Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

386. Telegram 9350 From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, June 7, 1974, 1156Z.¹ ²

June 7, 1974, 1156Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
BANGKOK 9350

O 071156Z JUN 74

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3993

NODIS
FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

E.O. 11652: XGDS-IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
TAGS: MILI, EAID, TH
SUBJ: THE DILEMMA IN U.S.-THAI RELATIONS; CONTINUED DEMANDS BUT DWINDLING RESOURCES

1. I HAD HOPED TO MEET YOU IN WASHINGTON, BUT ONLY THE LAST DAY OF MY RECENT CONSULTATION COINCIDED WITH THE FIRST DAY OF YOUR RETURN FROM YOUR HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL FOUR WEEK MARATHON ON THE DAMASCUS-TEL AVIV SHUTTLE. CONGRATULATIONS! BECAUSE I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD BECOME PERSONALLY AWARE OF TRENDS POTENTIALLY ADVERSE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THAILAND, I AM SENDING THIS PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU IN THE HOPES THAT, DESPITE ITS NECESSARY LENGTH, YOU WILL READ IT BEFORE YOU TAKE OFF MONDAY ON YOUR NEXT JOURNEY. IN BRIEF, MY MESSAGE IS THAT YOUR PARIS ACCORDS COULD BECOME UNSTUCK IF THE THAIS BECOME DISENCHANTED WITH OUR LACKADAISICAL RESPONSE THEY PERCEIVE TO BE LEGITIMATE REQUESTS LEVIED ON THE U.S.

2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON I TALKED WITH WINSTON LORD, HAL SONNENFELDT, LARRY EAGLEBERGER AND BRENT SCOWCROFT IN YOUR IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE. IN ADDITION TO BOB INGERSOLL AND OTHERS IN EA, I TALKED TO JIM SCHLESINGER, THE JOINT CHIEFS AND OTHERS IN DOD AND COLBY AND HIS TOP EA CREW IN THE AGENCY. THE ONE IMPRESSION I TRIED TO CONVEY TO ALL THESE WORTHIES IS THAT THERE IS A SERIOUSLY WIDENING GAP BETWEEN WHAT THE PRESIDENT AND YOU WOULD LIKE US TO BE ABLE TO DO IN THAILAND AND THE MEANS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS MAKING AVAILABLE TO THE BANGKOK MISSION TO KEEP THE THAIS WITH US. MY MAIN TASK IS TO CONVINCE THE THAIS THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS THAILAND’S COOPERATION WITH US TO BE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH ON THE EXISTING U.S. VALUE SCALE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE GLOBE, TO JUSTIFY THEIR TOLERATING A STILL LARGE, FREQUENTLY IRRITATING AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY DISTURBING U.S. PRESENCE IN THEIR MIDST.

3. THIS GAP PROBLEM IS BECOMING ACUTE AT THE VERY TIME WHEN A DECENT GROUP OF POLITICALLY INEXPERIENCED CIVILIANS IS ATTEMPTING TO STEER THAILAND TOWARD DEVELOPING THEIR VERSION OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, WHILE BEING SUBJECTED TO CONSTANT CRITICAL BARRAGES FIRED BY A FREE (THE ONLY ONE IN A MAJOR EAST ASIA COUNTRY EXCEPT JAPAN) AND HIGHLY IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS. THE SENSITIVE SKINS OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL IN THAILAND ARE NOT SOOTHED BY THE FACT THAT MUCH PRESS AND STUDENT CRITICISM AGAINST THEM FOCUSES ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE “SPECIAL” ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN CAMERA WITH THE USG BY THE DEPOSED MILITARY LEADERS. MANY OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS NOW SEEM PREJUDICIAL TO THAI SOVEREIGNTY.

4. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA OF THE PRESENT THAI LEADERS (WHO THUS FAR HAVE REMAINED REMARKABLY FRIENDLY TOWARD US) IS ENHANCED BY SOME INEXCUSABLE GAFFES COMMITTED BY MANY ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION. THE OPERATING STYLE DEVELOPED IN THE PRE-OCTOBER 1973 ENVIRONMENT IN THAILAND WAS ONE WHICH OFFICIALLY BELIEVED THAT AMERICANS COULD DO NO WRONG. A RECENT NOTABLE EXAMPLE WAS THE SCHEDULING OF A NAVY P–3 DEPARTURE FOR AN INDIAN OCEAN RECCE FLIGHT AT THE TIME NEWSMEN WERE ASSEMBLED AT U-TAPAO TO REPORT THE INITIAL DEPARTURE OF B-52’S. THIS BLOOPER NECESSITATES ME, PURSUANT TO A STATE-DOD CABLETO REQUEST OFFICIAL THAI GOVERNMENT APPROVAL OF THESE FLIGHTS SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER THE THAI MFA HAD GONE ON PUBLIC RECORD THAT ALL U.S. FORCES WERE IN THAILAND SOLELY TO SUPPORT MUTUALLY-AGREED UPON OPERATIONS IN INDOCHINA. I NEED NOT OBSERVE THAT THIS IS NOT THE IDEAL MOMENT TO PRESENT THIS PARTICULAR REQUEST.

5. AS YOU ARE ALL WELL AWARE, THAILAND HAS BECOME THE MAIN RESIDUAL U.S. OPERATING BASE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IF THAILAND SHOULD THIS DAY END ITS PERMISSION FOR U.S. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES INTO LAOS AND CAMBODIA, OUR FRIENDS IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT IN LAOS WOULD COLLAPSE AND THE KHMER ROUGE WOULD TAKE OVER CAMBODIA. YOU PERSONALLY HAVE ENDORSED THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE U.S. AIR ARMADA, BASED ON ROYAL THAI AIR BASES, MAKES TOWARD THE DETERRENCE OF ANY FULL-SCALE RESUMPTION BY HANOI OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE COMPLETE WRECKAGE OF THE 1973 PARIS ACCORDS.

6. WHILE THE OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAILAND AND CONTINUING U.S. OPERATIONS IN INDOCHINA IS WELL KNOWN, THE BOOKKEEPING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. DIRECT SUPPORT COSTS IN THAILAND AND THE INDOCHINA COUNTRIES IS STUDIOUSLY IGNORED BY MOST AMERICANS IN RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS, BUT IS ACUTELY OBSERVED BY COMPARABLE THAI OFFICIALS. IN SIMPLE ARITHMETIC THAILAND HAS RECEIVED SOME $2 BILLION IN U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID SINCE 1951. THE INDOCHINA COUNTRIES RECEIVED OVER $135 BILLION. IN FY 1974 ALONE THE U.S. POURED OVER $1.2 BILLION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, $420 MILLION INTO CAMBODIA AND SOME $200 MILLION INTO LAOS—ALMOST AS MUCH AS THAILAND HAS GOTTEN IN 23 YEARS. OUR GRANT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THAILAND IN FY 74 WILL TOTAL ABOUT $45 MILLION (INCLUDING NAPCOTICS AND OTHER SPECIALIZED ITEMS). THUS THE INDISPENSABLE THAI BASES HAVE BEEN AND ARE BEING RETAINED AT BARGAIN PRICES.

7. THIS OBSERVATION PROVOKES OTHERS: TO WIT THAILAND HAS BEEN “SPARED THE SUFFERING OF WAR.” TO THIS THE THAI RESPOND, “WE OPENED UP OUR COUNTRY TO THE AMERICANS IN THE EARLY AND MID-SIXTIES BECAUSE THEY APPEARED TO BE ABLE TO DO WHAT THEY SET OUT TO DO. IN REALITY WE ARE WORSE OFF NOW AND OUR SECURITY WEAKER IN 1974 THAN IT WAS IN 1965. CAMBODIA IS ALMOST ENGULFED BY THE KHMER ROUGE: THE LAOTIAN COALITION IS FRAGILE—THE PATHET LAO APPEAR TO BE CALLING THE SHOTS, WHILE THE NVA ARE IN PLACE ALONG 100 MILES OF THE MEKONG BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND THAILAND. THROUGH THIS BORDER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BACK THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN NORTHEAST THAILAND AND THIS INSURGENCY GROWS STRONGER YEAR BY YEAR. AS TO THE TWO VIETNAMS, WHO CAN TELL? WE KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO US IF THE U.S. WITHDRAWS FROM THIS PART OF THE WORLD WITHOUT FIRST MAKING US STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE CARE OF OURSELVES.”

8. THE FOREGOING NOTWITHSTANDING, THAILAND IS TREATED AS A NORMAL DEVELOPING COUNTRY IN MOST AID PLANNING AND A MINOR ALLY IN MOST MAP PROGRAMMING. IN THE LAST TWO YEARS BOTH MAP AND ECONOMIC AID TO THAILAND HAVE DROPPED PRECIPITOUSLY. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, WE HAVE ALREADY RENEGED ON FIRM COMMITMENTS MADE ON BOTH PROGRAMS. MAP FUNDS DIVERTED ELSEWHERE HAVE REDUCED A “FIRM” COMMITMENT OF $35.7 MILLION TO $29.7 MILLION. THE 1974 AID PROGRAMMING AMOUNTED TO $6.4 MILLION SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE AND SOME $7 MILLION IN OTHER TYPES OF AID. PERHAPS YOU DO NOT KNOW THAT $2 MILLION OF THE SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE GRANTS PROMISED TO THAILAND HAVE BEEN LOPPED OFF TO PAY FOR THE OPERATING COSTS OF ICC’S IN VIETNAM.

9. I HESITATE TO RAISE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS OF AID PLEDGES MADE BY YOU TO EGYPT AND SYRIA. I RECOGNIZE THE ESSENTIALITY OF PEACE IN THAT REGION AND THE PRICES THAT MUST BE PAID TO ACHIEVE IT. YET, ON THE DAY THE BANGKOK NEWSPAPERS REPORTED YOUR PLEDGE THAT THE USG WOULD SEEK $250 MILLION ECONOMIC AID FOR EGYPT, I HAD LUNCH WITH THANAT KHOMAN—FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS THAILAND’S FOREIGN MINISTER AND CURRENTLY ADVISOR TO PRIME MINISTER SANYA ON FOREIGN POLICY. THANAT, WHO IS VERY INTELLIGENT, EXTREMELY WELL-INFORMED, AND AN ABRASIVE CRITIC OF MANY, BUT NOT ALL U.S. POLICIES, IS ONE OF THE VARIED THAI LEADERS I HAVE SOUGHT TO CULTIVATE. ON THE DAY ALLUDED TO, SHORTLY AFTER WE HAD EXCHANGED PLEASANTRIES, HE COMMENTED SARCASTICALLY, “AND WHAT HAS EGYPT DONE FOR YOU RECENTLY?” SOON I WILL HEAR, “AND WHAT HAS SYRIA DONE FOR YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR?”

10. I NEED NOT TELL YOU THAT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A PEARL WORTH ALMOST ANY PRICE—BUT YOU KNOW THAT THE WORLD IS ROUND AND THAT MOST OF THE TOP PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENTS EVERYWHERE CAN READ AND WRITE AND ADD AND SUBTRACT. THEY KNOW WHAT WE ARE DOING FOR SOME NATIONS AND THEY KNOW THE RELATIVE WELL-BEING OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THEY SENSE SOME ROUGH CORRELATION BETWEEN OUR MONETARY COMMITMENTS AND OUR VALUE SCALE OF IMPORTANCE. THE THAIS ARE A PROUD PEOPLE; THEY BELIEVE THEY DESERVE BETTER TREATMENT FROM US BECAUSE THEY STUCK OUT THEIR NECKS SO FAR ON OUR SIDE OF THE INDOCHINA STRUGGLE. I HAVE ONLY READ NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF YOUR PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS ON THE AID BILL BUT I WONDER IF THAILAND RECEIVED ANY RECOGNITION FOR THE CONTRIBUTION THEY ARE MAKING VIA-A-VIS VIETNAM. THE THAI DO NOT WISH TO BE DEPENDENT UPON U.S.; A RECURRENT THEME IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESENT THAI LEADERS IS THEIR DESIRE TO REDUCE THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF OUR RELATIONS AND TO INCREASE THE CONOMIC PARTNERSHIP BY TRADE RATHER THAN BY ADDITIONAL AID; BUT WE NEED AT THE VERY LEAST TO KEEP AID AT THE LEVEL WE PROMISED THE THAI AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS FISCAL YEAR. THEY HAVE REQUESTED INCREASES IN TEXTILE AND SUGAR QUOTAS FOR THEIR EXPORTS INTO THE U.S. WE RECENTLY ACCORDED 2 MILLION SYE IN TEXTILES AND A SMALL (9,000 TON) INCREASE IN SUGAR. PERCENTAGE-WISE THE INCREASE SEEMED LARGE- 50PC, BUT SINCE THAILAND HAS ONLY RECENTLY BECOME A SUGAR EXPORTER SHE RANKS FAR DOWN THE QUOTA LIST IN THE AREA OF SWAZILAND.

11. THE OBVIOUS SOMETIMES NEEDS RESTATING—WE CANNOT NEGLECT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE PAST TO WIN THE GAINS OF THE PRESENT. IF WE DO, WE RISK LOSING MUCH. PARTICULARLY IS THIS TURE IN THAILAND. THE THAIS HAVE A REMARKABLE SKILL FOR SENSING CHANGE IN THE MANNER IN WHICH OTHER NATIONS RELATE TO THEM. IF THE THAI LEADERS ARE CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO THROW THEM ASIDE AS A USED TOOL—AND MANY OF THE ALREADY BELIEVE THIS—THEY WILL ASK US TO LEAVE, AND VERY UNCEREMONIOUSLY.

12. THE ISSUE REALLY COMES DOWN TO THIS, MR. SECRETARY. HOW MUCH DOES THE USG WANT IN THAILAND AND AT WHAT PRICE. WHY DON’T YOU AND YOUR POLICY PEOPLE PUT ON YOUR LONG-RANGE PLANNING HATS AND TELL ME? AND GIVE THE SAME WORD TO OTHER WASHINGTON AGENCIES. TO PARAPHRASE THE OLD AIR FORCE SLOGAN, THE IMPOSSIBLE I CAN DO RATHER EASILY, BUT MIRACLES REQUIRE A LITTLE WHEREWITHAL. KINTNER

1. Source: Library of Congress, Henry Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Container CL 238, Thailand, 1974–1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. An unknown person marked up the telegram and sent an attached note about it to Eagleburger: “LSE A rough message which you should read. Kintner’s pulled out all the stops—and in the process overstated his case. One point—a key one—he seems to forget: our expenditures in Indochina are as much in Thailand’s interest as they are in our own. Kintner does make a valid point, however: can’t we do something more for the Thais on such aspects as sugar quotas, textiles, etc.?”
2. Kintner complained about U.S. policy toward Thailand.