Office of the Historian

385. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 24, 1974, 10:30–11 a.m.1 2

Washington, May 24, 1974, 10:30–11 a.m.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

In reply refer to: I-22720/74

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Thailand Matters (U)

Participants:
Visitors
US Ambassador to Thailand - William R. Kintner
Director, Thailand & Burma Affairs, Department of State - John B. Dexter
DOD
Secretary of Defense - James R. Schlesinger
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency - VADM Ray Peet
Director, East Asia & Pacific Region, ISA - RADM Thomas J. Bigley
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense - Maj Gen John A, Wickham, Jr.
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense - Brig Gen Robert C. Taylor
Assistant for Thailand & SEATO, ISA - John H. Kelly

Time: 1030 - 1100, 24 May 1974.
Place: Secretary Schlesinger’s Office, Pentagon

I. (C) Military Assistance

Ambassador Kintner observed that in a time of declining MAP levels, the Thai are becoming uncertain as to how much they can rely on the USG. SecDef responded that it is important that the Thai understand the limits which the Congress has set on the military assistance program. Unfortunately, it may be difficult to attain the figure of $35 million in grant aid which had been established for Thailand during FY74. Ambassador Kintner said that a reduction below the figure of $35 million could have serious repercussions since the Thai Armed Forces are our strongest allies in defending the use of Thai territory by US forces. SecDef said that there is little prospect for relief from Cambodian are Middle Eastern requirements for larger shares of the military assistance program. Ambassador Kintner noted that Thailand is our main base of operations in Southeast Asia. The Thai have received some $2 billion since the inception of the military and economic assistance programs. Yet they look elsewhere and see that South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are receiving much larger amounts. SecDef responded that surely the Thai cannot envy the situation in which the Cambodians find themselves. [Page 2] Ambassador Kintner said that if we intend to maintain US forces over the longer term, we will have to be prepared to pay for base rights. SecDef asked how much of a MAP level would be required. Ambassador Kintner replied that the sum has not been identified but it would be sizable. Ambassador Kintner continued that he hoped the US could compensate for declining MAP levels by transfer of excess defense articles (EDA). VADM Peet pointed out that there are statutory constraints on EDA transfers. SecDef asked if FMS credits are a possible solution in the Thai context. Ambassador Kintner answered that the Thai have not heretofore availed themselves of available FMS credit. He doubted that they would use significant amounts.

2. (C) Reductions in US Forces

SecDef inquired whether the RTG is satisfied with the announced reductions which will result in a level of 27,000 authorized military manpower spaces in Thailand by the end this calendar year. Ambassador Kintner said that the RTG is generally satisfied with this reduction. The RTG will seek additional reductions next ear at about this time. By 1976 the US should be prepared to consolidate its remaining presence at the U-Tapao/Sattahip complex. SecDef agreed that it is important to reduce the US military presence in the Bangkok metropolitan area where it is politically very visible. Ambassador Kintner stated that once the USG has decided on its desired long-term presence, the proposal must be put to the RTG. Whether or not the current interim government would be prepared to address the long-term question is doubtful. Ambassador Kintner added that it is important to maintain evenly spaced withdrawals during this calendar year so that the Thai public will feel that this is an on-going process. SecDef noted that Congressional considerations require us to demonstrate our willingness to reduce significant numbers of US forces. The alternative is legislatively mandated reductions. The late March announcement of a reduction of 10,000 spaces from Thai land was helpful in alleviating pressure from the Hill for legislated reductions.

3. (S) Indian Ocean Surveillance

Ambassador Kintner stated that USN P–3 operations out of U-Tapao into the Indian Ocean surfaced last meek in the Thai press. This is a matter of concern, as a Foreign Ministry spokesman has stated that all US forces in Thailand were authorized only in connection with the Indochina conflict. Ambassador Kintner felt that there will be difficulty in obtaining continued PTO acquiescence in the P–3 Indian Ocean flights. SecDef stated that over the long haul we need Indian Ocean surveillance by the P–3 aircraft. Surveillance levels may fluctuate, but we must retain the option to perform surveillance from U-Tapao when it is needed. Ambassador Kintner said that solid rationale for the flights is required in order to regularize these operations with the RTG. Over the long term, the RTG is betting on ASEAN as a substitute tor SEATO. This causes a basic ambivalence in Thai attitudes because ASEAN has generally emphasized the long-term benefits of neutralization of Southeast Asia. SecDef said that he hoped Ambassador Kintner would be successful in preserving the P–3 operations from U-Tapao.

[Page 3]

4. (C) OV–10 Aircraft

Ambassador Kintner said that It appeared that senior officials of the RTG still hoped to receive a squadron of OV–10 aircraft from among those OV–10’s which will be redeployed out of Thailand. VADM Peet pointed out that there are no excess of OV–10’s and that Congress would eye any such transfer with grave misgivings. Ambassador Kintner said that he would be discussing this issue with the Air Force in an attempt to convince the Air Force that it should reduce its requirements for OV–10’s by 16. SecDef said that he understood Ambassador Kintner’s position.

NOTE: On 24 May, DepSecDef signed a memorandum addressed to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs which discusses equipment and facilities in Thailand. The memorandum states inter alia that there are no OV–10 aircraft excess to USAF requirements.

Approved by:
[signed] Ray Peet
Date: 5/30/74

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by:
John H. Kelly

Distribution:
SecDef (1)
DepSecDef (1
OSD/CCS (1)
CJCS (I)
CSAF (1)
DSAA (1)
State Dept-EA/TB (1)
State Dept-PM (I)
Arab Kintner (1)
ASD/lSA (1)
R&C (ISA) (1)

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Thailand, 091.112, 30 May 1974. Secret. Drafter by Kelly and approved by Peet. Schlesinger’s talking points from Kelly, May 23, are ibid.↩
  2. Schlesinger and Kintner discussed military assistance to Thailand, U.S. force reductions, Indian Ocean Surveillance, and OV–10 Aircraft.↩