101. Memorandum From Charles A. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, November 24, 1973.1 2
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT ACTION
November 24, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: CHARLES A.
COOPER [CAC initialed]
SUBJECT: Indonesian Aid
Level
The Indonesian Government is about to announce its aid request for next year to consortium members. This request will be for $600 million of bilateral non-food aid—our share, if we stick with our traditional one-third, would be $200 million. We could use about $30 million of PL–480 cotton in meeting this—bringing the AID requirement down to$170 million. This compares to an AID request to Congress for $90 million this year.
In view of Indonesia’s oil earnings and reserve levels, there is no conceivable economic rationale for almost doubling our AID level, and Congress would almost certainly balk even if we could pressure OMB and AID. Unfortunately, other donors, particularly the Japanese, will probably have no difficulty saying yes as visions of Indonesian oil dance in their eyes.
Our AID people have tried to get the Indonesians to hold down their request so that we get more credit for our food aid which doesn’t count. But the Indonesians decided at a political level not to make things easy for us. Consequently, unless we get to the Indonesians immediately, we will be faced with an Indonesian request which will be close to impossible for us to meet on our usual formula. It would be ironic indeed if we were to lose political credit with Indonesia in a year in which our over-all aid went up substantially—from $90 to $130 million in economic aid and from $20 million to maybe $100 million in PL–480.
Although it is very late in the game, I suggest you send the following back channel to Galbraith to try to head this problem off. It would be better to send a fully staffed out front channel message, but there simply isn’t time. The Indonesians are expected to inform other donors of their request level for next year early next week preparatory to a consortium meeting on December 10.
[Page 2]Recommendation:
That you send the back channel cable to Ambassador
Galbraith at
Tab A.
Other
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 533, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret. Sent for urgent action. At the top of the document Scowcroft wrote, “Cable sent. BS.” The draft backchannel message is attached but not published. The backchannel message as sent to Galbraith, November 25, is ibid., Box 411, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, Volume II, 1973, Part 1. Galbraith’s backchannel response, November 30, is also ibid.↩
- Cooper suggested that Kissinger send a backchannel cable about the level of aid to Indonesia.↩