97. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 15, 1973, 4:30 p.m.1 2

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

  • General Hasnan Habib, Aide to General Sumitro, Government of Indonesia
  • Brigadier General Nichlani Soedardjo, Military Attache, Embassy of Indonesia
  • Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. John A. Froebe, Jr., Staff Member NSC

DATE, TIME, PLACE: May 15, 1973, 4:30 p. m., General Scowcroft’s Office

SUBJECT: Military Assistance, Indochina, Sino-Soviet Conflict, Watergate

General Scowcroft began by noting Mr. Kissinger’s regrets that he could not meet with General Habib himself, since he was leaving for Paris tomorrow.

Special Channel Between the President and President Suharto

General Habib, reviewing the background of the special channel, said that it had been in existence for several years. He noted that on each of his visits to Washington he had met with Mr. Kissinger in order to convey greetings from President Suharto to President Nixon and from General Sumitro to Mr. Kissinger. General Sumitro, because of his new duties, now finds it difficult to visit Washington with the frequency that he used to. General Habib said that President Suharto wants to preserve this special channel in order to avoid surprises. Also, in President Suharto’s view, the special channel is a natural consequence of the special relationship that exists between himself and President Nixon. General Habib noted his Government’s desire to keep this channel secret, and said that on their side even Ambassador Thajeb is not aware of its existence—that in the Embassy here only General Nichlani is so aware.

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Request for Three More Destroyer Escorts

General Habib said that he wanted to present a personal letter from President Suharto to President Nixon concerning U.S. military assistance to Indonesia. He said that the role of Indonesia’s Navy had now become more important than before—it must prevent encroachments by foreign fishermen on Indonesian fishing grounds and control smuggling. He said that the present condition of the Indonesian Navy is such that if it does not receive additional attention it will soon be down to only 14 ships. The goal that has been decided upon is 54 vessels—as opposed to the present 89 with the backbone of the new Navy being speedy patrol boats and one division of destroyer escorts. The destroyer escorts are to number 4 and are to have a dual role: patrolling and the maintenance of basic seamanship skills in the Navy to provide a core for its possible future expansion.

Therefore, President Suharto in his letter to President Nixon has asked for three more destroyer escorts—which would be in addition to the one the U.S. has already agreed to provide.

General Habib noted that the Australians have also been helpful in the modernization of Indonesia’s Navy: Australia has now agreed to provide six patrol boats. For its own part, Indonesia plans to devote significant budgetary resources of its own to this project. General Habib said his Government is of course aware of the constraints on U.S. resources as regards military assistance.

General Scowcroft said that the Administration was very sympathetic to Indonesia’s needs on this score, and would do its very best to be responsive. He noted that Congress has placed severe limitations on U.S. military assistance programs, and that the Administration had to stay within these bounds.

Indochina

Taking out his list of other questions, General Habib asked about the prospects for the coming Paris talks, noting Indonesia’s concern over the Indochina situation particularly in light of its own participation in the ICCS. General Scowcroft expressed the Administration’s profound gratitude for Indonesia’s participation in the ICCS. He said that the U.S. hoped that the ICCS would become increasingly effective in helping enforce the Vietnam settlement. He also noted that in this connection the U.S. has made representations to Poland and Hungary, and that we are hopeful that Canada will remain a member of the body. In the U.S. view, he said, the ICCS is critical to meaningful implementation of the Vietnam Agreement.

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Addressing the question of enforcement of the Agreement, he said that the U.S. definitely did not sign the Agreement only to have it disregarded. The U.S. views most seriously Hanoi’s violations of the settlement, especially as concerns its use of Laos and Cambodia to resupply its forces in South Vietnam and to infiltrate new personnel there.

General Scowcroft said that Mr. Kissinger was meeting with Le Duc Tho in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the Agreement. Mr. Kissinger would make clear that the current situation is intolerable. He said, however, that he thought it premature to speculate on the outcome of the meeting. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that the serious violations of the Agreement that are occurring must end so that the two sides can get on with the problems of reconciliation.

General Habib asked how the questions of Laos and Cambodia might be treated in the talks. General Scowcroft said that we would concentrate on trying to find ways to get the other side to observe Articles 7 and 20, rather than focusing on the conclusion of a supplementary agreement. We believe that if we can get North Vietnam to agree to withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia, the prospects for these two countries will be very substantially improved.

General Habib asked if the ICCS would be a primary instrument in the effort. General Scowcroft replied that it would, along with the Two Party Commission General Habib asked if it would be the job of the ICCS to verify the force withdrawals from Laos and Cambodia. General Scowcroft said that the U.S. thought this should be the job of the old ICC, and in response to General Habib’s question said that we were hopeful that the ICC would be capable of doing this if it would be willing to reactivate itself. General Habib asked how the U.S. visualizes the smooth coordination of the efforts of the ICCS and the ICC. General Scowcroft said he did not think this would be a particular problem since they have separate roles—the ICCS being concerned with South Vietnam, while the ICC focuses on Laos and Cambodia.

General Habib noted that Thailand continues to see North Vietnam as a substantial threat to its security, while Hanoi sees U.S. bases in Thailand as a definite threat to its security; General Habib wondered about the possibility for eliminating these threats from both sides. General Scowcroft replied that basic movement on this question depended on Hanoi’s showing better intentions. If Hanoi did so then the U.S. would be willing to consider reciprocal actions.

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General Habib asked about the possibility of holding general elections in South Vietnam. General Scowcroft said that this would depend on agreement between the two Vietnamese parties. President Thieu for his part had said that he was willing to go ahead with these elections. The PRG, however, has not been so inclined, and probably would not be in the near future; General Habib said that in general he agreed with this appraisal, and asked if this question would be taken up in the Paris talks. General Scowcroft said it would, as well as in the National Committee of Reconciliation and Concord when that body begins functioning. Most basically, General Scowcroft said, the U.S. is seeking nothing less than full implementation of the Vietnam Agreement.

General Habib asked if the same basic approach that was used in arriving at the settlement in Vietnam, including the question of elections and commissions, could be applied in the case of Cambodia and Laos. General Scowcroft replied that we saw the two problems as somewhat different. In Laos, the cease-fire already exists and the two sides are negotiating. In Cambodia, the problem is whom the Government in Phnom Penh can negotiate with on the other side. Lon Nol, who has committed himself to negotiations, is having considerable difficulty in finding a forum in which to negotiate a cease-fire. General Scowcroft said that in general we saw the Cambodian situation as being considerably more nebulous than that in Laos. General Habib asked the U.S. attitude toward bringing Lon Nol and Sihanouk into negotiations with each other. General Scowcroft said that if the conflicting parties were willing to engage in discussions, the U.S. would be willing to support such discussions. The problem is that we have not yet reached such a situation.

General Habib asked about the possibilities of the U.S. working with the PRC toward this end. General Scowcroft replied that the U.S. is willing to work with and through all who are interested in achieving a settlement in Cambodia. He said that the U.S. is presently working quietly to try to bring the two parties together, but so far the principal obstacle has been Sihanouk’s refusal to sit down for discussions. General Scowcroft said that in general the U.S. would be willing to embrace whatever device might be useful toward the achievement of a settlement in Cambodia.

General Habib asked whether the U.S. had any particular preferences as to the future of Vietnam—a unified Vietnam or two Vietnams, an anti-Communist Vietnam or a Vietnam characterized by a special brand of Communism such as that in Yugoslavia. General Scowcroft said that the overriding U.S. interest was that the people of Vietnam decide their own political forms. The U.S. would accept whatever decision they come to. What the U.S. fundamentally opposes is a solution which might be imposed on one party by another through force of arms.

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General Habib asked what influence the PRC and Soviet Union have on Hanoi. General Scowcroft said that Hanoi was of course dependent on both the PRC and the Soviets for much of its military equipment. However, the Soviet and PRC goals could not be assumed to be the same, and it therefore could not be said that Peking and Moscow exercise control over Hanoi.

Sino-Soviet Conflict

Raising the question of the on-going Sino-Soviet conflict, General Habib asked for General Scowcroft’s estimate of the chances of a border flare-up, given recent increases in tension along their common border. General Scowcroft replied that any answer to this question would be highly speculative, and that indeed it was extremely difficult to say what these two nations’ basic goals might be. He noted that some such as Joseph Alsop speculate that the Soviet Union would make a pre-emptive attack on the PRC. General Scowcroft said that he saw possible dangers in such speculation, and that personally he did not believe that the Sino-Soviet tensions are any worse now than they have been in the past few years.

General Habib asked if there was anything that the U.S. might do to calm this situation. General Scowcroft said that the U.S. has no interest in a conflict between Peking and Moscow. Whenever we think it useful, we make clear to each that we want to avoid a conflict between them. General Habib noted that the continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict constituted a threat to the U.S. efforts to enhance chances for peace and stability. General Scowcroft emphasized that the U.S. is not trying to play Moscow and Peking off against each other. What we are trying to do is work with each to improve the chance for peace. Hopefully, they will be able to keep their conflict within reasonable bounds.

General Habib wondered whether General Scowcroft thought Japan might become involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict. General Scowcroft commented that Japan has no military capability to do so. He added that, at the same time, Japan obviously has an interest in Sino-Soviet relations, given its status as a major world power. General Habib said that he had heard in Japan from certain intellectuals that Japan should have a larger political role in the world and asked whether the U.S. would support a United Nations Security Council seat for Japan. General Scowcroft said that he had no clear answer to give at this point.

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Watergate

General Habib asked if the Watergate affair was likely to have an impact on U.S. foreign policy. General Scowcroft said that he had not been able to detect any so far, but that what the future holds is difficult to say. The Watergate problem might affect the Administration’s ability to get foreign affairs legislation through the Congress.

General Habib asked if General Scowcroft had any comment on the recent agreement between Moscow and West Germany on a pipeline. General Scowcroft said that he was not aware of this particular project.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 533, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in Scowcroft’s office. John Froebe gave Scowcroft’s talking points, May 15, which began, “You have agreed to meet with General Hasnan Habib, aide to General Sumitro(the number three man in Indonesia), today at 4:30 p.m. As you know, General Sumitro maintains contact with Dr. Kissinger as the special channel of communication between President Suharto and the President.” (Ibid.)
  2. Scowcroft and Hasnan Habib discussed intergovernmental communication, military assistance, Indochina, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and Watergate.