422. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, May 3, 1976.1 2
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
May 3, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT [initialed]
SUBJECT: Alternative Siting for Thailand Based Operations
The Problem
The Thai Government has given us until July 20 to remove our military and intelligence facilities from that country. An inter-departmental study has evaluated the need to continue these activities elsewhere and provided recommendations on possible relocation sites (Tab B).
Background
U.S. objectives in the negotiations which began last Fall with the Thai Government were to attempt to retain the following military and intelligence activities in Thailand:
[text not declassified]
- -- Chiang Mai Seismic Station (Detachment 415) [text not declassified]
- -- U-2R Operations, [text not declassified]
- -- P-3 Air Surveillance Patrols, which fly between Thailand and Diego Garcia and search the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits to identify the presence of naval combatants and merchant ships, particularly those of the Soviet Union.
- -- Ko Kha Spacetrack Facility, [text not declassified] During a December [Page 2] review of the Intelligence Community budget, you terminated funding for the Ko Kha facility beginning in FY 77, as an economy measure.
- — Utapao Airfield Facility, which supports U.S. aircraft transiting Thailand while re-supplying Diego Garcia and supporting other U.S. operations.
From November 1975 until March 20, 1976, our Embassy in Bangkok attempted to negotiate such a residual presence with the Royal Thai Government of Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot. Unfortunately, the discussions became deadlocked over the question of Thai jurisdiction over U.S. military forces. When this problem could not be resolved, the Khukrit government announced March 20 that all U.S. forces would have to withdraw from Thailand within four months (by July 20, 1976). The Thai did stipulate that we could retain 270 military spaces within our Military Advisory Group and our Defense Attache Office. On April 4, a new coalition government headed by the Democratic Party came to power in Thailand. While there seemed some prospect that this new government would reverse the Khukrit government’s decision, it now appears that it will allow the decision to stand.
Retention of Some Activities in Thailand
Both the Departments of State and Defense believe that despite the Thai decision to have all U.S. forces withdraw it may still be possible to obtain their agreement to allow us [text not declassified] to permit U.S. aircraft to transit Thai military airfields. The study recommends that we approach the new Thai Government to seek this agreement.
Alternative Sites
Air Operations
Should the Thai refuse us permission to use their airfields for our operations, the study recommends that we seek another transit point between the Philippines and Diego Garcia. While it would be possible to conduct both Diego Garcia support operations and P-3 patrols directly from the Philippines, technical considerations and risks make it preferable to have an intermediate transit point. But, even if the Thai should allow us to continue to use Utapao or another Thai airfield on a limited [Page 3] basis, the study recommends that we still attempt to find another location as a hedge against any future Thai decision to completely bar us from their country.
Australia and Cocos Island are geographically disadvantageous locations for flight operations. The political climate in Malaysia and Indonesia would probably not allow any favorable consideration of a U.S. request to operate from there. Only Singapore emerges as being a geographically and politically viable alternative to a base in Thailand. Lee Kuan Yew has indicated he wishes to move closer to us. Singapore’s existing air facilities have the capabilities to meet our immediate operational requirements. Its geographic location is convenient and its work force has the relatively high technological sophistication necessary to support and maintain our aircraft.
In approaching Singapore, the interagency study recognizes that Singapore may seek increases in our security assistance in response to our request. The study proposes that we attempt to remain within the bounds of Singapore’s current requests for security assistance. But it acknowledges that if we are unable to operate out of Thailand, an increase in our assistance would be justified as long as it did not unduly upset Singapore’s neighbors who are sensitive to Singapore’s growing military strength.
[text not declassified]
[Page 3]The study also recommends that we make no attempt to bring the U-2 program back to Thailand, because it has provided little information of current value.
Other Facilities
The interagency study also addresses the relocation of two other acti¬vities: the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and the SEATO Medical Lab. The mission of the JCRC is to conduct investigations of crash sites and grave sites to determine the fate of American men still unaccounted for in Indochina. The study points out that the recovery operations are not likely to resume in the foreseeable future but adds that the continuation of some form of recovery mechanism is politically important to the United States because it demonstrates that we are serious in our efforts to resolve this problem. The study therefore recommends that we attempt to retain in Thailand a small JCRC office within the 270 spaces allocated to our Defense Attache Office. The remaining JCRC personnel should be trans¬ferred back to the United States. Should the activity be forced to leave Thailand entirely the study recommends that we not attempt to relocate it in any other part of Southeast Asia but move it in toto back to the United States.
The SEATO Medical Lab conducts tropical disease research. If the Thai Government does not request that the medical laboratory remain in Thailand, the study recommends that it be disestablished.
Agency Positions
The Departments of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (Tabs C, D, and E all agree that we should adopt the policies which the study recommends.
I concur fully with the recommendations of the agencies involved. If you approve these policies, I will sign the National Security Decision Memoran¬dum at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize my signing the NSDM at Tab A.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
- Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–65, NSDMs, NSDM 329, U.S. Political Operations and Intelligence Activities Based in Thailand [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Umbra. Sent for Action. Ford initialed his approval of Tab A, not attached, which, once signed, became NSDM 329 (Document 423). Tab B, not attached, is the undated interagency paper prepared in response to NSSM 240, which the NSC staff sent out under a covering memorandum, April 21, from Davis to DOS, DOD, and CIA. (Ibid.) Tab C, attached, is a memorandum, April 24, from Springsteen to Scowcroft. Tab D, attached, is a memorandum, April 24, from Ellsworth to Scowcroft. Tab E, attached, is a memorandum, April 23, from Bush to Scowcroft.↩
- In response to NSSM 240, Scowcroft recommended that Ford approve a memorandum on alternative locations for US activities based in Thailand.↩