Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

116. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, February 7, 1975.

Your Meeting With Gromyko

[Omitted here are an introductory note and Section I. SALT.]

II. Security Arms Control Issues

All of these issues are proceeding more or less on their merits with no overall strategy.

—Somewhat surprisingly CSCE may be accelerating, even though the Soviets are still intransigent, because the allies are growing weary.

—A CSCE Summit in the late summer may not be avoidable, if matters take their course.

—The introduction of Option III in MBFR will take considerable time to work through the allies; any impact on the Soviets will probably be lost through leaks, and, in any case, if this move is to break the impasse, it almost certainly has to be introduced in your channel now.

—Negotiations will resume this month on the Threshold Test Ban (PNEs) and environmental warfare, and the CCD in Geneva will resume on March 4 where CW will be revived.

We ought to work out a scheme for holding or moving these various issues. A possibility might be:

1. Make a firm promise to Gromyko for a CSCE Summit in September (if necessary we can make concessions on CBMs because the allied position is collapsing).

2. Foreshadow to Gromyko that we will make a move on nuclear weapons in MBFR, without going into specifics, in return for which we expect agreement, in principle before the summit, to a first stage U.S.-Soviet reduction that will also include air forces.

3. Agree to try to work out an environmental agreement before the summit but ask Gromyko to hold off on both environment and CW in Geneva, until we have had more time to consider how to respond to their CW draft agreement (you might want to surface the idea of an interim moratorium on CW production, rather than a treaty).

4. On the Threshold Test Ban, the real issue comes down to our toleration for excavation PNEs over 150 kt with non-firm guarantees. If this is not supportable in Washington, can we strike a bargain to limit all PNEs to 150 kt, if we enter into a “cooperative arrangement” with the Soviets (which has strong overtones of a nuclear condominium).

—Since the outcome of this negotiation is bound to lead to a new controversy, there is no reason to force the pace. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to announce at the summit that the issue is resolved.

A. CSCE

At CSCE, the Soviets have maintained their inflexibility on both CBMs and the remaining Basket III issues while continuing to argue that the major issues of the conference have been settled and that it should end soon at the highest level. This Soviet intransigence can contribute to your current strategy of stretching out the negotiations and delaying Stage III and our final agreement to a summit until after Brezhnev’s visit here, but it also depends on the allies not giving in prematurely.

Gromyko can be expected to complain that we are not being active enough in pushing the allies toward more “realistic positions,” and not carrying through on the Brezhnev-Ford agreement at Vladivostok to work together to conclude the conference at the earliest possible time.

—You should say the U.S. has accomplished a good deal since last fall—both in the Principles Declaration and in Basket III—in moving the allies along, but that the Soviets must accept that further compromises will be necessary on their part, especially on the peaceful change language, CBMs, and the unresolved Basket III issues. (You have a detailed memo on CSCE issues in your briefing book.)

B. MBFR

You may decide to raise Option III, as follows:

—It is our impression that if we included air and nuclear forces in our proposals, the Soviets would be willing to include the withdrawal of a tank army.

—In the interest of moving the talks forward, we are considering certain proposals on air and nuclear elements. In particular, we are considering an offer to withdraw a significant number of nuclear weapons from the NATO Guidelines area (along with 29,000 ground forces).

—In return, we would have to have Soviet withdrawal of a tank army consisting of 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks in Phase I and agreement on the concept of a common manpower ceiling within the area as the goal for reductions in Phase II.

—However, we would be interested in obtaining the reaction of the Soviet side in these channels as soon as possible.

C. Environmental Warfare

Our first series of talks in Moscow November 1–5 only pointed up the differences between the Soviet catch-all approach, as set out in their draft convention tabled earlier at the UNGA, and our strictly limited “Option II” position, which would not include limits on “tactical” uses of environmental modification such as rainmaking. We will be meeting with the Soviets again at the experts level in Washington on February 24, and are working on a counter draft convention to give them at that time. Our immediate objective is simply to maintain the dialogue and forestall tabling of a Soviet draft in Geneva by extending the bilaterals into the period when the CCD is in session. If you offer an agreement by the summit, the Soviets might see it in their interest to subscribe to our more limited approach (especially since it is not a serious issue).

D. Chemical Warfare

The Soviets have been pressing us for bilateral talks on chemical weapons, citing our agreement in the July 3, 1974, summit communiqué to consider a joint initiative in the CCD. Vorontsov gave you a draft convention last August which is too broad in scope, inadequate on verification, and by limiting CW agents above a certain level of lethality, would catch all agents in our stockpile while leaving most of theirs untouched. In the SRG of January 27 you asked for more work on the question of whether we should produce binary weapons. Until these studies are completed and a decision taken, we are not in a position to respond to the Soviets.

Meanwhile, however, we should urge them not to table their draft convention in the CCD, which reconvenes March 4, pending bilateral discussion with us. You may want to suggest that since a formal treaty is unverifiable, a moratorium for say 5 years limiting stockpiles could be undertaken: a production ban may be inevitable if we have no programs.

E. Threshold Test Ban and PNEs

The second session of the TTB/PNE talks will be in progress when you see Gromyko. There are four key issues that will have to be worked out if—as the Soviets wish—we are to have an agreement by the summit.

—Yield Limit of Contained Explosions. We are proposing a 100-kiloton limit and on-site observers. However, we have some flexibility to move the yield up or to drop the observers.

—Verification of Excavation Shots. Here we have proposed a yield limit of 150 kilotons (with a salvo limit of 500 kts), observers and a very low limit on the fission yield of the device (say one-half kiloton). Eventually our verification needs could be satisfied either by the overall yield limit or, if the Soviets want explosions over 150 kilotons, by limiting the fission yield of each shot. This is going to be difficult for the Soviets either way, however, because a 150-kiloton threshold may constrain to some extent the Pechora-Kama project while the fission yield limit will require fairly intrusive on-site observer activity.

— LTBT. Any excavation program is likely to violate the LTBT. The Soviets will probably want explicit or tacit help from us in getting around this problem. This will be very difficult for us to do because the Senate is unlikely to ratify any TTB/PNE arrangement which looks to modification of the LTBT.

— PNE Cooperation. The Soviets want us to conclude a broad cooperative agreement on PNEs. We can probably go along with a modest program of cooperation covering domestic PNE applications, only on condition that our verification concerns are fully met. However, we cannot accept the Soviet idea of joint U.S./Soviet PNE services to third countries because of the overall political implications of superpower condominium.

The most valuable message you could leave with Gromyko is that verification is a very serious problem for us which, if it is not solved, will make it impossible to obtain the needed congressional support for ratification of the TTB.

F. Non-proliferation

The Soviets have agreed to attend a multilateral nuclear exporters meeting. On the other hand, they are very strong supporters of universal NPT adherence and the closest possible links between safeguards and the NPT. We are concerned that a conspicuous and inflexible public posture on the NPT will make it very difficult for the French to engage in meaningful cooperation on safeguards. Thus, if the Soviets are not willing to tone down their NPT position, we will lose both ways: the safeguards problem will get out of hand without French cooperation and the NPT rhetoric will not succeed in gaining NPT adherence by France and the other countries that matter.

[Omitted here are Section III. Trade/Emigration and Section IV. Bilateral Cooperation.]

1. Summary: In preparation for Kissinger’s upcoming meeting with Gromyko in Geneva, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland reviewed several issues related to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, trade, and bilateral cooperation.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot 81D286, Box 5, Soviet Union, January-March, 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is mistakenly dated “2/7/74.” All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The memorandum is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–November 1976, as Document 127. Kissinger and Gromyko met in Geneva February 16–17. For the memoranda of conversation, see ibid., Documents 128, 129, and 130.