Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

117. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, February 8, 1975, 11:14 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

• TTB/PNE and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy (NSSM 202)

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

• State

  • Robert Ingersoll
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt
  • George Vest
  • Jerome Kahan
  • William Hyland

• Defense

  • Robert Ellsworth
  • Dr. James P. Wade
  • Donald Cotter

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

• CIA

  • Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
  • [name not declassified]

• ACDA

  • Dr. Fred Iklé
  • Robert Buchheim
  • Paul Wolfowitz

• ERDA

  • Dr. Robert Seamans
  • Gen. Edward Giller

• NSC Staff

  • LTG Brent Scowcroft
  • Jan Lodal
  • Dr. David Elliott
  • Benjamin Huberman
  • James Barnum

Secretary Kissinger: (To Gen. Walters) Do you have an opening prayer?

Gen. Walters: I don’t have an official briefing, but I am prepared to give you some remarks about the current Soviet PNE (peaceful nuclear explosions) effort and about the status of the nuclear programs of some other countries.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, I’ll give you five minutes.

Gen. Walters: (Began to brief from the attached).

Secretary Kissinger: How can Argentina be [in]dependent of foreign suppliers?

Gen. Walters: By having their own chemical and technical capability.

[name not declassified]: They already have their own uranium supply. We believe they will have their own nuclear weapons capability by the early 1980s.

Secretary Kissinger: They have their own uranium?

Gen. Walters: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: How about that. Well, that won’t be my problem. I won’t be around in the early 1980s.

Gen. Walters: (Finishing his briefing) End of prayer.

Secretary Kissinger: We have two problems to discuss this morning, and I think we can dispense with both of them quickly. The first is peaceful nuclear explosions, and the second is on procedural aspects of nonproliferation. In respect to PNEs, the problem, as I understand it, is one of yield limits and verification requirements, and LTBT (Limited Test Ban Treaty) aspects of excavation PNEs. As I understand it, there is a general consensus within this group on what the yield limits should be and on verification provisions for contained PNEs. There is also interagency agreement that contained PNEs should have a 100kt limit and that observers should be included to verify such things as geophysical characteristics and data exchange. There is also agreement, as I understand it, that we would agree to fall off from our insistence on observers if the Soviets agree to 100kt contained PNEs. If the Soviets insist on 150kt contained PNEs, then we will insist on observers. Also, as I understand it, if we place a limit of 100kt on explosions, this would be consistent with the TTBT. But, if they up the limit to 150kt, then we would have to insist on observers. So, we are agreed on starting out with a 100kt limit and observers, but are prepared to fall off from that if necessary. Is that essentially correct?

Dr. Iklé: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. The next problem is excavation PNEs. As I understand our position, we want a limit of 150kt yield on individual excavation PNEs plus a 500kt limit on salvo (aggregate group) yields. There would also be a requirement for observers. The observers would verify such things as depth of burial, detailed geological characteristics, and fission yields.

Dr. Iklé: I don’t quite agree with you on that. I think there is another way to handle the excavation PNEs. I don’t think we need to get involved with observers as long as excavation PNEs are the same yield as contained PNEs.

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, you’re fighting the problem. The President (Nixon) already agreed in Moscow to go beyond a 150kt limit on excavation PNEs. Yield limits below 150kt are another problem.

Dr. Iklé: I thought that we had agreed to explore the possibilities. We also have the LTBT problem on excavation PNEs.

Secretary Kissinger: Nobody understands the Moscow agreement (LTBT). We can reopen the question, but only with the clear provision that there is adequate inspection. But we can’t go to the Soviets with another proposal above 150kt. We can’t go back to the Russians and say we want to scrub the 150kt limit.

Dr. Iklé: I think we can separate out the 150 aggregate kiloton issue without getting into trouble. I think we can make a provision for aggregate yields up to the 150kt limit. Observers would not be needed as they are much cleaner yields. For observers to pick up melt samples for determining fission yields is a cumbersome operation anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me make this very clear. I do not want the agencies going around reopening issues that the President has already decided upon. If it’s possible to bundle up the 150kt package with a 500kt group limit, that’s okay. But, we can’t go in with that position.

Mr. Buchheim: I thought last June we had made the decision on aggregate limits.

Secretary Kissinger: That was your decision, but not the President’s.

Dr. Iklé: We have the problem of how good the melt samples are.

Gen. Giller: At the present time we feel that we do have the ability to collect melt samples. We’re confident that a low fission yield limit will constrain the Soviets from developing weapons under the guise of PNEs at least for the near term, the next ten years or so. The problem is whether we will be able to ten to fifteen years from now. We differ from Fred (Dr. Iklé) in this regard.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me that it is not possible to begin negotiations with the Soviets when they have already agreed on observers for explosions above 150kt. It’s just the wrong way to begin negotiations. We start at the beginning asking for observers and then come back later offering to drop observers as a compromise. I agree that we ought to explore the cluster method. That may be a way to get at it. But, falling off from the observer requirement at the beginning is the wrong way to go about it.

Dr. Iklé: Observers can do the verifying on the aggregate yields and wouldn’t have to concern themselves with the fission yields, which are hard to sample anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: So, what you are saying is that the only way to get an agreement above the 150kt limit is in clusters. Fred, what is really the issue?

Dr. Iklé: We should first propose limiting all PNEs to the 150kt level, then we can fall back to a cluster limit, say at 500kt.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is—the question is whether we can get a break in the deadlock. You say the only way to do this is to cluster them at about 150kt. We should say instead that PNEs above 150kt would be permitted if adequate inspection procedures could be found. If adequate procedures are not found, then we can retreat to the clusters. But, to fall off a position the President has already okayed is not right. Then the Soviets will say that the U.S. is lying. Our word will be worthless. The Soviets will adopt the attitude that we don’t mean what we say. President Nixon agreed to negotiate an agreement permitting yields of over 150kt if they were monitored. We have to put forward what we have already agreed to and then go to the next position.

Dr. Iklé: But we can ask them (the Soviets) how this monitoring is to be done.

Secretary Kissinger: Suppose they tell us how it is done. What then?

Dr. Iklé: We can say that what they propose is not sufficient—that we know of a more satisfactory way. We won’t reject their proposal outright.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They’ve already told us how the monitoring is to be done.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no trouble with the outline. The working group paper is a good analysis. I have the problem that our efforts for an agreement can use a lot of fat with the Russians. We have said that we would agree to something and then come back seven months later and say we don’t. That doesn’t make sense.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The agreed strategy is to give some more details to the Soviets, including observer requirements.

Secretary Kissinger: This is a more sensible program. I think we should give them all that we need on observer requirements. Let’s be tough on that.

Dr. Iklé: Then we get into a debate on the modalities.

Gen. Giller: Details are not important.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s tell it to them. We can tell them what is needed, and then they can say it is impossible. Then, we can say what do you think needs to be done, and then say this proposal is much more acceptable. They can go to the Politburo with something like that. I think it is much better to negotiate from such a position than to go to them asking what they want.

Dr. Iklé: There is a further problem—violation of the LTBT.

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, that’s a totally different thing. If we say no to going over a 150kt limit that’s going back on our word. We have no obligation to change the LTBT.

Dr. Iklé: We have to recognize that excavation PNEs and the LTBT are related and the negotiations could fail over this.

Secretary Kissinger: If it fails it’s because of the LTBT. We can manage that. That’s another thing. If they can figure out how to do excavations without violating the LTBT that’s okay, but there’s no technical way to do it is there? If we want to make it fail, we can stick on the LTBT. I am not recommending to this group that we change. I do not feel that we have the slightest reason to change our position on the LTBT. That is their (the Soviets’) problem. We want to resist pressure to change the LTBT for excavations.

Dr. Iklé: For the Soviets it’s a tactical question of how excavations are handled under the LTBT.

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, I feel we have a moral obligation to put forward our position on a 500kt limit on excavation PNEs. Let it fail, what the hell do we care? Maybe they will accept restrictions on a 500kt limit and it will still fail. I just don’t want to be cute with them. The LTBT should not be modified. I don’t want to give the Russians the impression that we are trying to screw them on something. The President has agreed to going above 150kt already. If we can do both, well, fine. But, we can’t go back on something the President has already agreed to.

Dr. Seamans: We (ERDA) are with you on that.

Secretary Kissinger: Then what the Hell are you doing at this meeting? Don’t you know this is where everybody is against me?

Dr. Seamans: I guess I haven’t been in town long enough.

Secretary Kissinger: You’ll learn. I just don’t want us to be cute about this thing. I don’t want the Soviet delegation going back to the Politburo with the report that the Americans are doublecrossing them. I think we should be tough, I think we should be mean, and I think we should be complicated. What we want is a 150kt yield limit on single explosions and a 500kt limit on aggregates (salvos).

Dr. Iklé: That’s fine as long as our distinction on fission yield samples does not become misconstrued as implying agreement that excavation PNEs are okay under the LTBT.

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, that’s a totally separate issue. I agree with you that observers should not use samples to get around the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Test samples are for determining whether there has been a weapons test. The LTBT has to do with venting and can be handled separately. Our position should be that if there is radioactive material floating around in the atmosphere, then it is not acceptable.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That may get us into a negotiation on the LTBT.

Secretary Kissinger: They will continue to use their definition. Will they have trouble at 500kt?

Gen. Giller: I think they will have trouble at 150kt, let alone a ceiling of 500kt.

Secretary Kissinger: We will maintain our position on the LTBT. We have to recognize that there is a grey area between what is gas and what is debris, but that is nothing new.

Mr. Lodal: We have faced that problem before; in the case of weapons test ventings, which we’ve protested.

Secretary Kissinger: In either event we still have the problem, with or without the PNE agreement.

Dr. Elliott: We would still face the problem of having to modify the LTBT. We could be neutral if they . . .

Secretary Kissinger: We will permit PNEs if there are consistent with the LTBT. We will oppose the Soviets if they want to revise the LTBT.

Mr. Hyland: I doubt the Russians would want to revise the LTBT at this point. The real issue with the Russians at this point is whether we are going to cooperate on PNEs.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s the real issue. Bob (Mr. Ellsworth) what do you think?

Mr. Ellsworth: I don’t really know if we can answer that question at this point. We would have no problem with cooperation if we settle the verification aspects satisfactorily.

Dr. Iklé: We could use existing agreements to cooperate on PNEs without having a brand new cooperation agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: What does ERDA think?

Gen. Giller: Our big problem is public sensitivity to the environmental impact statement we would have to write. Joint cooperation on PNEs would end up watering down a major document.

Secretary Kissinger: Can’t we keep environmental criticism out of print?

Gen. Giller: No. If you have a treaty that simply permits PNEs you can, but not if you join in cooperation in PNEs. And, it gets us in for a cooperative venture that is not consistent with the environmental aspects.

Secretary Kissinger: So environmental objections will be raised. Domestically, international cooperation will be used to pry loose data. Then, I assume we are not prepared to cooperate.

Gen. Giller: If we sign an agreement to cooperate we will have to go through the environmental procedures.

Secretary Kissinger: What we say and what we do has to be kept out of public discussion.

Gen. Giller: I think an agreement on cooperation on PNEs is good, but we should not sign it as part of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Dr. Iklé: We need not have a separate agreement. Also, we should look at other negative aspects.

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, what do you really have in mind?

Dr. Iklé: Well, for one thing, it would be very unpopular. In the second place, it would get us into a bind on PNEs with other countries; Germany and Israel, for example.

Secretary Kissinger: Whether we cooperate or not is a technical point. Either we tell them we oppose cooperation on PNEs or say we are prepared to cooperate. But, I don’t believe we should be getting into a treaty. Maybe it should be on an ad hoc basis, project by project.

Dr. Iklé: They know we don’t have the necessary support for this.

Secretary Kissinger: We can tell them that we are prepared to cooperate with them, but outside of a formal agreement.

Dr. Iklé: I just don’t think we should get into cooperation PNE agreements.

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, you are confusing the two issues—the legal framework with whether or not cooperation should take place.

Dr. Iklé: We’ve already talked to the Soviets about this and there is no clear understanding about this.

Secretary Kissinger: It is one thing to say that we won’t cooperate on PNEs. But if the Soviets are determined to have a PNE agreement, I don’t understand why we shouldn’t go along with them.

Dr. Iklé: It’s a question of Article V (of the NPT) obliging us to share PNE benefits with non-nuclears. We don’t want to push PNE benefits, for non-proliferation reasons.

Secretary Kissinger: The question is whether a U.S.-Soviet Agreement to cooperate has anything to do with non-proliferation.

Dr. Iklé: The trouble is that our national policies are affected by what Congress thinks and about what is going on out in Colorado.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we ought to know what we want to do. We have to have a national policy before we try to reach some sort of agreement with the Soviets. I think it’s better to have a cooperation agreement. I think we ought to defer the issue. (To Scowcroft) Let’s have a study of this right away. We’re just not ready for that decision.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets, however, will keep after us for some sort of agreement.

Dr. Iklé: How would going on with a PNE cooperation agreement benefit us?

Secretary Kissinger: What would be the losses? Who would be affected by an agreement?

Dr. Iklé: My impression is that Germany might want PNEs. They’ve done some work with the Egyptians.

Secretary Kissinger: The Germans won’t have PNEs based on national policy. We would tell them it’s not in their interest. We can’t say to the other NPT countries that we’ll help on PNEs but if you ask us we can’t do it. Non-weapons states have no capability for nuclear explosions. What would you do if they want PNEs?

Dr. Iklé: If Brazil, for example, asks for a 70kt device that wouldn’t be interfering with the Threshold Treaty. It could be done.

Gen. Walters: If we refused them they would do it on their own.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, we need a national policy on peaceful nuclear explosions. We won’t get all the issues unless we have a national policy. (To General Scowcroft) We need the study right away. It has been my experience that a country’s interest in a nuclear capability is for weapons purposes anyway. As long as they have the right to do PNEs, they can still come up with an explosion. There is only one excuse for a nuclear explosion, and that is for weapons development. The Indians understand it.

Now, on nonproliferation. We have agreed to continue on with the Nuclear Suppliers Conference. As I understand, the preparations for the conference have stopped until we get a reply from the French. If we don’t get an answer by March 10, we’ll start bilateral talks. I think we should have a detailed plan and put it forward to this group.

Mr. Lodal: The working group is already working on this.

Secretary Kissinger: I will talk to Sauvagnargues (French Foreign Minister) about it after my trip to the Middle East. I think, however, that we will have to move toward a suppliers conference by March 10.

Dr. Iklé: And hope in the meantime that they don’t settle their deal with Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that is a good point. We should make the point with them, saying that we hope they won’t do anything inconsistent with our approach to the conference.

Dr. Iklé: You may have to make the same point with the Germans. They are about to conclude a deal with the Brazilians.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we should do that.

1. Summary: The participants discussed the possibility of a PNE cooperation agreement with other countries.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 23, Meeting Minutes—Verification Panel (Originals), February 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified and “[in]”, added for clarity. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The working group paper is ibid. Walters’s briefing is not attached and not found. An undated 28-page summary of strategy for the second round of PNE negotiations is in the Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 4, Verification Panel Meeting, 2/8/75—TTB/PNE and Nonproliferation (2). NSSM 202 is Document 50.