224. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 14, 1976.1 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: May 14, 1976

SUBJECT: Lockheed Affair

PARTICIPANTS:

  • Japanese Ambassador Fumihiko Togo
  • Ambassador Shizuo Saito, Special Envoy
  • Shinichiro Asao, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North American Bureau
  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary Habib
  • Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor
  • William C. Sherman, Director for Japanese Affairs (Notetaker)

DISTRIBUTION: WH (Rodman)

Amb. Saito: Mr. Secretary, I would like to extend my thanks to you for receiving me and to convey, on behalf of Prime Minister Miki and Foreign Minister Miyazawa, our gratitude to you and to the President for the help which the United States has provide in dealing with the Lockheed affair. I believe you are aware of the circumstances which caused my trip to the United States at this time — the compromise between the opposition and government parties in the Diet which permitted deliberations there to resume on the condition that a special envoy he sent to the United States. I am that special envoy. My mission is under no circumstances to ask for any renegotiation of the agreement on exchange of Lockheed information. I want, however, to explain the current political situation in Japan, to bespeak continuing US Government efforts to provide us with as much information as possible on the Lockheed matter, and finally to exchange views with authorities here on the ways in which we can better regulate and control the international behavior of multinational corporations Finally, I would also like to say that we are very happy with the fine arrangements Mr. Habib and his staff have made to enable me to meet with senior leaders in the United States Government.

[Page 2]

The Secretary: Whom have you seen?

Amb. Saito: So far I have seen Attorney General Levi and SEC Chairman Hills. I will be seeing Secretary Richardson this afternoon and also hope to see Senator Percy.

The Secretary: (to Mr. Habib) Has Richardson left on his trip yet?

Mr. Habib: No, he will be leaving in a few days.

Amb. Saito: The Prime Minister asked me to stress the extremely political nature of the Lockheed question in Japan. I have the impression that in the United States it is more a matter of the morals of one individual firm, but in Japan it has much larger dimensions. Unfortunately, we have had a number of cases in the past where politics and money have been connected. Moreover, in this case there is a suspicion of involvement of members of the extreme right-wing who are looked on with distaste by much of the Japanese populace. In addition there are allegations that bribes were exchanged in order to influence the procurement of military aircraft by official agencies of the Japanese government, and this is another aspect which makes the political situation a delicate one. The Prime Minister asked me to emphasize these points and to ask for your cooperation in expediting the Investigation.

The Secretary: As you know, Mr. Ambassador, the investigation is being conducted by the SEC and the Justice Department. Under our system it is not appropriate for the Secretary of State to be involved in what is essentially a criminal or administrative investigation. I will, of course, point out to Chairman Hills that a rapid solution of the case would be desirable, but I obviously cannot tell him how to conduct his business. We look forward to seeing justice done, but it would not be appropriate for the Department to be involved in a criminal investigation. We certainly hope for the fullest and most effective investigation, and we hope at the same time to avoid any foreign policy embarrassment. However, regardless of our wishes in the matter, there is no way in which we can interfere in the process itself. We will do everything in our power to expedite the exchange of documents under the procedures which we have agreed upon. I saw Chairman Hills the other evening and he knows how important the investigation is. However, he must be extremely careful to make sure that every step he takes is appropriate under our laws.

[Page 3]

Amb. Saito: When I saw the Attorney General I told him I was, of course, not a representative of the Ministry of Justice but that I simply wished to ask him to extend his cooperation to Japanese Ministry if Justice officials in continuing our investigation. He said he would do this to the fullest.

The Secretary: I’m sure he will. For that matter, if the Government of Japan has any specific concerns, I’m sure that both the Attorney General and Chairman Hills will be happy to look at them with the greatest of care.

Amb. Saito: We have no complaints about the passage of information and we are hoping that it will continue. As you know we have elections this year in my country....

The Secretary: There is some activity here also.

Amb. Saito: (continuing) And our government is trying to clarify this Lockheed situation as soon as possible. It. would be very helpful to have the matter clarified well in advance of our elections.

The Secretary: Are you saying that we should conclude our investigations before your elections or wait until after they are over?

Mr. Leigh: Rod Hills has said that under the consent order he expects to have a finished report on Lockheed within the next six months.

The Secretary: But that won’t be in time for the Japanese elections.

Mr. Habib: The material on Lockheed is being transmitted to the Japanese in a continuous stream.

Mr. Leigh: It’s my personal view that the whole subject of Lockheed is so extremely complex that a report cannot be completed within six months.

Amb. Togo: The Japanese desire simply to keep the material coming and, hopefully, to be able to interview or question witnesses here in the United States.

Amb. Saito: Yes, our investigations have proceeded to the stage where we need to have direct access to witnesses here, and we will hope that the US legal authorities will assist in this under our Judicial Assistance Agreement.

[Page 4]

The Secretary: Can we do this?

Mr. Leigh: Yes, we will do our best. Attorney General Levi fully agrees.

The Secretary: We will do everything possible within the limits of our law and provide whatever information there may be. We don’t get it or see it as far as I know.

Mr. Leigh: No, neither I nor Mr. Habib has seen it.

Mr. Habib: We don’t want to see it.

Amb. Saito: As you know the Japanese desire to get the names of possibly implicated government officials is unusually strong. If there is no solution to this case, we are going to have a serious public reaction and great criticism of the government. That is another reason we are in such a hurry.

The Secretary: We have been through some similar problems.

Mr. Habib: Ambassador Saito will be meeting the press later this afternoon. Can we agree on a press line.

The Secretary: (to Amb. Saito) What would you like to say?

Amb. Saito: I will say that I explained the political situation in Japan to you, that you showed great understanding and sympathy, and that the United States will continue to extend its cooperation to the Japanese government.

Mr. Habib: Did you want to say also that you agreed that this matter would not have any adverse affect on US-Japanese relations?

The Secretary: No, I want to be more positive than that. I want to say that our relations have never been better, and there is no doubt of that on our side. I don’t want to give the impression that a matter like Lockheed could have an adverse affect on our relations.

Mr. Habib: We will make sure that it is stated in a positive manner.

Amb. Saito: I would like to add a few points that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister asked me to make. The first of these is that, although this problem has given rise to serious unrest in Japanese politics, there will be in the wider view no [Page 5] major changes in the Japanese political structure. Secondly, the Prime Minister asked me to tell you that he is confident in his ability to tide over this critical moment. Finally, Mr. Miyazawa asked me to tell you he believes at the present time you can assume there will be an extraordinary session of the Diet held in the fall and then Diet dissolution and general elections late in the year.

The Secretary: But they must be held this year, isn’t that correct?

Amb. Saito: Yes, but the government would prefer to have them as late as possible in the fall. I would like to make the point again that there should he a substantial interval between a clarification of the Lockheed problem and our elections.

The Secretary: My instinct is that it will be unlikely that our bureaucracy will complete its investigation before elections in Japan.

Amb. Saito: Let me give you this letter of introduction from Prime Minister Miki, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary: (after reading the letter) This is a very courteous and warm letter which I appreciate very much. Please extend my warmest personal regards to the Prime Minister who deserves a great deal of the credit for the warm relations which now exist between our two countries. We fully understand your requirements in continuing this investigation and we hope that you also understand ours. Thank you very much for your visit.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P –820117 – 2339. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sherman and approved by Collums.
  2. Kissinger and Saito discussed the Lockheed scandal.