Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

20. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes and Richard Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, September 11, 1975.¹ ²

Washington, September 11, 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

September 11, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: THOMAS J. BARNES

SUBJECT: Recommendations on Presidential Visit to Southeast Asia and Japan

Issue

Although the precise dates have not yet been set for the President’s visit to Peking, we believe we should now decide in principle whether he should make several other stops in East Asia en route or on his way home. We specifically endorse Indonesia and the Philippines, also suggest Australia and New Zealand, and recommend postponement of a decision on Japan. An early decision is important for planning purposes, but we would not approach the governments concerned until you have checked with the Chinese, possibly during your discussions later this month with Chiao Kuan-hua. Public announcements would follow the announcement of the dates of the China trip.

Background

The time appears to be ripe for a Presidential trip to Southeast Asia. The dust of the Indochina collapse is clearing away. The course of a new post-war era in Southeast Asia is beginning to emerge. Important changes are taking place in the international politics of the region, while the broad strategic picture has altered little.

Most ASEAN states are seeking accommodation with the Communist powers, in particular China. There is increased talk of regionalism and of retaining independence of action through the balancing of great power interests. The non-Communist states are also polishing up their nationalistic and even “non-aligned” images and accepting the reality that domestic peace requires self-reliance and internal progress. At the same time there is concern about Hanoi’s intentions, and uncertainty about the long-term future role of China the Soviet Union, and also Japan.

Thus, all the ASEAN states have separately indicated their desire for increased U.S. military assistance and for a continuing strategic balance in the Western Pacific favorable to the United States.

A Presidential trip to Southeast Asia near the end of the year would:

• — Illustrate the continuing major U.S. interest and role in Southeast Asia.
• — Demonstrate that outside of Indochina, the U.S. remains the permanent friend and preferred power of the ASEAN states.
• — Establish a turning point in U.S. relations with Southeast Asia — away from the previous focus on Indochina and toward a forward-looking confident posture.
• — Underscore to the Chinese, the Soviets, and others, the continuation of a strategic balance favorable to the U.S.
• — Boost the confidence and morale of the ASEAN states.
• — Provide a self-confident environment for a possible subsequent move of reconciliation with the Indochina states.

Indonesia and the Philippines

We believe that the President can visit two of the ASEAN states without raising questions as to why he is not visiting the others. The Malay Archipelago is likely to be the focus of our future strategic and political influence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, the most important country in this area, is a natural choice for a Presidential visit.

A Presidential visit to Manila would also provide a favorable atmosphere for our later renegotiation with the Philippine Government of the Military Bases Agreement. Our military bases in the Philippines will provide the ongoing U.S. strategic presence in Southeast Asia, and Subic Bay in particular is vital to our position in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, given our historic ties, failure to include Manila in a Presidential tour of the region would have serious repercussions in the Philippines.

Australia and New Zealand

Likewise, while the President is in the Southeast Asian area, we believe it would also be useful to include visits to our two traditional allies, Australia and New Zealand. By the time of the President’s travel to East Asia, the SEATO Council of Ministers is likely to have agreed to the gradual phaseout of the SEATO organization. Under Prime Minister Whitlam, Australia has been following a more independent line and, contrary to our desires, New Zealand has gone ahead with its resolution in the United Nations for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. A Presidential visit to Canberra and Wellington would underscore the fact that, despite these events, we continue to desire a strong alliance with these two nations. Visits to Australia and New Zealand, however, would have considerably less priority than either Indonesia or the Philippines.

Singapore: Malaysia and Thailand

A visit to Singapore but not to Kuala Lumpur would cause awkwardness and some suspicion in Malaysia. And if both Singapore and Malaysia were included, we could not appear to be excluding only Thailand from the itinerary. There are arguments in favor of a Presidential visit to Thailand, but we recommend that consideration of such a visit be delayed until after the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Thailand by next March. Additionally, Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot may visit the United States later this year, either to attend the UNGA or on a separate official trip. We consequently believe that the President should not visit Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand this year.

Japan

Last spring you told Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa that the President might stop over briefly in Japan on his way to or from the People’s Republic of China. You indicated that if either party thought this stopover was desirable, we would consult. The feeling in the State Department (EA) is that one year after the first Presidential visit to Japan, only a few months following Prime Minister Miki’s reception in Washington, an even shorter time since Secretary Schlesinger’s visit to Japan, and in the train of Hirohito’s forthcoming visit to the States, a Presidential stopover in Tokyo would be too much of a good thing. In addition, State is concerned that the Japanese Government itself might not be enthusiastic about ginning up for another Presidential visit, presumably one that might again involve the Emperor.

A personal briefing of the Japanese by the President on his China trip could, however, serve several objectives:

• — Underscore that the U.S.-Japan alliance is on a par with that of any of our West European allies.
• — Demonstrate at the highest level U.S. faithfulness to its pledge to coordinate with Japan our relations with the Communist powers, in particular China.
• — Enhance the aura of U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region prior to the President’s visit to Southeast Asia (more subtlety, a Peking-Tokyo route to Southeast Asia would suggest the current conjunction of U.S.-Japanese-Chinese interests in stability in the Asia-Pacific area, including the Korean Peninsula).

Whether we expect a breakthrough in U.S.-PRC relations during the President’s trip to Peking will be an important factor influencing a decision on a Tokyo stopover. After your preparatory trip to Peking in late October, you will be able to stop in Tokyo and provide the Japanese some indication of our expectations. On the assumption that there is to be no breakthrough in U.S.-PRC relations, this advance discussion — together with a debriefing after the President’s visit to China by either yourself or Assistant Secretary Habib should meet Japanese expectations.

If, however, we move to the establishment of diplomatic relations, a Presidential stopover could be important in preventing another “shock” to our relations with Japan.

In early August you indicated to Prime Minister Miki that you did not expect normalization with the PRC this year. If, following your advance trip, there should be a change in this assessment, it will be especially important for us to demonstrate our sincerity to the Japanese. In this case we should consider an “unofficial” rest stop in Tokyo by the President on his way into China, in addition to your October advance briefing. Consequently, we recommend holding off a decision on the Tokyo visit until after your preparatory trip to Peking.

Proposed Travel Schedule

If the President spends a maximum of five days in China, we would envision:

• — the sixth day in travel to Manila;
• — the seventh day in the Philippines;
• — the eighth day in travel to Jakarta;
• — the ninth day in Indonesia;
• — the tenth day in travel to Canberra;
• — the eleventh day in Australia;
• — the twelfth day in travel to Wellington;
• — the thirteenth day in New Zealand;
• — the fourteenth and fifteenth days in travel back to the U.S.

Assuming that the President leaves Washington for Peking by the end of November, this schedule should put him back home by the middle of December.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A recommending that a decision on a Japan stopover be held in abeyance, and that Presidential visits be approved in principle at this time to:

	Approve		Disapprove
Philippines
Indonesia
Australia
New Zealand

State concurs in this recommendation.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 18, President’s Trip to the Philippines and Indonesia, December 1975 (2). Secret. Sent for action. The Department of State concurred in the memorandum. None of the recommendations on the last page were approved or disapproved, but, in the top right hand corner of the first page, Scowcroft wrote, “Probably will be no other stop.”
2. Barnes and Solomon made recommendations on whether Ford should stop in East Asia before or after his trip to China, but Scowcroft responded that there would probably be no other stop.