the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities and technology. While not objecting to our proposal to require multinational ownership and operation of such facilities, the French would not support the condition that these exports be predicated on the acceptance by the recipient of full safeguards on its entire fuel cycle and a general non-proliferation commitment. The FRG generally supported the French position and others, regardless of their specific views, would not agree to conditions more stringent than the French will accept.

In preparation for the next meeting in London on June 18, the participants asked the U.S. to formulate and circulate a new paper taking into account the views expressed in the exploratory meeting as a basis for finding consensus. The Verification Panel Working Group has prepared a draft of such a paper (Tab A). The areas in which agreement existed are included as before, and the paper deals with the issue of enrichment and reprocessing on a basis consistent with the strongest safeguards condition thought to be acceptable to the French. Four conditions would be imposed relative to reprocessing and enrichment.

—There would be mutual agreement between supplier and recipient as to where nuclear material could be reprocessed and stored.

—Nuclear material could not be enriched in any enrichment facility to weapons grade without the written consent of the supplier nation.

—Reprocessing and enrichment facilities would be multinationally owned, involving as a minimum the direct participation by the supplier in its management and technical operations.

—Any replicated facility would fall under the same restraints as were applied to the original transfer.

(The above conditions are consistent with those we are seeking in our agreement with Iran and which we would like to use as a model in future U.S. agreements.)

Recommendation:

That you approve the distribution of the paper at Tab A to the other six participants before the next round of the Nuclear Suppliers Conference, with a view that the provisions in this paper constitute a good basis for a consensus understanding at that meeting.

1. Summary: Elliott and Lodal recommended that in advance of the next session of the Nuclear Suppliers Conference, Kissinger distribute a discussion paper on safeguards and export controls prepared by the Verification Panel Working Group to the other participants.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 32, Nuclear Suppliers Conference, Briefing Book, April 1975 Follow-up. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the approval line reads: “RCM for HAK re HAKTO 2.” Tab A is Document 146. Tab B, an undated U.S. aide-mémoire on suggested export controls, is attached but not published.