100. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 4, 1973, 5:30–6 p.m.1 2

TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Date: October 4, 1973 Time: 5:30-6:00 p.m.
Place: Waldorf Towers 35A

PARTICIPANTS:

  • Indonesia
  • Foreign Minister Malik
  • DG for Political Affairs Foreign Ministry Mr. Djajadiningrat
  • Amb. Anwar Sani
  • Chef de Cabinet Mr. Alex Alatas
  • U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Hummel, Acting Asst Sec
  • Mr. Heavner, Notetaker
  • Mr. Stearman, NSC

Subject: U.S. Indonesian Bilateral: Cambodian Situation, PL–480 Commodities for Indonesia, Middle East Problem

Distribution: S, E/S, EA

Clearance: EA - Hummel

[Page 2]

SECRETARY: The last time I saw you was in Brussels I believe.

MALIK: Yes, that is right. I know you are a busy man, Mr. Secretary, but I don’t want to take too much of your time here, though we are still hoping to invite you to Bali where we can have a little more time. First of all, I want to congratulate you on the new heavy load you have on your shoulders as Secretary of State.

SECRETARY: I should tell you about what I said to Gromyko when he became a member of the politburo. That was before I was Secretary — and I sent him a message congratulating him on having been elevated to my level.

MALIK: As I indicated in my cable to you sent through Amb. Galbraith, we are very anxious to have your views on Cambodia.

SECRETARY: On Cambodia our view is, first we are facing difficulties with Congress. To be very honest with you, the cut off of the bombing was certainly untimely and not to be wished. Since then the military situation has developed better than many of us feared, however. Now there is some prospect of a military balance.

Our view as expressed to President Suharto and to you is that we want to preserve an independent, neutral Cambodia, and within the limits imposed upon us we will do all we can to that end. In this effort we welcome help from other countries. We are aware of your long assistance, and your support on the principle of neutrality and independence is particularly helpful.

You know, Sihanouk is given to exalted statements. He announces every few weeks that he won’t see me. Of course the truth is I never asked to see him, and I have no intention of seeing him in Peking. I have nothing against him in the abstract; however, we want to deal with the real forces in Cambodia. If a military balance can be maintained, negotiations have a chance, and hopefully a solution could be reached along the lines of the Laotian solution. If that happens, we can live with it, as I suppose you can also. If there is no. military balance, there is no point in it (negotiation).

[Page 3]

In any event we do not see why we should get in the forefront of the effort to find a solution. To the degree that we show no eagerness, Sihanouk becomes more eager. We are willing to see someone come up with a solution. It would not be helpful for the US to be the principal negotiator, and we are taking a somewhat aloof position, while of course giving military and economic assistance to the Phnom Penh Government. We hope that Southeast Asian countries will exert influence where they can.

MALIK: I was wondering whether in your talks with the Chinese the question has come up concerning the race between the various Red factions in Cambodia. I mean the factions supported by the Red Chinese and those supported by Sihanouk.

SECRETARY: And those supported by Moscow, too. You are right that there is a conflict between the various rebel factions. One reason negotiations are so difficult is that there is no unified leadership on the other side.

MALIK: If we were to support Sihanouk we fear that he might not be strong enough to control the emergents.

[Page 4]

SECRETARY: It would be a mistake to support Sihanouk, and we won’t do it. If he were only the spokesman of the Red Khmer, we should deal directly with the Red Khmers. If he is not the spokesman of the Red Khmer, why talk to him? We must first know what the Red Khmers are doing. If there is a balance between the Red Khmers and Phnom Penh, then there might be a role for Sihanouk to play.

You should pay no attention to the misleading newspaper stories about our attitude on this. I am not going to Peking to negotiate the Cambodian situation.

MALIK: The picture is very clear then. We have the same evaluation of the situation. We are not enthusiastic about supporting any move which would put Sihanouk into the picture.

SECRETARY: If there were a military balance between the Red Khmer and Phnom Penh, if Sihanouk gave assurances of remaining neutral and could deliver anything and if the major powers were agreed, the situation would be different. If not, there would be no deal. But the situation is not right for that, and we are ignoring Sihanouk, confining ourselves a few enigmatic noises.

MALIK: It is also our view that the present Government in Phnom Penh should be given an opportunity to stand fast for some time so that a balance can be struck.

SECRETARY: I completely agree. Unless the other side offers a proposal which is truly balanced, we continue to strengthen the Phnom Penh Government and give it an opportunity to achieve the necessary military balance.

MALIK: We have continuously urged Phnom Penh to strengthen itself and to prepare for major pressure from the other side.

SECRETARY: The main thing now is for Phnom Penh to stabilize itself and devote itself to better organization of its military forces. Any help you could give would certainly be welcome.

MALIK: We have already given them all the benefit of our experience. During our last meeting you hinted that you wanted us to help with pilots. This we cannot give.

SECRETARY: If there are any major developments we will inform you. Anyway, don’t interpret my Peking trip as having anything to do with the Cambodian problem. This will be the least important aspect of the trip.

MALIK: That is clear to us now, and we will inform our friends in Southeast Asia.

SECRETARY: Please not all the details.

MALIK: The second thing I wanted to bring up with you is a message from President Suharto through me. We want to make sure that, if possible, the U.S. Government will cause no difficulties in providing supplies (PL–480 commodities); I mean rice.

[Page 5]

SECRETARY: Our problem is the inadequacy of supplies. What is the situation, Mr. Hummel?

MR. HUMMEL: We are studying the problem of allocating our very scarce resources. A decision has to be made in a week on what is available in PL 480. But no final decision has been taken.

SECRETARY: When will there be a decision?

MR. HUMMEL: Within a week or two, we hope. There is a study of the problem now in the NSC.

SECRETARY: Mr. Stearman, are you sitting on that? Look into it, please, and be sure I am informed. (To Malik) We will let you know. It (PL 480) may be less than what you want.

You know of course that we attach a high priority to Indonesia and are keenly aware of the friendship of the President for President Suharto.

MALIK: What we want to be sure of is that if there are cuts in the PL–480 program or if the rice program is to be abolished, it is important to give us time to plan.

SECRETARY: This will be told you.

HUMMEL: Figures on PL 480 have been sent to the NSC.

SECRETARY: (To Stearman) l want to see those figures this weekend.

MALIK: Also, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask if there are any developments on the Middle East situation in which Indonesia could be helpful.

SECRETARY: Well, this is a situation in which there must be secret diplomacy. Any public statement we make is immediately shot at from all sides.

Secondly, we need some cooperation from the Arab countries. It is important that they work with us. We would welcome any help you can give us with the Arab countries. You cannot begin a negotiation with the final details of the agreement. They have to have the confidence to start on a road with us. I have seen the Israeli, Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Ambassadors.

[Page 6]

We are serious about making some progress in this problem, but it will take time. Everybody says that because of past successes, we can come up with miracles. It took me 4 years on Indo-China and 2 1/2 years on China. Frankly, it was easier with Indo-China when you could bomb one side and cut off the supplies of the other side but you can’t do either in the Middle East.

Perhaps you could tell your Arab friends that if they deal with us responsibly, we will make a major effort. Tell them we are serious and that they should have confidence in our efforts. I don’t think, at this stage, we should write out the whole program. What do you think?

MALIK: I have been following this problem from year to year. I have had many talks with the Arabs, most recently at Algiers. I have concluded that they don’t really know the way out, and some new road must be found. Last year when I met with the Israelis I suggested that perhaps they could take a new initiative of some kind.

SECRETARY: Not before the election. There is an election in Israel in three weeks and until then, they can’t do anything.

MALIK: Well, after the election then. What is important is that the Israelis have the courage to take an initiative.

SECRETARY: I agree.

MALIK: In all my talks with the Israelis it has been clear that they are fearful of taking any steps.

SECRETARY: There is of course the problem that if they make concessions, they don’t get anything for it and then those concessions merely become the starting point for the next round of negotiations. They are fearful of this, of their public opinion, and even one another. They contribute to the deadlock.

As long as both sides stick to maximum positions, they have a great excuse for not doing anything. We are serious about this matter. What your Arab colleagues must understand is that they have to have a little confidence in us. They can’t go around saying that the U.S. is treacherous and then expect us to do their work for them. Perhaps you can encourage them in that direction.

[Page 7]

MALIK: This of course I can do.

SECRETARY: Thank you.

MALIK: Now that you are Secretary, the Arabs have high hopes for a solution.

SECRETARY: They think I am a magician. They don’t think I’m a diplomat. But there is no magic solution, and it won’t happen that way. It will take a lot of difficult and detailed work.

MALIK: I think they have reached the point where they can neither find a peaceful solution nor wage war. Also the radicals have no way out. Some of them are placing great hope in you.

SECRETARY: I will do my best, but they must help. If they make an effort, I will make an effort.

MALIK: I think they will make an effort.

SECRETARY: Let me know what their reaction is.

MALIK: Yes, I will.

SECRETARY: Well, Mr. Minister it is always a joy to see you.

MALIK: It is always good to see you, and I want to say finally that I hope you know my invitation still stands. You must come to see Bali.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 533, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Volume 4, 1 January 1973–. Secret; Exdis. The meeting was held in apartment 35A at the Waldorf Towers. Cleared by Hummel and approved by Bremer. Talking points for this meeting are ibid.
  2. Kissinger and Malik discussed Indochina, foreign aid, and the Middle East.