Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

6. Memorandum From Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Washington, September 27, 1973.¹ ²

Washington, September 27, 1973

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Korea/Far East Trip Report, 7-19 September 1973 (U)

INTRODUCTION

At your direction, I led the U.S. delegation to the 6th annual meeting of the U.S.-Korea Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held at Seoul on 12-13 September, During the four days in Korea, I met privately with President Park, Prime Minister Kim, Minister of Defense Yu, and other key Korean and U.S. civilian and military officials. On our way out to Seoul, we spent a day in Hawaii for detailed discussions at CINCPAC relevant to the SCM and the other countries to be visited. Upon conclusion of the SCM, I directed Bob Hill to proceed to Taiwan for a two-day visit with key Nationalist Chinese officials, inasmuch as ranking DOD visits to Nationalist China have been few and far between of late.

While in Bangkok, I had important, long-range discussions with Prime Minister Thanom, members of the U.S. Mission, General Vogt and his key people in USSAG, and the staff at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center. During my day up country in Thailand, Dennis Doolin visited Cambodia for discussions with U.S. Embassy and GKR/FANK officials. We next visited Okinawa for a helicopter overflight of the facilities on the island, and then proceeded to Tokyo for two days of discussions with U.S. and GOJ officials, and concluded the trip with a wrap-up session at CINCPAC.

I will keep this report short and touch upon only the most important aspects of each stop. I reported to you by cable on 14 September the results of the US/Korea SCM and will not cover that ground again in this memo. My observations and recommendations concerning each of the countries visited are enumerated below.

In brief, I consider the trip to have been timely and worthwhile. In both the SCM in Seoul and my meeting with Prime Minister Thanom in Bangkok, I believe that we raised the dialogue to a new level of candor, in that we clearly told the leaders of both these nations what we can do, what we can’t do, and why. I believe that officials at the highest level of both governments have a better appreciation of the realities that we face in the U.S., a better understanding of what the Nixon Doctrine really means, and I came away feeling that relations with our Asian friends are on the way to becoming a partnership in fact as well as in name.

KOREA

In my private meeting with President Park, it was quite clear that he understands the Congressional pressure facing our Security Assistance legislation. He told me he knows that if Congress cuts the funds, there is nothing that can be done about it and that the job then is to look for alternative ways to complete the original plan. However, it was equally clear that this appreciation of U.S. realities was not present (or, at least, not evident) at the ROK General Staff level. For this reason, my remarks at the three formal meetings of the SCM were candid and to the point, and I attempted to leave them with no sense of illusion that somehow the “White Knight” would miraculously ride in to save the situation and complete the Modernization Plan as originally envisioned. They got the message, and I am convinced that by telling it straight, we have assisted both President Park and Minister Yu in dealing with the ROK General Staff. The U.S. MAAG Staffs in Korea and their ROK counterparts are now going to sit down and reassess the MOD Plan on the basis of a realistic hierarchy of priorities vis-a-vis scarce MAP dollars. Minister Yu and I parted on the best of terms, and our Ambassador, Phil Habib, said that the meeting will permit future Embassy and MAAG dealing with the ROKG to be conducted on a much more realistic basis. Phil is an outstanding representative of President Nixon. His obvious rapport with, and access to, President Park is quite evident.

I have prepared detailed Memoranda of Conversation for each of my calls in Korea, Thailand, and Japan. They are available, as well as Bob Hill’s and Dennis Doolin’s individual reports on Taiwan and Cambodia. You should read the MemCon of my meeting with President Park. He is deeply suspicious of Japan’s military intentions.

THAILAND

On September, I met for 90 minutes with Prime Minister Thanom, Air Chief Marshall Dawee, and Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai. As in Korea, in response to Thanom’s attempt to reopen discussion of the military equipment “wish-list” that he gave to the Vice President last February, I replied that I had already seen and studied the list, but that I had no authority to make any commitments until the second quarter FY74 CRA level for military assistance is resolved by the Congress. Several other feeble probes were made, but they were essentially pro forma and indicated that Thanom, like President Park, knows the Congressional score. (Incidentally, I think his understanding has been aided by the excellent reporting of his Ambassador in Washington, Mister Anand.)

Of immediate relevance was the clear statement by the Prime Minister that he is not pressing for additional substantial U.S. redeployments from Thailand in the immediate months ahead. I put the question to him directly, and he replied, “We never put a deadline on this. We discuss it among ourselves with regard to U.S. units that are not being utilized. When real peace comes to this area, the problem will solve itself (i.e., U.S. troops will no longer be needed). It depends on the situation at the time.” (See MemCon.) This is not to say that future reductions are not desirable—they are—but the heat that has been portrayed in Ambassador Unger’s cables just isn’t there, as far as the Prime Minister is concerned. Moreover, it was good that Dawee and Chartchai attended the meeting because they are two of the major proponents of a faster U.S. drawdown in Thailand. Chartchai is presently in New York and scheduled to meet with Dr. Kissinger, and I strongly suggested that he discuss future U.S. reductions in Thailand with Henry.

CAMBODIA

Dennis Doolin talked with our Mission in Phnom Penh (but not the Khmer) about our MAP problems and the second quarter CRA. Doolin reports the unanimous belief on the part of our Mission that the GKR will make it through the rainy season. The Mission also believes that they can make it through the next dry season and beyond, but whether they will or not depends upon a number of moves that must be taken, the most important of which is the conscription of additional manpower. In this regard, the GKR is making a grave mistake in proposing a mobilization decree that will affect only those males in the 25-35 age bracket. This is not a realistic conscription law, especially in a nation that is fighting for its very survival. Conscription should start at 18 years of age, and the Embassy is pressing daily for a revision of the draft legislation. If FANK does not get the necessary personnel, the question of survival is academic. If they do meet the personnel requirements, the GKR can survive. Whether it wi11 or not depends upon the one item that cannot be put into any military assistance program—the desire to prevail over the enemy.

[text not declassified]

While in Southeast Asia, I also reviewed EAGLE PULL. The plan is ready to be implemented on eight hours’ notice, and six hours is the scheduled time to withdraw approximately 600 people. Depending on the situation at the time, security forces will be available. The Mission in Phnom Penh has weekly meetings on the subject, and the Charge is fully satisfied with the State of readiness, as is General Vogt, who considers this contingency of the utmost importance.

TAIWAN

I asked Bob Hill to visit the ROC while I continued on to Thailand and that he provide his observations and impressions of the situation there. Bob reports that the general attitude in Taiwan on international security relations in the East Asian and the Pacific area is cautious but confident. GRC officials foresee the continued psychological and political requirement for a visible U.S. military presence throughout the area to be the best deterrence against aggression in the years ahead. In discussions with General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the General Staff, Bob reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty and our resolve to maintain close relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In reply, General Lai and Premier Chiang Kai-shek stated that the Republic of China was optimistic and that economic trade, and foreign investments projections into the future were very bright. Bob met on two occasions for a total of three hours with Premier Chiang Kai-shek. The Premier said that his country will remain resolutely anti-communist, will never abandon its basic principles and accommodate with Peking. The ROC will remain a faithful ally of the U.S. The Premier also said that his government was considering sending high-level representatives to Washington to discuss security relations, and that he hoped that the GRC would not be excluded from future U.S. policy moves vis-a-vis Peking.

JAPAN

Bob Hill rejoined the party on Okinawa where we stopped for a 90-minute helicopter flight over our various facilities. On that island is the most bewildering and strewn-about hodgepodge of installations imaginable. It is no wonder that the Okinawans, as well as the GOJ, are pressing for meaningful consolidations of our holdings there. Our present posture on the island is indefensible politically as well as cost-wise, and I am convinced that if these conso1idations and relocations are not effected soon, our position on the southern part of the island could become untenable within a few years.

During a brief but intensive stay in Tokyo, I met with Foreign Minister Ohira and his key aides as well as the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency, Mr. Yamanaka. I also had detailed discussions with Ambassador Ingersoll and his staff, as well as Lt. General Pursley and his key component officers. I sensed a stronger sense of confidence on the part of the Tanaka government than was the case four or five months ago. The mood is also prevalent in Japan that the East-West detente is taking hold and will continue to progress. At the same time, however, the Japanese are keenly interested and concerned with regard to future U.S. troop levels in Asia, especially in Korea. I believe that the future of our base structure in the Home Islands over the next few years is good, provided that we rationalize this structure by further effective consolidations and relocations. The Japanese are keenly interested in joint participation with the U.S. in the Siberian oil venture.

Mr. Yamanaka also recounted his recent meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, at which Kim commented negatively on the quality of U.S. material assistance received under the MOD Plan. Yamanaka also evinced concern with regard to U.S. intentions vis-a-vis Taiwan, which he referred to as an “isolated island outpost of the Free World.” I steered the conversation back to a discussion of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The Japanese also commented on the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping at some length. I told them that, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, the matter was not within my purview and, thus, I had not discussed it with Korean officials

As elsewhere, I stressed the theme of true partnership and mutuality as our relations develop. I made no specific request of the Japanese, other than that it is their specific responsibility to define what they mean by self-defense. The definition of this self-defense planning is of the utmost importance in our developing realistic joint defense planning with the Japanese. For their part, Mr. Yamanaka said that his government was determined that the homeporting of the USS Midway go smoothly and that we have no reason for concern in this regard.

Mr. Yamanaka is a blunt and abrasive fellow and, in attempting to be one of the boys, comes across like a bull in a China shop. He indicated that he wants to travel to Washington, official invitation or no.

CONCLUDING POINTS

Based upon my observations and conversations on this trip, I believe there are certain recommendations and actions that need to be followed up, as follows:

1. Our base posture in Okinawa must be realigned and consolidated as soon as possible. I understand that the consolidation plan prepared by Lt. General Pursley’s staff was forwarded to CINCPAC on 14 September. This study will require close review and prompt action.

2. The expertise and capabilities of our forces in Thailand are not being fully utilized. Thus, there should be a gradual step-up in the training of Thai forces on U.S.-used bases, culminating in a fully integrated training program (to include command and control).

3. As in the Korean case, described in my 14 September cable, there should be similar joint business ventures in Thailand related to in-country production of certain items of military equipment.

4. With regard to Cambodia, FANK training must be intensified before the dry season arrives in November and we must work to ensure that adequate manpower is available. Our Mission in Phnom Penh must not relax its pressure on the GKR to lower the draft age to eighteen, instead of twenty-five.

5. You should approve a Thai request for an additional squadron of OV-10’s which, subject to your concurrence, would be declared excess to USAF needs. The Thai already have two squadrons of OV-10’s, are utilizing them effectively, and have the maintenance skills to keep them operational. This additional squadron is necessary for both the support of ground forces and command and control.

6. In the future, we should be very cautious with regard to any future reduction of U.S. forces on Taiwan. As a contingency against the possible loss of vital base rights in both Okinawa and the Philippines at some future time, and its obvious impact upon the regional security interests of the U.S., the retention of a visible and meaningful U.S. presence on Taiwan should be considered.

In sum, it was a most rewarding trip—both for me and my staff—and, I believe, substantively, as the dialogue with Seoul and with Bangkok has moved to a more realistic plane. The support that I received from Bob Hill, Dennis Doolin, Bill Beecher, and the rest of the staff was truly excellent, and our embassies and military missions extended us every consideration. I strongly recommend that you visit Japan either later this year or early next year to give further evidence of our keen desire to move to this new level of meaningful partnership with our key allies.

Beill [signed]

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Korea 337, 27 Sep 73. Secret. The memorandum is stamped “Sec Def has seen. 29 Sep 1973.”
2. Clements reported on his trip to East Asia.