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  4. Document 96

96. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 24, 1973, 1405–1430.1 2

Washington, April 24, 1973, 1405–1430

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Home Leave Consultation Call by Ambassador Galbraith (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

  • Defense
  • Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger - ASD/ISA, Acting
  • Mr. Dennis J. Doolin - DASD/ISA/EAPA
  • Captain R. A. Shaid - Desk Officer/ISA/EAPR
  • State
  • Francis J. Galbraith - U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
  • Mr. William Grant - Desk Officer

Time: 1405-1430, 24 April 1973
Place: Mr. Eagleburger’s Office, Pentagon

(S) Mr. Eagleburger opened the discussion by asking Ambassador Galbraith for his views on the U.S.-Indonesian Law of the Sea (LOS) issue. Ambassador Galbraith replied that this particular issue was the only thing he sees on the horizon where the U.S. and Indonesia might be on a collision course. Various other areas of interest have associated problems to contend with, but represent basically compatible interests on both sides. He went on to reflect that the Indonesians prefer much more loosely worded statements or agreements, under which they can bend a little one way or the other, but run into trouble when forced into “chiseling principles in rock,” as U.S. legal minds are wont to do. The Ambassador commented that the LOS issue will definitely be a problem unless we can find a better formula vis-a-vis the Indonesians, or some suitable compromise. He expressed a wish that we could just leave the issue alone, and just continue to provide telephonic notice slightly in advance of U.S. ship transits through [Page 2] the archipelago. Moreover, he added, the GOI welcomes our ship transits, it complements Indonesia’s own limited surveillance effort, particularly when the U.S. is trailing or watching third country (communist/insurgent) ship/craft movements. ..General Sumitro has expressed GOI desire for U.S. ships to continue tracking and surveillance on into Indonesian waters when required. Mr. Eagleburger commented that any exception for Indonesia would cause serious problems elsewhere in dealing with the many other countries which support the archipelago concept.

(S) Mr. Eagleburger asked how the MAP program was coming along. The Ambassador replied that things were “OK so far,” that the GOI was understanding relative to our problems with Congress (program dollar levels/authorizations). He reflected that President Suharto doesn’t want to complain too much and cause problems for President Nixon, since he knows that President Nixon wants to help as much as he can.

(S) The Ambassador commented on a problem of MAP equipment deliveries, and how we often delivered piecemeal (mortars without baseplates which arrive months later, training ammunition which arrived two years after the related weapons were delivered). He recommended that deliveries come in a complete package when feasible, and suggested that a “watchdog” arrangement in DOD would be helpful toward that purpose. The Ambassador noted the Indonesians have complained that only about 20% of the equipment promised (funded under MAP) has been delivered thus far. He considers our program for the GOI to be a relatively small program, and that it would seem that we ought to be able to do better on implementation. Mr. Doolin and Mr. Eagleburger both indicated that ISA would look into the situation. (Comment: Captain Shaid will coordinate a letter response for Mr. Eagleburger’s signature, to inform the Ambassador on the status of undelivered MAP balances and whether the situation related thereto can be improved.)

(S) The Ambassador reflected on the positive effects of the provision of excess defense articles, the T-33 jet trainer aircraft and H-34 helicopters, and added that future transfer of excess trucks in relatively good condition for use by the National Police would also have a positive effect. With regard to allocation of additional (three Claud Jones class) DE’s which the Indonesians want, he supported a sale to GOI when available, but preferred spacing the allocation thereof at intervals of about one per year. He wants to insure that the DE’s can be effectively assimilated in the face of limited Indonesia budget support and maintenance capabilities. He noted that with the addition of these kind of items, the Indonesians would not be “so rigid on figures” (specific grant levels).

(S) Captain Shaid suggested that the Ambassador table his views on Embassy-Defense Liaison Group (DLG) relations, which he had aired with Vice Admiral Peet during the preceding call. Ambassador Galbraith stated that if the Ambassador is to be the President’s representative, then he must know what is going on, and that he had found his greatest difficulty (in Indonesia) to be on the military (DLG) side of the house. He added that his comments [Page 3] included relations with the Defense Attaches/DIA on occasion. He continued that he did not care who took the lead with regard to implementation of the MAP program, that the important matter was to get the job done right. As the Ambassador, he considered it his job to coordinate and direct all efforts of the USG in Indonesia. If communications to the DLG do not inform the Embassy, or if communications from the DLG are not coordinated with the Embassy, then such actions undermine his capability to exercise judgment, which is why he has been placed there. He emphasized the need for effective, open exchanges of communications between those concerned—State, DOD, CINCPAC, the Embassy and the DLG.

(C) Mr. Eagleburger stated the intent of Defense is to keep the Ambassador fully informed, but that it was not possible to go so far as to direct the DLG to coordinate all traffic with the Embassy, due to the terms of reference problems. He indicated that we would do all we can here in Washington to be responsive, and suggested that the Ambassador make his views known to Admiral Gayler when he passes through Hawaii on the way back to Jakarta. The Ambassador stated that he already had planned to be in Hawaii for a forthcoming political-military conference.

(C) The call was concluded with Mr. Eagleburger’s departure for another meeting. While Captain Shaid was waiting with the Ambassador for his transportation to arrive, he asked the Ambassador if a visit by COMSEVENTHFLT aboard his flagship might be well received in Indonesia. the Ambassador replied there would be no objection to such a visit if it came at a suitable time, as outlined in recent message traffic (maximum of one ship visit every six months to Jakarta, same for Surabaya; overall maximum of one visit per quarter to Indonesia). He also agreed that COMSEVENTHFLT’s visit should probably be after Admiral Sudomo is relieved by the new GOI Navy Chief of Staff, and that Jakarta would be the better port for the visit.

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by:
Captain R.A. Shaid, USN

Approved by:
[signed] The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA/EAPA)

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–117, Indonesia, 333, 1973, May 2. Secret. Drafted by Shaid and approved by Doolin. The conversation took place in Eagleburger’s office. Eagleburger’s talking points for the meeting are ibid. On April 25, Kissinger disapproved a recommendation that he meet with Galbraith. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, April 23; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Far East, Box 533, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–)↩
  2. Eagleburger and Galbraith discussed U.S. relations with Indonesia.↩