104. Statement by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé)1
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning on the Geneva Protocol of 19252 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.3 Ratification of these two arms control agreements in the field of chemical and biological warfare has the strong support of the President and the executive branch. We welcome the initiative of the committee in holding this hearing, which we hope will lead to prompt ratification of both agreements.
As you know, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use—in effect the first use—of chemical and biological agents in war. Except for the United States, all militarily important countries are parties to the Protocol.
The extensive hearings on the Protocol held by this committee in March 1971 examined the reasons why U.S. ratification of the Protocol has been so long delayed. In the interest of brevity, I shall not go back over this record now, although I would, of course, be happy to respond to any questions regarding the history of the Protocol.
INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF PROTOCOL’S SCOPE
During the 1971 hearings, differing views were expressed on the question of including riot control agents and herbicides within the scope of the Protocol. As a result, the committee requested that the executive branch reexamine its interpretation of the Protocol’s scope.4
[Page 338]In response to the committee’s request, the executive branch has undertaken a comprehensive review. We have reconsidered our legal interpretation and analyzed possible alternatives for resolving differences of opinion on the scope of the Protocol. We have evaluated the military utility of riot control agents and herbicides. And we have, of course, carefully considered alternative approaches that would accomplish our arms control objectives.
PRESIDENT’S DECISIONS CONCERNING PROTOCOL’S SCOPE
Mr. Chairman, the President considers it important that the United States ratify the Geneva Protocol at the earliest possible date. On the basis of an interagency review he has very recently taken decisions with a view to achieving Senate advice and consent to ratification. The President has authorized me to announce those decisions today.
The President has authorized me to state on his behalf that he is prepared, in reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the Protocol, to renounce as a matter of national policy:
(1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters;
(2) first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control circumstances to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. This exception would permit use of riot control agents in riot situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control;
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. This use would be restricted to situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks;
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions. The use of riot control agents would be permissible in the recovery of remotely isolated personnel such as downed aircrews—and passengers;
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the combat zone to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations.
The President intends to conform U.S. policy to this position, assuming the Senate consents.
Finally, the President, under an earlier directive still in force, must approve in advance any use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that you may have several specific questions concerning this policy. I would be happy to respond to such questions at this time, before I proceed to the section of my statement dealing with the Biological Weapons Convention.
[Page 339]BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION OF 1972
The second agreement before the committee is the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The full title is the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction. As the title suggests, this convention completely prohibits biological and toxin weapons. Since it provides for the elimination of existing weapons, it is a true disarmament measure.
The convention is entirely consistent with U.S. policy concerning biological and toxin weapons, since the United States had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the convention was negotiated. In fact, our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has already been destroyed. Our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.
Since opening the convention for signature in April 1972, 110 nations have become signatories. This includes all members of the Warsaw Pact and all members of NATO except France. In order for this treaty to come into force, it must be ratified by the three depositories—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR—and at least 19 other countries. Enough countries have now ratified, some 36, so that only ratification by depositories is still required. The British have completed all the parliamentary procedures for ratification and the Soviet Union has announced that it intends to ratify before the end of 1974. It is particularly important that U.S. ratification be accomplished in the near future so that we will not be the ones who prevent this treaty from coming into force.
VERIFICATION AND U.S. INTEREST IN ENTRY
There is one aspect of the convention to which I would like to give particular attention: the question of verification. Verification of compliance with this convention in countries with relatively closed societies is difficult, particularly for the prohibition of the development of these weapons.
Nevertheless, in our judgment it is in the net interest of the United States to enter into this convention, basically for three reasons:
First, the military utility of these weapons is dubious at best; the effects are unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable, and there exists no military experience concerning them. Hence, the prohibitions of this convention do not deny us a militarily viable option and verifiability is therefore less important.
Second, biological weapons are particularly repugnant from a moral point of view.
Third, widespread adherence to the convention can help discourage some misguided competition in biological weapons.
[Page 340]It is to be feared that, without such a prohibition, new developments in the biological sciences might give rise to concern because they could be abused for weapons purposes. Such anxieties could foster secretive military competition in a field of science that would otherwise remain open to international cooperation and be used solely for the benefit of mankind.
It is important, however, that the limited verifiability of this convention should not be misconstrued as a precedent for other arms limitation agreements where these special conditions would not obtain.
Mr. Chairman, the administration believes that the Biological Weapons Convention represents a useful arms control measure. We hope the United States will not prevent the treaty from entering into force through its failure to ratify. By failing to ratify, we would deny ourselves the benefit of having other countries legally committed not to produce weapons that we have already given up. And we would deny 109 other countries the benefit of a treaty that they have already signed.
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Summary: In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Iklé communicated President Ford’s decision concerning the Geneva Protocol’s scope and his support for the ratification of both the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention.
Source: Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 822–825. A footnote in the original indicates the version of Ikle’s statement printed in Documents on Disarmament is extracted from Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session, on Ex. J. 91–2, Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; Ex. Q. 92–2, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and on Their Destruction; and S. Res. 18, Relating to a Comprehensive Interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, pp. 11–12, 15–16.
↩ - Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 764–765. [Footnote is in the original.]↩
- Ibid., 1972, pp. 133–138. [Footnote is in the original.]↩
- Ibid., 1971, pp. 215–218. [Footnote is in the original.]↩