144. Telegram 3427 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
3427. Subj: NPT RevCon: Analysis of First Week.
1. Summary: Apart from organization of conference and election of officers, first week devoted entirely to opening statements of delegations. Principal themes were need for greater and faster progress in achieving CTB and reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals; desire for negative security assurances; and calls for preferential treatment for NPT parties. End summary.
2. Most delegations (other than U.S., UK and Soviet bloc) stressed need for NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenals, asserting that SALT had not had this result, and would stimulate a qualitative arms race.
3. Second most common theme was desirability of CTB (in many cases put as a ban on nuclear weapons tests, with special provision for PNEs) as the single most important step that could now be taken under Article VI.
4. A large number of delegations disparaged the value of Security Council Res 255 and called for undertakings by the NWS not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties to the treaty (limited, in some proposals, to those who were not members of alliances). Several pointed to the possibility of such undertakings in connection with appropriate nuclear free zones. The Japanese privately advised us that they would be content to hold back on their proposal until most opportune time, but stressed the importance to them, for domestic consumption, of taking such an initiative.
5. There was widespread support for measures to improve the physical security of nuclear materials, but no detailed suggestions. There was also widespread agreement on the importance of IAEA safeguards.
6. A substantial number of delegations stated that nuclear supplier states should require, as a condition of nuclear supplies, that recipient countries that are NNWS not party to NPT must subject their entire nuclear fuel cycle to IAEA safeguards, as NPT parties are themselves [Page 484] required to do. (The UK, FRG, U.S. and USSR did not advocate this solution). Several delegations attempted to press the Soviets into making a voluntary safeguards offer such as that made by the U.S. and the UK.
7. A number of delegations called for preferential treatment for NPT parties in international nuclear cooperation and in technical and financial assistance to LDCs as well as increases in the amounts thereof. Several supported the idea of multinational reprocessing plants.
8. Discussion of PNEs was not extensive. None of the delegations asserted that PNE technology had reached the point where it was clearly of benefit to the parties and none expressed a desire to have a specific project carried out. (But after a showing, during Friday’s luncheon break of Soviet films on creating a reservoir and extinguishing a gas well fire, several delegations privately indicated that this showed that PNEs could be useful.) The Nigerian delegate inferred from the fact that the NWS had excepted PNEs from the TTB and were negotiating a separate agreement on the subject that they must see value in them. A large number of delegations considered it important to set up an international PNE regime and to negotiate the agreement or agreements that would ensure that the NNWS parties could obtain PNE services on a non-discriminatory basis when and if they proved of value. The UK idea of a PNE committee of the IAEA was mentioned by only a handful of delegations. The Soviet statement that they were prepared to make PNE services available to NNWS whether or not they were parties to the treaty was noted by the Philippines (which complained about the cost to the IAEA of the new PNE unit in the Secretariat) and one or two other delegations.
9. The Swiss—whose intervention was among the most negative of the week—raised the issue of laser fusion. We subsequently furnished their delegation, as well as the Australians, Dutch, Philippines and FRG (all of whom requested it) with the U.S. statement on this subject. Morokhov (head of the USSR del), Rometsch (IAEA) and the German delegation all said privately that they were pleased with the U.S. handling of this problem.
10. A rather persistent theme was the need for the conference to come out with concrete results and binding commitments, rather than mere rhetoric. This desire was reflected in the Mexican and Romanian initiatives reported septels.
11. Launching of the tripartite draft declaration ran into difficulties. A number of delegations thought it was too bland, and privately expressed the view that much would have to be added to it to make it fly. The Soviets convened a group which preliminary soundings had indicated might be considered “sympathizers”—including the Czechs, Austrians and Belgians—but then proceeded to press them so hard to [Page 485] co-sponsor the draft without substantial change within 24 hours, that they balked. The UK then held a meeting of the EC–9, who decided it would be a tactical mistake to surface the draft at this time, but said they would offer comments and suggestions on it early next week.
12. The idea of a second review conference in 1980 received widespread support (other than from the Soviet bloc). See also the Mexican resolution on this subject, reported septel.
13. The issue of passing on the applications of Algeria, Cuba, Israel and South Africa for observer status remained unresolved. President Thorsson and the committee chairmen will meet again on this subject Tuesday morning. Barton (Canada) plans to make an effort to get agreement on admitting them en bloc, but if separate consideration is required, his fall-back would be to defer consideration of the South African application (with the expectation that it would never be brought to the floor) and meanwhile South African delegate would in fact continue to be present at the meetings, but without a nameplate.
14. At this point, no supplementary instructions appear necessary (except as requested in septel on Mexican res), but delegation would appreciate being advised (i) when and if it can be authorized to make a statement, or support a recommendation, on export credit financing; (ii) when and if it appears possible to authorize the delegation to say anything beyond present instructions with respect to the intention or determination or willingness of the U.S. and USSR to follow the current SALT negotiations promptly with negotiations on possible reductions and/or qualitative restrictions; and (iii) any relevant congressional developments on safeguards or nonproliferation.
15. If usable analysis of qualitative restrictions included in the SALT I agreements is available, delegation would appreciate receiving it.
16. Net assessment so far is that conference less negative than expected, largely due to the fact that the balance of interest groups represented is more favorable. Nevertheless, we expect to be given a hard time, even from friendly delegations, especially on Article VI, CTB and negative security assurances. This prospect is all the greater in view of the fact that the chairman of the committee considering these matters is Amb Clark of Nigeria, who is not expected to run a taut ship and whose sympathies are strongly against our position.
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Summary: The mission transmitted an analysis of the first week of the NPT Review Conference.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750167–1079. Confidential. Repeated for information to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Mexico City, Moscow, Ottawa, Rome, Tokyo, USUN, the Mission to NATO, and the Mission to the IAEA in Vienna. The Romanian and Mexican initiatives are in telegrams 3407 and 3408 from Geneva, May 10. (Ibid., D750165–0315 and D750165–0389) The tripartite draft declaration is in telegram 3196 from Geneva, May 5. (Ibid., D750156–1022) The Mexican draft resolution is in telegram 3426 from Geneva, May 12. (Ibid., D750165–1045) Telegram 4095 from Geneva, June 2, transmitted the delegation’s final summary of the conference. (Ibid., D750191–1002)
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