Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

7. Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 15, 1974.¹ ²

Washington, January 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

January 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W.R. Smyser [WRS initialed]

SUBJECT: Domestic Dissent in Asia and U.S. Policy

We must recognize that the recent increase in domestic tension that has developed in South Korea will not be the only instance of that kind in Asia during the coming year.

Similar crises can occur at any time in at least four different countries:

• —In Thailand, where the present centrist caretaker government may be unable to find a path to constitutionalism that will be acceptable to the military on the one hand and to the students and their supporters on the other. If elections are held within the next three months as promised, the resulting government is likely to be more responsive to student and intellectual pressures — which could sharpen its problems with the Thai military leadership and perhaps even lead to a coup.
• —In Indonesia, where the small but growing student protest that began late last year against official corruption, government shortcomings in economic development, and foreign investment (particularly Japanese) poses the first significant protest movement that the Suharto Government has had to face.
• —In the Philippines, where President Marcos’ disorganized opposition has recently begun a more earnest effort to mount effective pressure against his political controls.
• —In South Vietnam, where President Thieu is about to ask for a constitutional amendment permitting him to run again. You know what the reaction will be, here and in Vietnam.

We are supplying aid to all these governments, and the opposition is well aware of how to make an impact among sympathetic American journalists as well as on the Hill. We could have some problems this spring, when all the school terms begin again in Asia and when the opposition figures begin granting interviews and staging various forms of protest.

As I noted in my memo of last week regarding Korea, I understand that the President and you believe we must maintain our distance from these domestic disputes, even though we will pay a certain price.

The EA bureaucracy, however, often still wants and tries to instruct its posts, whenever such incidents occur, to go in and give advice to our allies, usually put in terms of western political value judgments — whether or not that advice is sound. They do this partly out of honest sentiment and partly because it enables them to tell our press and our Congress that they are doing their best to promote progress toward democracy. If they do it on any single case, it will be harder to dissuade them on others.

We can try to control these pressures from here, if you wish to do so. We can stop cables and try to get a deeper understanding of your reservations about involvement in other nations’ domestic affairs. But it would also be helpful if you could either talk to Mr. Ingersoll about this yourself or ask me to talk to him about it. Our approach would be more consistent if the relevant EA offices know what you want in advance.

Options

1. That you authorize us to continue blocking State messages that lead to our involvement in the domestic problems of our allies in Asia.
Approve
Disapprove

2. That you authorize me to discuss this with Mr. Ingersoll along the above lines.
Approve
Disapprove

3. That you speak to Mr. Ingersoll yourself (we can give you talking points, if you wish).
Approve
Disapprove

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1338, Unfiled Material, 1974, 5 of 9. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Kissinger did not approve or disapprove any of the recommendations on the last page but, near the top of the first page, Scowcroft wrote, “HAK has seen. Just watch the outgoing traffic carefully.”
2. Smyser warned of the likelihood of domestic dissent in numerous Asian countries and of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs’ tendency to meddle in such situations.