270. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul, August 27, 1975.1 2



  • President Park Chung Hee
  • Minister of Defense Suh Jyong-chul
  • ROK Chairman of JCS Ro Jae -hyun
  • Secretary General, Kim Chong-yom
  • Senior Protocol Secretary, Choi Kwan-soo
  • Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
  • Ambassador Richard L. Sneider
  • General Richard G. Stilwell
  • Chairman, JCS, General George S. Brown
  • CINCPAC, Admiral Noel A.M. Gaylen
  • Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Maj Gen John A. Wickham

TIME & PLACE: President Park’s Office, August 27, 1975

During the pre-lunch and luncheon conversation, three areas of particular interest were covered.



President Park discussed his concerns about the Japanese attitude toward Korea, particularly his fears about the leftward drift in the Japanese political scene when the younger generation takes over and the diminution of Japanese economic assistance to Korea. During the discussion, Secretary Schlesinger said that he proposed to discuss with Prime Minister Miki the need for greater Japanese economic assistance to Korea.



In the course of discussing recent Congressional visits to Korea, Secretary Schlesinger noted that President Park, as a result of these visits, must be aware of Congressional attitudes on human rights and the problems it has caused the Administration.



President Park described his rationale for acquisition of submarines. He said that, in order to deal with the North Korean submarine threat both during a period of conflict and to present infiltration and subversive efforts, he wished to acquire a comparable capability. He felt that, if the ROK had similar capability, North Korea would not utilize its submarines. Secretary Schlesinger suggested that there are probably more cost-effective ways for dealing with the North Korean submarine threat than purchasing or [Page 2] building submarines in the South. He mentioned use of P–3’s and sensors for the detection and if necessary destruction of the submarines. He also stressed the vulnerability of the North Korean ports to mining and other techniques to close these ports. It was agreed that the U.S. would provide experts to review the options available to deal with the North Korean submarine threat. In addition, the Secretary asked General Brown and Admiral Gayler to look into P–3 operations in the Korean area.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, Korea (11). Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation took place in President Park’s Office. The discussion occurred before and during lunch. Howard Graves, Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent this memcon to Scowcroft on September 9.
  2. Park and Schlesinger discussed Japan, human rights, and anti-submarine warfare.