Office of the Historian

21. Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, October 16, 1975.1 2

Washington, October 16, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

October 16, 1975

To: The Secretary
From: SAP Winston Lord

US Strategy in Asia: Trends, Issues, and Choices

Shortly after Saigon fell, we sent you our assessment of the probable impact of developments in Indochina on our position in the region along with options for managing the fallout from those events. We promised a more considered judgment once the dust had settled a bit. Six months have now passed, and the attached paper represents our current evaluation of where we stand and the future issues we face in Asia.

In most respects this is an upbeat assessment. The structure of the Major Power balance in the Far East appears unchanged in its essentials, despite some new uncertainties. The Soviets are looking for political openings, but they’ve probably lost as much ground (versus China) in Northeast Asia (Korea, Japan) as they have gained in Southeast Asia (Hanoi). Peking entertains ( additional doubts about our political will and staying power, but the strategic factors underlying the PRC’s interest in closer ties with us remain valid. In Japan there are some fresh breezes blowing on security issues, but changes in Japanese policies will come only gradually.

In Southeast Asia overreactions to Hanoi’s victory have been avoided, but policy adjustments in the direction of greater self-reliance, more diversified diplomatic strategies, and stronger regional efforts—initially stimulated by the Nixon doctrine—have been given an emphatic new impetus. Our position in that region is undergoing a marked transformation, but our basic interests are not in serious jeopardy. It looks like we can retain a foothold in Thailand for some residual military presence and continue our substantial presence in the Philippines; all Southeast Asian countries—save [Page 2] those in Indochina—are eager to keep us engaged, politically and economically.

In Korea we continue to face serious policy dilemmas. But these are inherent in the situation itself; they are not a derivative consequence of the setback in Indochina.

The key issues for the future are familiar.

  • — In what direction should we seek to push the evolution of Great Power relations? Should we lend ourselves to a tacit anti-Soviet entente in the Far East by promoting the coordination of policy on political and security issues with the PRC and Japan?
  • — How should we play the Ford visit to China?
  • — What kinds of Soviet involvement in Asia should we seek to obstruct? Which should we seek to encourage?
  • — What kinds of adjustments in Japan’s security posture and regional role should we urge on the GOJ?
  • — How should we respond to South Korean efforts to develop independent defense options (including a possible nuclear option) and to adopt increasingly oppressive internal measures? Should we undertake new initiatives—including direct contacts with North Korea—to attempt to stabilize North-South relations and to catalyze new Great Power understandings with respect to Korea?
  • — What kind of residual military presence should we seek to sustain in Southeast Asia?
  • — Should we attempt to augment our current relations with ASEAN countries? In that connection should we concentrate on intensified bilateral ties with its individual members or efforts to shape a relationship with ASEAN as a regional grouping?
  • — What pattern of future relations should we seek to develop with Hanoi and the successor regimes in Indochina?
[Page 3]

These are not novel issues, and this paper will tell you a good deal that you already know. Nonetheless, as you embark on extensive travel to Asia over the next two months, we thought it would be useful for you to have this comprehensive piece.

Throughout this exercise we have consulted widely with EA and have tried to reflect their comments on an earlier draft in this version. I gave copies of this paper to Phil Habib and Bill Gleysteen, but they have been swamped by the rush of last minute preparations for the Peking trip and have not yet had a chance to react.

Attachment:
Paper: US Strategy in Asia.

  1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–40, NSSM 235, U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asian-Pacific Region (2 of 2) (11). Secret. In the top right-hand corner of the first page, an unknown hand wrote, “Mike Armacost gave me this thoughtful document.” On October 3, Armacost drafted the attached paper, which is not published.↩
  2. Lord summarized Armacost’s paper on U.S. Strategy in Asia.↩