269. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 12, 1975, 4 p.m.1 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: June 12, 1975
Time: 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: Korean and other Subjects
PARTICIPANTS:
- The Secretary
- The Deputy Secretary
- Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
- Robert Blake, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Relations
- Winston Lord, Director Policy Planning Staff
- Daniel O’Donohue, Country Director for Korea Affairs, Notetaker
Copies to: S; LPB; WH-Mr. Rodman; S/S
The Secretary: Phil, can you write your report in a way the President will understand it?
Mr. Habib: You have my report. We would have to do a separate report.
The Secretary: Don’t always argue with me. Do a report with the main themes and a few individual vignettes. Do it by tomorrow for my signature. I read your report. It is a good report.
Mr. Habib: First, we thought we would give you a report on the Korean Question and the UN. Bob, do you want to?
Mr. Blake: Tomorrow we are meeting with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to go over detailed planning for the UN. The first step is a letter to the Security Council —
[Page 02]The Secretary: Phil, can you tell me why the State Department is recommending that we cut military assistance to Korea? Schlesinger called me and said that State wants to cut $50 million from Korea’s aid. I want you to know my job is not to resolve disputes between the Agencies.
Mr. Habib: We asked for $176 million?
The Secretary: Defense wants $200 million.
The Deputy Secretary: Aren’t there special circumstances? Defense wants to spread the Cambodian Aid money over several countries.
The Secretary: Why wasn’t I given an opportunity to approve this? Why wasn’t I informed there were differences between State and Defense. There is a great skill in this Department in not bringing these matters to my attention.
The Deputy Secretary: We are considering increasing funds in Indonesia and the Philippines.
The Secretary: Even if every Bureau in this Department agrees, I may not want to agree. However, I am totally defenseless if I don’t know these issues. If Defense is willing to carry the ball, why can’t we agree to asking for more money?
The Deputy Secretary: The big problem is that we can’t get a bill through Congress.
The Secretary: I would like to hear the arguments for increasing aid.
Mr. Habib: We could add to the Indonesian and Thai programs.
The Secretary: I object to situations when the Bureaus agree but I don’t even know what is going on.
[Page 03]The Deputy Secretary: I thought that Carl had informed you of the figures.
The Secretary: I have to know what the issues are. They shouldn’t just run figures by me. I certainly did not know Defense disagreed.
The Deputy Secretary: We will look into this.
The Secretary: All right, but for bureaucratic reasons as well as policy I want to move our position closer to Defense.
Mr. Blake: We have general agreement with the Koreans on the letter. We hope to consult next week with the principal allies.
Mr. Habib: Tell the Secretary the principal elements of our letter.
Mr. Blake: First of all, we state our willingness to terminate the U.N. Command, subject to agreement by the other side, in January. Second, we indicate our readiness to reduce the U.N. Command profile.
The Secretary: Why reduce the profile before we terminate the Command?
Mr. Blake: To get votes in the United Nations.
The Secretary: Where would we reduce?
Phil, you can’t fall asleep in the Secretary’s office.
Mr. Lord: He woke up at 4 this morning.
The Secretary: Why did you get up then? Did you get in this morning?
Mr. Habib: No, I got in yesterday. With regard to the U.N. Command we plan to reduce the flags, and other manifestations of the UN presence.
[Page 04]The Secretary: Why?
Mr. Habib: You have the UN flag and other UN symbols flying over every base and used by every soldier in the country.
The Secretary: Who is the UN Commander?
Mr. Habib: General Stilwell.
The Secretary: Why do we have the separate military commands?
Mr. Habib: They need to trim the headquarters.
The Secretary: What is U.S. forces in Korea? Does it include the air force?
Mr. Habib Yes, the air force and the navy. 8th Army is the army headquarters and for logistics. The situation is not as bad now as it was. They have brought the two headquarters together. Last year — wasn’t it, Dan?
The Secretary: Where are the headquarters located?
Mr. Habib: Seoul. The air force headquarters is at Osan. The navy is divided between Chinhae and Seoul. The navy has no American ships but the American Commander runs the ROK navy.
The Secretary: If the UN Command goes, we won’t need that admiral in charge.
Mr. Habib: No, not necessarily so. If the UN Command goes, you can have another kind of structure to handle this.
Let’s presume North Koreans and Chinese agree to our proposal on UN Command termination — I don’t expect it — we would then have to work out another arrangement with the Koreans. We have started talking.
[Page 05]The Secretary: You don’t think the Chinese and North Koreans will agree?
Mr. Habib: No.
The Secretary: Why not?
Mr. Habib: The North Koreans will continue to press for the UN Command dissolution and U.S. forces withdrawal.
Mr. Lord: Peking has cooled the North Koreans down militarily but is strongly supporting their UN efforts.
Mr. Habib: By lowering our profile, we would gain votes.
The Secretary: How is New York going to turn out?
Mr. Habib: We have a tough fight on our hands. Remember the Cambodian issue where everyone thought we were going to lose the vote.
The Secretary: We lost the country.
Mr. Blake: The next step is inscription and priority of our item.
The Secretary: You better make clear to Moynihan that we want a bloody fight on this issue.
Mr. Blake: We have talked to him on this issue. He knows.
The Koreans agree with us on our approach — in fact, they are out in front of us.
Mr. Habib: They are willing to consider dismantling the UN Command to avoid a defeat.
The Secretary: This would be OK except for the US forces withdrawal part.
[Page 06]Mr. Habib: On that point we could clearly defeat a resolution against the U.S. forces if it was without the reference to the UN Command. I don’t think we would lose on that. It’s the UN part that makes it difficult.
Mr. Blake: I agree.
The Secretary: What would the Chinese and North Koreans do if we drop the UN Command?
Mr. Habib: They would continue to press for the US forces removal in New York but that is not the problem. I believe they would continue the Armistice Agreement tacitly, but interpret it to their purposes. For instance, they could make an argument that the Northwest Islands are within their territorial waters and, without the UN Command, their territory.
Mr. Lord: There is the Japanese base problem.
Mr. Habib: We would lose the bases. This is a straw-man. If the Japanese did not want us to use the bases, we could not use them anyhow.
Mr. Lord: I know, but they are under the UN umbrella. I don’t object but we should pin the Japanese down on this. We should talk to the Japanese.
Mr. Habib: We will, after we have talked to the Koreans.
The Secretary: You have discussed all this with the Koreans? What have I got to agree with?
Mr. Habib: You agreed with this approach.
The Secretary: Don’t give me that baloney. Do you think that I understand all of these issues?
Mr. Habib: Of course.
Mr. Lord: Phil, there is one difference — the January one termination date. That is new.
[Page 07]Mr. Blake: You are right.
The Secretary: The Koreans agree?
Mr. Habib: Yes.
Mr. Blake: Yes, but they are doubtful about the success of even what we propose. They are very pessimistic. If things don’t go well, we expect them to again propose we terminate the UN Command.
Mr. Habib: The Koreans are more pessimistic than we are. We believe we should proceed on our present course for now and look at the question again closer to the UNGA. We don’t have to make any final decision on the UN Command future at this time. We may have to look at this again closer to the UNGA.
The Secretary: Of course. What else?
Mr. Habib: The Fraser hearings.
The Secretary: What are they about? Fraser wants a letter to Park?
Mr. Habib: No, you indicated that you wanted to see us about the Fraser letter to McCloskey. Fraser wants to see you, too. Fraser has a series of hearings on human rights. He is interested in Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
The Secretary: He is out of his mind. We don’t have that kind of bargaining position.
Mr. Habib: On the Philippines and Indonesia, I agree. Korea is different. If we don’t approach Park, Fraser might try to end MAP or cut US forces. I believe he hasn’t got the votes for this. However, he can raise hob. He can cut the MAP levels and embarrass us greatly. Under Emergency Measure 9 Park has eliminated almost every [Page 08] guarantee to free speech. He is trying the Secretary General of the Korean Council of Churches and the country’s most distinguished poet — every soft-headed person here, PEN —
The Secretary: Why is he doing this?
Mr. Habib: Because the poet writes nasty things about Park. He calls the government corrupt. Park doesn’t like this.
The Secretary: Why does Park face opposition?
Mr. Habib: Park is determined to avoid any opportunity for his opposition to get control. The opposition can overthrow Park by unleashing the mob. I mean by the mob, the students. He doesn’t want to give them a chance to do this.
The Secretary: That is understandable.
Mr. Habib: It is in our interest to get Park to moderate his actions. Did you see the Evans/Novak column?
The Secretary: What did it say?
Mr. Habib: Park explained the basis for his policy. He indicated he is not prepared to lose control over the situation because of the external threat from the North.
The Secretary: I did read the Political Science lecture sent up to me by EA.
Mr. Habib: I read it for the first time today.
Such an approach will not change Park. However, Park will understand an approach. He told you once if there was anything he was doing which caused us problems, to let him know. I think he will interpret an approach this way.
[Page 09]The Secretary: Let me see a rewrite. The first sentence needs changing. We are concerned about the impact on our policy but —
The Deputy Secretary: Fraser has modified his position. He is concerned about stability in the area. He has softened his position on public actions which would...
Mr. Habib: Fraser is trying to build a record first on Korea — then the Philippines and then Indonesia.
Mr. Lord: What if we approach Park and he doesn’t do anything?
Mr. Habib: Fraser will...
The Secretary: Fraser will insist that even Kissinger could not get Park to change and then lower the boom.
Mr. Lord: What about the impact of Park’s policies on the domestic situation.
The Secretary: If there is an overthrow, we would have another strongman, except probably Leftist.
Mr. Habib: There was a democratic government for about 8 months. It was chaotic although just when it was settling down, Park then ran a coup.
The Secretary: As a nation our competence seems to be in undermining our friends.
Mr. Habib: The problem is not to replace Park, but how to get him to moderate.
The Secretary: Re-do the telegram. I will look at it.
Mr. Lord: I am concerned that the human rights problem might erode the ROK domestic cohesion.
Mr. Habib: President Park is creating a situation for North Korea to exploit.
[Page 10]The Secretary: I would not recommend what he is doing. I do know that to monkey around with Marcos on this is a disaster.
Mr. Habib: Marcos is a buzz saw on this. He will tell us he has the situation under control and that he has faced insurgents, an assassination plot. Moreover, Marcos succeeded to chaos. In Park’s case he did not need the suppression. Park’s suppression has succeeded moderation. For many years he followed a moderate policy.
The Secretary: I don’t mind doing something. I am not opposed to a telegram.
Mr. Habib: We will re-do it.
[Omitted is material unrelated to Korea.]